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PREFACE 
 
There is a preliminary question that needs to be addressed before presenting this study in 
detail: why should anyone be interested in Finnish security thinking and defense policy? After 
all, Finland is among the smallest and most peripheral countries in Europe and its impact on 
the strategic issues of the European Union is marginal. The main aim of this paper is to show 
that on the contrary, when dealing with the question of European defense or assessing the 
impact of the Scandinavian strategic culture on the security policies of the European Union, 
the attentive observer can not and must not pass up a careful consideration of the position of 
Finland, a country perhaps of secondary importance in the overall international scenario, but 
certainly essential in any attempt to coherently craft a common European defense system.  
It is indeed impossible to overlook the strategically relevant geographical position and 
historical heritage of Finland, whose course has always been characterized by an effort to 
preserve its own national identity and links to western culture, despite the presence of 
intrusive eastern influences. The struggle between opposing tendencies can however be 
deemed important in retrospect, because it contributed to the development of Finland as a 
regional power in two key areas of Europe: Nordic and Baltic. The present-day role of Finland 
in the European Union was mainly crafted by its experience as a crossroad, or more precisely 
an energetic bridge-builder, between the ever-fighting East and West, whether described in 
terms of Kingdom of Sweden and Tsarist Empire, communist bloc and capitalist bloc or 
European Union and Russian Federation.  
This small state of relatively recent independence, situated on the very eastern border of 
Europe, built on republican democratic institutions and best-known worldwide for having 
established an extremely advanced welfare state and for having long maintained a position of 
strict neutrality in international politics, since its origin was in fact involved in the strategies 
of great powers to gain control of the Scandinavian/Baltic region and create an effective 
buffer zone against reciprocal threats. The often unwilling involvement in geopolitical 
calculations of more powerful neighbors certainly crafted Finland’s understanding of strategic 
issues as no other event. The essence of Finnish strategic culture as emerged from history can 
thus be identified with three main pillars: commitment to the idea of power balancing in the 
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international society, dating back almost five centuries, non-offensiveness, a concept that goes 
back about three centuries, and the long-cherished legacy of liberalism. 
From the time when Finland was annexed to Sweden, in the 12th century, two major events 
have transformed the country’s political position: firstly, after having been part of the 
Kingdom of Sweden for six hundred years, Finland became in 1809 an autonomous state 
within the Russian Empire; secondly, on December 6th 1917 the Parliament of Finland 
declared the independence of the nation. Although the country’s history during these eight 
centuries is thus sharply divided into three distinct periods, a continuous line of development 
has characterized the political rights of the people, the functioning of institutions and 
legislation and, in general, the discourse surrounding foreign and defense policy. 
This brief research paper is aimed at providing an introductory yet accurate analysis of several 
moments of Finland’s history, in order to assess the main events that shaped the country’s 
attitude from the early years to present-day, with particular attention devoted to the recent 
integration of Finland within the political structure of the European Union. Such analysis will 
facilitate the evaluation of the degree of compatibility between Finnish strategic heritage of 
neutrality and the common European policies in the comprehensive field of defense.  
Providing a picture of a country’s security orientations from its very origins to the present day 
challenges the author with the need of individuating the manifold influences which have 
contributed to the completion of the mosaic, as it appears to the contemporary observer. Of 
course, assessing the impact of each single event on the overall outcome would require an 
investigative effort which goes far beyond the ambitions of this brief working paper; operating 
a selection of the issues taken into account, forcedly neglecting others, is thus necessary. To 
facilitate the reader’s task, accurate bibliographic reference was however provided, so to fill in 
the eventual blanks. 
I have adhered to a rather schematic methodological approach, dividing the paper into 
temporal blocs, each of which is in turn sub-divided into conceptual units, so to highlight 
Finland’s position at the crossroad of different yet entwined dynamics. Backed by ample 
empirical evidence and an extensive bibliography, the study intends to offer an input to more 
advanced elaboration concerning the ongoing process of change which is re-shaping the 
foreign and security environment of Finland. For this purpose, the salient stages in the 
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country’s history will be evaluated, in the attempt to extrapolate their actual impact on current 
Finnish and European security perceptions. 
Such a concise historical outlook will gradually introduce the reader to the core of the paper: 
the development and re-shaping of the concept of neutrality in relation to original national and 
international security issues in the post-Cold War European environment. 
More specifically, the first part of the paper will in brief outline the centuries-long periods of 
Swedish and Russian domination up to World War I, the achievement of national 
independence, the diverse pragmatic foreign policies during the inter-wars years and finally 
the dramatic events of World War II, which left Finland isolated from the West and in bad 
standing with the East. To understand Finland’s present-day security policy, it is indeed 
necessary, for any reader unacquainted with it, to assess its ancient historical background.  
The discussion will especially focus on the defensive interests at stake for the great powers 
during these centuries and on their effects on Finland’s increasing awareness of its role as a 
bridge between the East and the West. In effect, the long-lasting conflict between Sweden and 
Russia meant an increase of Finland’s weight in the military considerations of the two nations, 
whereas in the war between the Central and the Allied Powers the role played by Finland was 
relatively small, yet significant in molding the future strategic perspectives of a small, newly 
independent country caught in the crossfire of great powers’ politics. It will be argued that the 
early involvement in the antagonism between different civilizations and cultures was indeed a 
critical factor in crafting Finland’s orientation toward a policy of neutrality and non-
alignment, two concepts that will be developed in a more recent era, but whose early 
manifestations can be dated back to these events. 
In the second part, subdivided into three chapters, Finnish relations with the Soviet Union, 
with Western Europe and as a “bridge-builder” between the East and the West will be 
evaluated, in order to point out the ability of those political leaders who managed to sail the 
turbulent waters of the Cold War, still maintaining a delicate balance between Finland’s 
natural inclination toward Western culture and economy and the imperative necessity of 
preserving satisfactory political and commercial relations with the incumbent Eastern 
neighbor. These years were marked by the emergence of the concept of neutrality, or more 
precisely put a peace-promoting and active policy of neutrality, interpreted by the Finnish 
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ruling class as the only possible way to avoid participation in the ideological and potentially 
military confrontation that quickly emerged from the ashes of World War II.  
It will be observed how, even though on strict legal interpretation, the term “neutrality” means 
the keeping of a sovereign state outside a war, the purpose in Finland’s neutrality was 
somewhat broader, intended to establish, already during peace, the preconditions for the 
maintenance of war-time neutrality, by pursuing such a foreign policy as to induce others to 
trust in its determination to remain neutral and ability to defend itself. This policy’s most 
important outcomes were to enable Finland to enthusiastically participate in the most 
important international and regional organizations – the United Nations Organizations (UNO) 
above all, but the Nordic Council as well – for the dynamic promotion of worldwide peace 
and disarmament, the strengthening of mutually advantageous economic relations with 
partners belonging to both blocs and the intensification of political and strategic contacts with 
the other Scandinavian nations. 
The third part of the paper will finally take into account the three components of Finnish 
security doctrine in the post-Cold War years: the pursuit of full political and strategic 
integration in the European Union, through its dynamic attitude and active participation in the 
shaping of the Common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); the maintenance of a policy of 
non-alliance and of a credible defensive potential, capable of reaching a high degree of 
interoperability with NATO or eventual European military structures without resorting to any 
binding political commitment; the establishment of newly tailored relations with the Russian 
Federation, the Scandinavian neighbors and the Baltic countries and the various effects that 
their attitude has on Finland’s security perception.  
In an international environment undergoing rapid and unexpected changes, Finland’s 
economic ties to the European Union (EU) smoothly evolved into official membership in 
1995, just in time to play a role in the process of development of new policies and to take part 
in the last phase of the economic union; for the country, this meant full participation not only 
in the largest free market area of the world, but also in the most advanced process of political 
integration, an involvement that implied acceptance of the heritage of values and guidelines of 
the community. The discussion will be aimed at illustrating how, despite unproblematic 
overall integration, Finland’s engagement in the uniting of Europe is still somewhat hesitant 
and incomplete, particularly in the field of defense and security policy: the compatibility 
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between Finland’s unwillingness to take part into any military alliance and the emphasis 
placed on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) by the Treaty of Maastricht and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam is still at stake.  
It will be contended how up to present-day, by taking part in EU-led crisis management 
operations and initiatives, Finland has succeeded in achieving a high degree of involvement in 
the outer security dimension of the European Union, without needing to enter any binding 
obligation concerning the inner security dimension. Whether that will still be possible in the 
near future is a major question, whose answer remains uncertain: the alternative is no longer 
between neutrality and military alignment, but between participation and non-participation in 
the crafting of a system of common defense in Europe. A particularly fitting example of the 
Finnish original understanding of security will be provided through the analysis of the 
Northern Dimension initiative, aimed at addressing major cross-regional issues in a more 
comprehensive way than by simply relying on military means: once again, perhaps in an even 
more challenging context, Finland resorted to the promotion and strengthening of dialogue 
and cooperation as the most effective way to improve both regional and global security. The 
added value of this choice may soon be asked to reveal its full potential in terms of conflict 
prevention.   
Even more complex and troubled is the relationship between Finland and NATO, which will 
be discussed in the last chapter: the Atlantic Alliance being the core structure of present-day 
Western security, Finnish orientation toward it can not be underestimated. Whereas most 
European countries regard the ESDP as a means to give themselves more opportunities for 
dealing with future crises, but at the same time support closer EU-NATO ties, Finland can be 
counted among that minority whose policy has a European rather than an Atlantic orientation. 
Notwithstanding the development of a certain amount of dialogue with the alliance, NATO 
membership is not deemed necessary in the absence of any specific threat and has been 
relegated to the rank of a mere option, to be availed only in case of major changes in the 
security environment. The latest international events, highlighting the possible re-emergence 
of Russia as a global power, could of course prove decisive in shaping Finnish future point of 
view, leading to a reconsideration of its overall security approach. Whatever the choice will 
be, certainly Finland will not renounce its mediation role in this phase of transition. 
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1. ORIGINS OF FINNISH DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Already since the Iron Age, the first Viking settlements that formed along the Finnish 
coastline perceived very clearly the importance of the commercial route to the east that 
crossed the Baltic via the Åland Islands and then followed the shore of the Gulf of Finland, 
sheltered by islands, to the River Neva, and up to Lake Ladoga; from there, streams led to the 
upper course of the Dnieper, and by following that river it was possible to reach the Black 
Sea, Constantinople, and Arabian lands. In short, the southern coast of Finland was always 
given special consideration, as a privileged access to the great international trade routes.  
Characterized up to that time by an extremely heterogeneous variety of scattered settlements 
and small colonies, mainly inhabited by hunters and fur traders, since the 12th century Finland 
started drawing the interest of its neighbor states, specifically due to its extremely convenient 
geographical position, that rendered this region surrounded by ice a very attractive 
commercial outpost, as well as an inexhaustible source of valuable raw materials; within a few 
decades, the competition  began to develop into an open conflict between West and East1, with 
Sweden on a side and the kingdom of Novgorod on the other, a conflict also heightened by the 
distinctly religious breach between Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy.  
Therefore, the grand strategic significance of Finland emerged initially as its role as the 
outpost of Roman-Catholic realm, which in turn laid the foundation for many of the later 
East–West divisions along Finland’s eastern border. Being located at the intersection of two 
international societies, the Catholic realm and what later became the Byzantine empire, 
Finland acquired crucial strategic significance, especially when the latter was replaced by 
Muscovy’s hegemony. It is no chance, as this study will attempt to illustrate, that Sweden and 
Russia considered the possession of Finland essential, in order to both protect their own 
commercial interests in the Baltic area and ensure their control over a strategically vital 
territory for their respective security: before obtaining its independence in 1917, the area 
known today as Finland belonged for almost seven centuries to the Kingdom of Sweden, the 
                                                            
1 JUTIKKALA [1996], pp. 40-41; 
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first that managed to impose its influence, and for over a century it was integral part of the 
vast Russian Empire as a Grand Duchy, even if in the frame of relative autonomy2. 
Over the centuries, several wars have been fought by a plurality of actors – Sweden and 
Russia above all, but also Denmark and Germany – in order to entrench an influence on this 
territory. Swedish hegemony in Finland in the 16th century and Swedish-Finnish supremacy in 
the Baltic region during the 17th and 18th centuries had significant implications for the overall 
development of Finland’s strategic culture. The main concern regarded the struggle to keep 
other great powers – Russia in particular – out of the Baltic Sea. Swedish-Finnish hegemony, 
which fully emerged in the aftermath of the Thirty Years War, was facilitated by deep 
structural changes in the overall European balance of power: economic and demographic 
factors were favoring the northern regions of Europe and the Kingdom of Sweden managed to 
draw relevant benefits for this new situation.  
Meanwhile the Russian Empire grew stronger and its interest for Finland became a 
geostrategic priority3, due to the country’s location at a confluence of the northern extremity 
of Eastern Europe and the eastern extremity of the Baltic-Scandinavian region. At first, the 
main concern was preventing any possible Swedish attack against northwest Russia, but later 
the importance of Finland emerged with regard to the security of the city of St. Petersburg, 
founded by Peter the Great in 1703, which symbolized his desire to modernize the Empire and 
became imperial capital shortly after, due to its privileged position of “window on the West” 4.  
The era of Russian domination is particularly relevant for the purpose of this study, as 
peculiarities of Finland’s security and defense policy have often been connected with the fact 
that the country and Russia are geographically linked together5. This big neighbor’s ambitions 
on Finland’s territory slowly materialized through three successful military campaigns: the 
Great Northern War (1700-1721), which led to the acquisition of many Baltic territories and 
turned the Kingdom of Sweden into a second-class regional power, The Hats’ War (1741-
1743), whose conclusion for Russia meant the gain of more territories formerly belonging to 
Sweden, and finally the Finnish War (1808-1809), a triumphant campaign which granted 
Russia the control over the whole of Finland. 
                                                            
2 JUSSILA, HENTILA, NEVAKIVI [1999], pp. 33-37;  
3 KARSH [1986], p. 265; 
4 BATER [2004], p. 191; 
5 NOKKALA [2008], p. 73;  
 
 
8
1.2 THE SWEDISH ERA (circa 1157-1809) 
 
The Kalmar Union, consisting of the unification under a common monarch of the three 
kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, was the first balancer available for Finland in 
dealing with the threat posed by Russia. Germans, Danes and Swedish all tried to establish 
commercial colonies on the coast of Finland, but eventually the strengthening of the Catholic 
Church’s and the Swedish Crown’s grip on Finland would increase during the 13th century and 
would last until the beginning of the 19th century. For more than six hundred years, most of 
the Finland peninsula was an integral part of the Kingdom of Sweden and this left a deep 
mark, especially in terms of religion, language, political institutions, culture and economy6: 
Swedish became the dominant language of the nobility, administration and education; since 
then, the Swedish legal and social systems began to take root in Finland and its legacy 
survived up to present day. 
Sweden established its official rule of Finland in 1323, as the Treaty of Nöteborg between the 
Kingdom of Sweden itself and Novgorod assigned only eastern Finland to the latter, whereas 
the western and southern parts of Finland were tied to the Western European cultural sphere7. 
It has been correctly pointed out8 that one can not reason, without stumbling on 20th century’s 
ideologies, in terms of Swedish “domination”, being instead more correct to define this period 
as a reunion of different regions and peoples under the allegiance of a same monarch: in fact 
in 1362, Finns were given the right to send representatives to the election of the king in 
Sweden, and in the 16th century this right was extended to include representation in the 
Swedish Diet. Some scholars9 trace in the actions of Finnish leaders of these years the origin 
of a distinct Finnish foreign policy designed to further specific Finnish interests rather than 
those of the Kingdom of Sweden as a whole. A number or reasons may be given in support to 
this thesis: the looseness of the ties linking together the various parts of the Swedish realm, 
Finland’s geographical isolation, the influence gained through active political participation in 
the Kingdom’s affairs on behalf of the Finnish élite. 
                                                            
6 LAVERY [2006], p. 31; 
7 KORPELA [2002], pp. 384-397; 
8 MELASUO [1999], p.243; 
9 JAKOBSON [1968], p. 3; 
  RENVALL [1963], pp. 4-5; 
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During the greater part of the Middle Ages, the situation was such that alternating pressures 
from the East and the West maintained themselves in a kind of equilibrium and no distinct 
steady thrust in either direction occurred. The emergence in the late 15th century of the 
Kingdom of Novgorod however brought a decisive change, as relations with the East started 
to be perceived as a mortal danger to the existence of Finland. However, Swedish influence 
remained intact.  King Gustav Vasa (1523-1560) and his successors invested a lot on external 
expansion, so that by the middle of the 17th century Sweden became the dominant power in 
the Baltic area10; during this glorious period, Sweden created an empire centered on the Gulf 
of Finland comprising the provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, Livonia and managed, due to 
the weakness of Russia, to push the Finnish border further east. Especially king Gustav Adolf 
(1594-1632) engaged in a series of administrative and military reforms, such as the 
introduction of conscription and the construction of a powerful navy, which were able to 
secure the Baltic area from any ambition on behalf of a foreign power.  
A victorious campaign against Russia led in 1617 to the Peace of Stolbova, which deprived 
the eastern rival of any access to the Baltic; furthermore, during the Thirty Years' War (1618-
1648) Sweden gained tracts in Germany as well, including Western Pomerania, Wismar, the 
Duchy of Bremen, and Verden; at the same period Sweden conquered some Danish and 
Norwegian provinces north of the Sound. These victories may be ascribed to a well trained 
army, which despite its small size was more professional than most continental armies. 
However, Sweden was unable to support and maintain its army as the war was prolonged and 
the costs of warfare could not be passed to occupied countries. With consolidation of the 
administration in Stockholm, uniform Swedish rule was extended to Finland in the 17th 
century.  
In the second half of that same century, however, Swedish power declined steadily in the face 
of the rise of France, Prussia and above all Russia, whose position improved notably during 
the reign of Peter the Great, who looked to re-establish a Baltic presence: Russia, Denmark 
and Poland signed an alliance aimed against Sweden, but the first move came from Sweden 
itself11, which sparked the conflict in 1700. 
                                                            
10 LAVERY [2006], p. 41; 
11 JUTIKKALA [1996], p. 201; 
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The Great Northern War (1700-21) was mainly fought for supremacy in the Baltic Sea. The 
early part of the war consisted of a continual string of Swedish victories under Charles XII: 
Denmark was defeated in the summer of 1700, in such a way that she could not participate in 
the war for a number of years; in November of the same year, also Russia suffered a crushing 
defeat in the Battle of Narva; Poland was quickly neutralized and surrendered in 1706, even 
though the peace treaty brought no advantage to Sweden, not even compensation for the 
expenses of six years of warfare. During the years between 1700 and 1707, two of Sweden's 
Baltic provinces, Estonia and Ingria, had been seized by the Tsar, and a third, Livonia, had 
been essentially ruined. To secure his acquisitions, Peter founded the city of Saint Petersburg 
in Ingria in 1703 and began to build a navy and a modern-style army: when Sweden invaded 
Russia in 1709 its army suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Poltava, after which Charles 
XII fled to the Ottoman Empire and the Swedish armies retreated out of Russia.  Peter's 
victory shook all European courts: in just one day, Russia emerged as a major European 
power.  
This shattering defeat did not end the war, although it decided it. Peter continued his 
campaigns in the Baltic area: in 1710 the Russians captured Rīga, Tallinn and Viipuri; in 1714 
Finland was occupied and it remained under the control of the Russian army until 1721: 
during this period, known as the Greater Wrath, thousands of Finns were killed or deported to 
Russia. The years of bloody Russian domination caused the Finns to focus all of their energies 
around the sole goal of securing their own country, an issue that would be the leitmotiv of 
Finland’s defense policy for the centuries to come. Over the next few years little changed and 
the war was finally concluded in 1721 by the Treaty of Uusikaupunki, which reflected the 
bipolar balance set by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713). According to the peace agreement, Russia 
received from Sweden the Baltic territories as well as a large portion of Karelia, certainly 
affirming itself as the greatest power in Eastern Europe. Sweden on the contrary lost almost 
all of its "overseas" holdings gained in the 17th century and ceased to be a major power. After 
this war, Finland developed a more distinct profile as a part of the Swedish Kingdom, because 
several actions were carried out in order to rebuild the country after the bloody military 
occupation, but at the same time the territory remained exposed to the threat of attacks and 
occupation from its powerful eastern neighbor. 
 
 
11
Unable to face Russia alone, Swedish political leaders sought opportunities in the conflicts 
between major powers to re-conquer some land: the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, 
known as the Hats' War, which resulted in the Lesser Wrath, a second occupation of Finland 
by Russian troops. The conflict was instigated by the Hats, the dominant Swedish political 
party at the time12, whose denial of strategic realities convinced them that regaining the lost 
territories had to be Sweden’s priority: the threat was soon relieved, when a powerful Russian 
army inflicted a major defeat to the Swedish. In 1742, following the Russian occupation and 
vague promises to make the country independent13, the attempt to create a kingdom in Finland 
took place, but the Duke Peter of Holstein-Gottorp, chosen as the future monarch by the 
Landtag of Turku, later became Peter III, Emperor of Russia, frustrating the hopes of Finland 
for independence.  
As the war unfolded, the Swedish position deteriorated and the army was forced to retreat 
towards Helsinki, where it was encircled and finally capitulated on September 4th 1742. The 
Treaty of Turku, signed on August 7th 1743, led many to conclude that Sweden could no 
longer conduct offensive war against Russia, which also acquired another slice of Finland to 
the northwest of Saint Petersburg, with the towns of Lappeenranta and Hamina. The territory 
ceded to Russia, together with the Karelian territories gained in 1721, were later called Old 
Finland and were incorporated into the newly formed Grand Duchy of Finland in 1812.  
Certainly, the Finnish experience of Stockholm’s stubborn unwillingness to accept the state of 
imperial overstretch during the 18th century gave birth to two crucial components of Finnish 
strategic culture, which was later to play a major role14: the importance of alliances to balance 
Russia and a commitment to strategic restraint. Although the concept of neutrality can not still 
be taken into account, since obviously only an independent country can be neutral and thus 
only after Finland’s gaining independence in 1917 did it become a truly topical issue. After 
some attempts to find suitable allies, at a time when no rapprochement to Russia appeared 
possible, Finland oriented itself toward a neutrality of the Scandinavian type, encouraged by 
how these countries had managed to remain outside of World War I. 
 
 
                                                            
12 BERGMAN, MÜLLER, STRØM [2003], p.6;  
13 JUTIKKALA [1996], pp. 233-234; 
14 HEIKKA [Mar. 2005], p. 99; 
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1.3 THE RUSSIAN ERA (1809-1890) 
 
Until the 19th century, the bilateral struggle between Sweden and Russia drew the line 
between East and West that ran through Finland. The Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) were 
decisive in order to determine Finland’s place in Europe, because when the Russian Emperor 
Alexander I concluded the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, he tried in vain to convince 
also the Swedish King Gustav IV Adolf to join the Continental System15. When this peaceful 
attempt failed, on February 21st 1808, Russian troops crossed the border and captured 
Hämeenlinna, finding Sweden quite unprepared for the attack: Swedish troops were stationed 
in various fortresses in Finland, while the rest of the army was unable to leave southern 
Sweden for fear of a simultaneous attack coming from Denmark.  
This was the outbreak of the Finnish War (1808-1809). Shortly after, the Russians with only 
modest troops overran, basically without resistance, Kuopio, Tampere, Jakobstad, Svartholm 
and Helsinki. Under a new commander, the Swedish army counter-attacked and the Russian 
offensive was halted, also thanks to the Finnish population that rose up in guerrilla, fighting as 
far as Old Finland, which led to some setbacks suffered by the Russians16; however, even if 
pushed out of Central Finland, the Russian forces received some considerable reinforcements 
and eventually launched a new powerful offensive, whereas the Finnish guerrilla movement 
was gradually extinguishing: as a consequence, Russia's situation in Southern Finland 
improved significantly. The Swedish situation was further weakened by being at war with 
France and Denmark, both of whom threatened Sweden's possessions: this forced the Swedes 
to allocate their main forces to southern Sweden. By that time, Russian forces had overrun all 
of Finland and on November 19th 1808, the Convention of Olkijoki was signed, forcing the 
Swedish army to leave the country.  
The emperor was, however, now eager to bring hostilities to the territory of Sweden, certain to 
reach a victorious end. As Russian forces embarked upon an unprecedented march across the 
frozen Baltic, King Gustav IV Adolf — accused of fatal mistakes leading to the loss of 
Finland — was dethroned in Stockholm17. When news of the Russian incursion spread to the 
Swedish capital, the new king proposed a truce, agreed on by the Russian commander. 
                                                            
15 LAVERY [2006], pp. 51-52; 
16 KIRBY [2006], p. 73; 
17 TOMMILA [1962], p. 18;  
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Scattered hostilities continued until May, but the last engagements of the war proved 
inconclusive and Russian generals succeeded in neutralizing this belated counter-offensive.  
The peace negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Hamina, signed on September 17th 1809, 
according to which Sweden ceded the whole of Finland, part of Lapland and the Ålan Islands 
to Russia. This way, Russian foreign policy aims had been fully achieved: Finland was under 
its dominance, creating a buffer state between Sweden and Russia itself, securing St. 
Petersburg and weakening Sweden to the point where it could no longer represent a realistic 
threat, due to the dreadful financial situation and low national morale18. The Hamina treaty 
merely confirmed the already existing state of international affairs in a peace agreement. 
Although Russia’s fears that Finland might become a start-point for an attack against the 
Empire were considerably alleviated as a result of the annexation in 1809, they were by no 
means dispelled: the highest Russian military commanders feared that if a Russo-German war 
broke out, Sweden would certainly join Germany and attempt to regain Finland19, now legally 
belonging to the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland, to which in 1812 Russia 
appended the territories previously known as Old Finland20. The situation which emerged by 
the Treaty of Hamina was unique because, having been an integral part of the Swedish 
Kingdom for many centuries, Finland shared a common social and institutional structure with 
its western neighbors: extensive peasant landownership, Lutheran religion, and a developed 
local administration. Thus an Eastern-type political dependence of a national minority was 
combined with a Western-type society and a separate administrative frame21. 
Why did Alexander create a separate Finnish entity, rather than simply incorporating Finland 
in the vast Russian Empire? Scholars highlight that maintaining the status quo helped keeping 
the country peaceful, while still serving Russia’s defensive interest22. The national advantage 
of Finland seemed thus closely linked to the military interest of Russia, a leitmotiv that would 
mark the country’s history in the years to come. Besides, it was customary for the Russian 
government to rely on co-opted local élites in the minority regions to maintain political order 
and the prevailing political relations. 
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Whatever the reason, in preserving its laws, privileges and religion, Emperor Alexander 
launched a transformation of Finland, which during this period became geographically larger 
and more unified. The administration of the Grand Duchy was based on its own customs: 
Scandinavian-type administrative and political institutions, an autonomous civil service and 
judiciary, an own currency, a national economy and even a small national armed force for a 
time. In 1812, Helsinki became the capital of the Grand Duchy and the administrative sphere 
of the Senate, which originally was only empowered to make decisions of little moment, 
gradually enlarged and developed more into some type of “home government”23. To a certain 
extent is it possible to say that for the Finns, relations with Russia was foreign policy, as they 
could almost negotiate like representatives of a foreign country. Nevertheless, the Russian 
Emperor maintained full sovereignty over Finland and the new state institutions were anything 
but democratic, being the products of Russian imperial power rather than Finnish people’s 
will. Although the country did not have the “rank of a nation”24 yet, this new situation 
challenged Finland’s people to consider their group identity and to craft their idea of nation, 
best described by the slogan attributed to professor A.J. Lagus: “Swedes we are not, Russians 
we will never be, so let us be Finns”25. 
Of course, the Grand Duchy represented only a rather small annex of the enormous empire, 
but not devoid of importance for its defense doctrine, which has changed very little from the 
advent of long-range weapons to present days26: although the contribution of the Finnish army 
was merely symbolic in strict military terms, it was commonly believed that the Russian 
government, concerned especially for the security of St. Petersburg and fearing that Germany 
might capitalize on its considerable influence in Sweden to use Finland as a staging base for 
an invasion, aimed at creating in Finland a strong defense against the other Baltic powers. 
The idea of systematically “russifying” Finland started to find expression towards the end of 
the reign of Nicholas I, although it did not represent the tsar’s own thinking, but as this 
process developed in the second half of the 19th century also the first signs of a growing 
Finnish nationalism became evident: originating as an academic movement, Fennomania, it 
incorporated the study of linguistics, folklore, and history, and it eventually developed into the 
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Finnish Party, a political organization that helped to establish a sense of national identity and 
spread it among people. The leading Finnish nationalist spokesman was the philosopher, 
journalist and professor Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-1881), who saw the increasing use of 
the Finnish language as the most opportune way for Finland to avoid assimilation by Russia27.  
The cultural background of the European strategic scenario during the 19th century was the 
Vienna system, but the conservative and in many ways counter-republican nature of this 
system was not enough to prevent the forces of nation-building from rising everywhere in 
Europe. Finland’s nationalist awakening, combined with Russia’s gradually tightening grip, 
led the republicans and liberals in Finland to recognize that they had to formulate an exit 
strategy from the Russian sphere of influence. Discussions on the question of neutrality were 
initiated in 1863, following the international consolidation and recognition of the notion, but 
in this early phase the nationalist movement still tended to emphasize the importance of good 
relations with Russia, in order to gain further political and economic autonomy28: in this view 
the declaration of neutrality would have certainly been detrimental, provoking a Russian 
reaction. The 19th century in Finnish culture is thus the story of a nation realizing that 
defending republicanism required gradually distancing itself from the big neighbor29. 
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2. SECURITY POLICIES OF INDEPENDENT FINLAND 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
All things considered, the years that Finland existed as an autonomous part of the Russian 
Empire were, with the exception of the final period, a time of friendly relations between the 
small nation and the great power30. The Russian leadership honored Finland’s special position 
and laws, so that the Grand Duchy was able to continue its development along the path of 
Western civilization. Some have observed31 that in this period Finland was already acting as a 
subject of European international society and classical international law. The reign of 
Nicholas II (1894-1917), however, brought a change which altered the balance of this 
relationship, by violating the autonomy of Finland, and favored the rise of a strong Finnish 
nationalism. 
The Bolshevik revolution, which overthrew the Provisional Government in 1917, drastically 
changed the perspective of Finnish history. On a side, Finland was finally able to achieve its 
independence, but on the other this opened the issue of reciprocal relations, complicated by 
the fact that at virtually no time did Finnish and Soviet security and foreign policy interests 
coincide: since the beginning, Finland was unwilling to be a part of the Soviet plan of 
collective security in Eastern Europe put forward in 1933 and thus came increasingly to be 
placed by the Soviet Union alongside Poland and Germany as potential aggressors32. 
Throughout independence, Finnish security policy has been confronted with the permanent 
dilemma of how to keep on the right side of the Soviet Union and preserve national 
sovereignty at the same time. Since its own forces obviously could not secure the position of 
the state, newly independent Finland looked about for outside protection. Observing the 
foreign policy of the inter-war years, it appears evidently that national defense was the main 
concern of the administration and that finding trustworthy allies was seen the most logical 
way to achieve it: each time an attempt to establish closer ties with one country or a group of 
countries failed, immediately Finland tried to find protection elsewhere.  
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At the very beginning, in 1918, General Mannerheim established cooperation with the still 
undefeated Imperial Germany and this short-lived alliance at least saved the country from the 
Bolshevik Revolution. After Germany's defeat, cooperation with Berlin was replaced by a 
policy of rapprochement with Britain and France, but it was soon clear to the Finns that the 
Western powers, remote and preoccupied by more serious issues, would not show sufficient 
interest in the security of this exposed and hardly accessible country. Dependence on the West 
was thus abandoned in favor of a new regionalism, the cooperation of the so-called border 
states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – but this regional grouping was objected by 
some domestic forces, on the grounds that it antagonized the Soviet Union and could therefore 
endanger Finland’s very independence; thus, this border-state policy was also renounced. 
Finally, Finland started pursuing the road of neutrality: the first choice consisted of relying on 
the support of the League of Nations, the international organism conceived by the American 
President W. Wilson, on which Finland placed its best hopes of finding adequate shelter from 
any possible aggression; when this proved ineffective, Finland resorted to sheltering under the 
umbrella of Scandinavian solidarity. Neutrality after 1935 meant basically avoiding any 
conflict with Russia, although not yet through the kind of active bridge-building policy which 
was the hallmark of Presidents J.K. Paasikivi and U.K. Kekkonen’s foreign policies in the 
postwar years. 
The events of World War II, however, proved that Finland’s security strategies had been 
entirely ineffective in neutralizing the eastern threat, since the Soviet Union showed to be a 
mighty adversary by militarily defeating Finland in 1940 and heavily pressuring its defense 
system again in 1943, after breaking the siege of Stalingrad. The Peace Treaty, concluded in 
Paris in 1947 with the victorious powers, left Finland alone at the mercy of its historical 
enemy. Whereas other Scandinavian countries – namely Denmark and Norway – were able to 
shape their postwar defense policy with the aid of the Western powers, Finland, as one of the 
defeated nations, was faced with the thankless task of building up new foundations for its 
security without any help. Not many options were available at this point: challenging the 
Soviet preponderance was clearly impracticable and so was relying on the help of the distant 
western nations, whose interests did not extend as far as the Gulf of Finland. Only a complete 
revolution in the understanding of Finnish-Soviet relations could have saved the country from 
being completely encompassed within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. 
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2.2 INDEPENDENCE, CIVIL WAR AND TOTALITARIAN THREATS 
 
The ensuing conflict between Finland and Russia stemmed from divergent understandings of 
the 1808-1809 events: from a Russian perspective, Finland was conquered in the name of 
security, whereas the Finns conceived their cooperation with the Russian Empire in moral and 
legal terms. In the constitutional struggle which followed, Finland looked for help outside its 
borders: some sought and found help in Western Europe, whereas others established contacts 
with Russian revolutionary circles which remained intact for decades33. The ties with the West 
were the strongest, as its moral support gave the nation courage in its fight against Russia and 
at the same time retarded the tempo of Russian oppressive measures.  
The conflict sparked due to three main events: firstly, the policy of intense russification 
enacted by Nicholas Bobrikov, appointed governor-general of Finland in 1898 and 
particularly hated by Finland’s people because of his tendency to quell any outburst of Finnish 
nationalism34; secondly, the February Manifesto, signed by the tsar in 1899, which by 
decreeing that the laws of the Empire would take higher order of precedence than the laws of 
Finland significantly contributed to the upraise of an anti-Russian opposition; thirdly, the 
Conscription Act signed in July 1901, which deprived Finland of its own army: originally 
established as an independent force with the sole mission of defending the country itself, this 
army had recently participated to the Crimean War (1854-1856) and to the Russo-Turkish war 
(1877-1878), but was now going to be incorporated into the Russian army and made available 
for action anywhere.  
These choices made by Russian authorities split the political spectrum in Finland into two 
main parties: on a side were the Old Finns (or appeasers), those who saw loyalty to Russia as 
the key to national prosperity and survival, on the other were the Young Finns (or 
constitutionalists), those who wanted to restore the state’s autonomy and constitutional 
framework. The compliance wing argued that it was impossible for Finland to resist the 
superiority of Russia, therefore the loss of self-rule could be compensated only by the survival 
of a nationalist spirit; the autonomist wing, which eventually emerged as the majority, opted 
instead for a bridge-building policy aimed at regaining the lost autonomy in a legal 
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framework. Even though the opposition acted mostly through peaceful civil disobedience, one 
activist managed to assassinate Bobrikov on June 16th 1904. Dissatisfaction was also 
expressed under the form of a general strike that engulfed Finland in November 1905, shortly 
after the news of the Russia’s shocking defeat in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905)35 had 
spread through the country.  
Tsar Nicholas II responded by replacing the Old Finns’ majority in the Estates-General, whose 
strategy of appeasing had proven unsuccessful, with constitutionalists, by providing Finland 
with a new legislature in 1906 (the existing Estates-General was undemocratic and tended to 
the exclusion of emerging social forces) and by suspending with his November Manifesto the 
February Manifesto and all the relative legislation36; unfortunately, these measures  were no 
more than a tactical retreat, soon followed by renewed attempts to submit the new Eduskunta 
(the Finnish Parliament) to the control of Russian power, depriving Finland of anything other 
than the right to express an opinion on the imperial legislation. With the Eduskunta effectively 
rendered impotent and most key places in the public administration occupied by 
representatives of the Russian Empire, political life fell into a state of inactivity: none of the 
parties gave any serious consideration to the idea of Finland’s independence; the most that 
was hoped for was a restoration of autonomy within the frame of the Russian Empire.    
The outbreak of World War I in 1914 brought new vitality and provided the opportunity to 
strengthen ties to the West. In the beginning, the war was seen by Finnish people as a great 
opportunity to regain autonomy, as a reward for the help in fighting Germany37, Russia’s most 
dangerous enemy; however, history took a different direction and the several defeats suffered 
by the obsolete Russian army caused food shortages, thus producing an acute discontent in 
Finland, hit particularly hard despite the fact of not being directly committed in combat. The 
revolution that broke out in Russia in February 1917 and the replacement of the tsarism with a 
provisional government meant an end to imperialization for Finland: at the initiative of 
Finnish political parties, based on the general election in 1916, a new Parliament was formed 
with a majority of Social Democrats, whose leader O. Tokoi became Prime Minister.  
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The new political power was willing to cooperate with the provisional government of Russia, 
but no agreement was reached. The shared opinion in Finland was basically that the personal 
union with Russia was finished after the Tsar was dethroned – although they had de facto 
recognized the provisional government as the ruling power – so it was expected that the 
authority would be transferred to Finland's Eduskunta, which the provisional government of 
Russia refused, suggesting instead that the question should be settled by the Russian 
Constituent Assembly.  
The Social Democratic party (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP) from the very 
beginning shunned the provisional government, seen as an obstacle on Finland's road to 
independence, and sought to cultivate contacts with the Bolsheviks, who had been kept 
outside the government but seemed prepared to have Finland’s autonomy broadened; on July 
17th they passed a bill, the so-called “Power Act”, which restricted Russia’s influence on 
domestic Finnish politics and transferred the “supreme authority” to the Finnish Parliament  – 
with the significant exception of defense and foreign policy. For the Russian provisional 
government this was however far too radical: as the Parliament had exceeded its authority, it 
was dissolved38. 
The minority parties were content, as new elections promised a chance to gain majority, which 
they were convinced would improve the chances to reach an understanding with Russia; they 
were inclined to cooperate with the Russian Provisional government, fearing the Socialists' 
power would grow and result in radical reforms, such as equal suffrage or land reforms. The 
majority had, of course, the squarely opposite opinion, not accepting the provisional 
government's right to dissolve the Parliament, the abolition of the Power Act and the 
cooperation between Finnish non-Socialist forces and the oppressive Russian powers. The 
result of the elections was a small non-Socialist majority, but the October Revolution in 
Russia, with the Bolsheviks now seizing the power, turned Finnish politics upside down39: the 
new majority of the Parliament started to feel a great urge for total independence, whereas the 
Socialists came gradually to view Russia as an example to follow.  
On November 15th 1917, the Bolsheviks declared a general right of self-determination, 
including the right of complete secession, “for the Peoples of Russia” and on the same day the 
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Eduskunta passed an act very similar to the Power Act, with no reservation made in respect to 
foreign policy and military affairs. On December 6th 1917, the Parliament approved a formal 
Declaration of Independence by a vote of 100 to 88. On December 31st the Council of 
People’s Commissars a decree recognizing “the independence of the Republic of Finland as a 
country”40, which on January 4th 1918 was approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the 
highest Soviet executive body. It has been noted41 that the granting of Finnish independence 
by the new Soviet regime was an ideologically motivated act, in line with Lenin’s belief that 
conceding the right of nations to self-determination would intensify the class struggle in the 
newly independent countries, eventually leading to the reunification of the socialist republics. 
Germany, Sweden and France recognized Finland as an independent country on January 4th 
1918, soon followed by many other European nations42. 
From January to May 1918, Finland experienced the brief but bitter Finnish Civil War that 
colored domestic politics and the foreign relations of Finland for many years. On the one side 
there were the White Civil Guards, who represented the legitimate authority in the country, on 
the other side fought the Red Guards, consisting of workers and activists who intended to 
bring Finland into the orbit of the Bolshevik Soviet Union, following Lenin’s exhortation. The 
defeat of the latter, which appeared obvious after the decisive battle of Tampere (April 4th-6th 
1918) was achieved with support from Imperial Germany, whose troops took Helsinki on 
April 14th. The end of the Civil War raised a new issue: should Finland be ruled by an 
unelected king or governed by an elected president?43  
The supporters of a monarchical system based their arguments on tradition (throughout history 
Finland was always ruled by a monarch), on foreign policy considerations which induced to 
think that a German king would have cemented ties between Finland and Germany and on the 
fact that a foreign monarch would be an impartial force that could mediate the conflicts 
between political parties and that could serve as a barrier to the spread of violent radicalism. 
The supporters of a republic instead advanced the argument that strong democratic institutions 
would be more inclusive, facilitating a broader participation of all social classes to the needed 
reforms. Since the absence of the Social Democratic party in the months after the war gave the 
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monarchists the parliamentary majority, on October 9th 1918 Prince Friedrich Karl of Hesse 
was chosen as king Väinö I of Finland by the Eduskunta.  
However, already in November of the same year, Germany’s capitulation in World War I 
meant the end of Finland’s monarchy. The Constitution (Regeringsform), drafted by law 
professor K.J. Ståhlberg and ratified in July 1919, part of which is still in force today, 
instituted a republic which fused together the parliamentary and presidential systems, this way 
addressing both the republicans’ desire for a strong legislature and the monarchists’ call for a 
strong executive. The introduction of a republican constitution did not completely resolve the 
crisis of political authority in the country, because the unwillingness of the main political 
forces to cooperate and overcome their divisions resulted in years of fragile short-term 
governments44, weakened the basis of such a new-born democracy and opened the door to 
various types of authoritarian tendencies. Despite the presence in the country of a well 
organized Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue – SKP) which embraced the 
ideal of a proletarian revolution aimed at overthrowing the moderate government, the real 
threat to the established order in Finland came from the right: the greatest danger for 
parliamentary democracy came from the Lapua Movement (Lapuan Liike)45, an ardently anti-
communist and nationalist organization started in 1929, which in its early days was able to 
draw enough sympathy among politicians and common people to be able to influence in a 
determinant way the elections in 1931, which resulted in the presidency of P.E. Svinhufvud, 
and even to attempt a coup d’état in 1932; both the Lapua Movement and the Patriotic 
People’s League (Isänmaallinen Kansanliike – IKL), another nationalist movement mantled 
with populism, were clearly inspired to Fascism and the broad support initially shown to them 
by the political and military élites46 caused considerable embarrassment in the diplomatic 
circles and certainly damaged the country’s reputation abroad, as several international 
observers still looked with extreme suspicion at the close ties between Finland and Germany. 
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2.3 FIRST FOREIGN ORIENTATIONS 
 
The main objective of Finnish foreign policy in the years following its independence was to 
gain international recognition and to be welcomed in the “family of nations”. As a newly born 
country in the eastern half of Europe, Finland lay in what the founder of Czechoslovakia, T. 
Masaryk, called Europe’s “danger zone”. Countries in this area, unable to provide for their 
own protection, had to find security on a continent where larger powers looked upon their 
existence with disdain or indifference. Because they had once been parts of larger empires, 
these new countries feared losing their independence to larger neighbors, Germany and Soviet 
Union in particular. Yet, like several others in this “danger zone”, Finland failed to find an 
effective formula for national security before the outbreak of World War II.  
In the beginning, having received significant military aid from Germany during the war of 
independence, it was quite natural for Finland to maintain friendly relations with this great 
power47, which, aside from being its foremost supplier of import-goods48, also appeared as the 
only solid bulwark against the spread of communism: as early as 1918, the government led by 
Paasikivi tried by all means to keep the country neutral during World War I, in such a way 
that the political and economic relationship with Germany would not be damaged, as this 
alliance was hoped to be the best way of protecting Finland’s independence. The military 
collapse of Germany in November 1918 signified also the end of the pro-German orientation, 
as from this time on the governing parties rejected the idea of imperial Germany and oriented 
themselves in the direction of the leading powers Western Europe. Even in the early 1930s, 
when Germany’s new military rise could have made that country an appealing candidate for a 
counterweight  against the Soviet Union, the image of Nazi Germany gradually deteriorated in 
Finnish eyes, partially as a result of their trade war with Great Britain in 1934, which harmed 
Finland’s economy as well, and more generally due to their radicalism49. 
At the end of World War I, Finland tried to improve its relations with the victorious countries, 
France and Great Britain above all: the elections held in March 1919, whose outcome was a 
less pro-German government, fulfilled a fundamental criterion of the allied powers for the 
recognition of Finland as an independent state, which was finally accorded on May 3rd 1919 
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by the Council of Foreign Ministers assembled in Paris for the peace conference50. In 1919-
1920, Finland provided logistical support to Great Britain, which sought to help the counter-
revolutionaries in Russia against the Bolshevik forces; even after British activities in the 
Baltic had decreased, the conservatives continued to hope cooperation in containing Russia. 
Relations with France remained instead at the basic level of diplomatic support. The Finnish 
government also considered help from the United States as a potential option: in April 1939 a 
military attaché was sent to Washington in order to inquire about possible loans for military 
purchases from the United States, but they were refused under British pressure. The 
relationship with the main European powers did not measurably improve the country’s 
security either, as the Allies sought to use Finland as a staging area for an operation to capture 
Petrograd (the name of St. Petersburg since 1914), as a part of a larger effort to remove the 
Bolsheviks from power: Finnish leaders had little affection for the Bolsheviks, but the Allies’ 
offer of support was too little for such an operation, so they refused to participate51. 
Furthermore, in the uninterrupted quest for allies and notwithstanding the firm opposition of 
some political forces such as the communists52, Finland joined the “general and common 
family of the League of Nations”53 in December 1920 and was among the most enthusiastic 
members of the newly created world organization, whose main task was to promote 
international peace and friendlier international relations. Regarding Finland’s primary 
concern, securing the threat from the East, great hope was placed in Article 10 of the League’s 
Covenant54, which required member states to aid any other member state subject to 
aggression. The policy adopted by Finland during the years of its membership in the League 
of Nations already anticipated an attitude toward neutrality, as it mainly consisted in stressing 
the importance of legal solutions to international disputes as well as emphasizing the 
maintenance of peace and security. At first Finland, like France, even aimed at taking the 
League in the direction of an effective military alliance55; this valuable contribution allowed 
the country to be represented in the League Council from 1927 to 1930. 
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The weight of the security issue in Finnish membership appears even more evidently when 
considering its proposal of instituting financial aid to be put at the disposal of all countries 
attacked without provocation. In spite of all these efforts, soon the League of Nations proved 
unable to match the request for security needed by small states and the blowback resulting 
from this paralysis was distinctly felt in Finland56.  
Since the major powers in Western Europe did not have a sufficiently strong interest in 
Finland to commit in granting its protection, the immediate alternative was to look towards 
closer neighbors57, joining the “sanitary cordon” sponsored by France, whose objective was to 
block the Soviet Union off from the rest of Europe. So, in the early 1920s, Finland sought to 
establish deeper collaboration with the other border-states that had recently emerged along the 
western frontiers of Soviet Union; in 1921 Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland delivered joint 
protest notes to the Soviet government regarding the violation of the autonomy of East 
Karelia. This event led to a strengthening of reciprocal relations and eventually to the opening 
of negotiations among the border states, aimed at initiating a reliable cooperation: the 
agreement they signed in 1922 in Warsaw was chiefly political in nature, but did have a clause 
for military cooperation in the event of an attack on one signatory. However, even though the 
Finnish government removed the military article before submitting the treaty to Parliament for 
ratification, the combined right and left gave a vote of no confidence, afraid that such an 
alliance would have ended up damaging the policy of neutrality, drawing Finland into 
conflicts in Central Europe58. Later on, the western powers, too, warned Finland against any 
alliance with the Baltic countries, whose position externally was regarded as weak. In 
addition, many in Finland were displeased by Poland’s aspiration to achieve hegemony within 
the alliance. The consequence of these events, although some still supported the idea of a 
broad alliance between Scandinavian and Baltic countries, was that the border-state policy 
gradually withered away and was forgotten.  
Despite western conjectures, by 1920 it looked increasingly clear that the Bolsheviks were to 
keep their grip on power. The government of Finland then decided to normalize relations with 
its eastern neighbor, by means of a formal peace treaty. Delegations met in the Estonian city 
of Tartu in June 1920 and for the next five months, argued over the border: the Soviets wanted 
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the islands in the Gulf of Finland, in order to enhance the defense of Petrograd (renamed 
Leningrad in 1924); the Finnish side, led by J.K. Paasikivi, opened negotiations by demanding 
both Russian Karelia (also known as Eastern Karelia) and the Kola Peninsula, territories 
which had never belonged to Finland in any political or administrative sense, but whose claim 
reflected the ambition in the political establishment to create a so-called Greater Finland, that 
would include all speakers of Finnish and closely related languages.  
The Finnish demands exemplified a destabilizing factor in interstate relations in Europe after 
World War I, as on one hand the war advanced the principle of national self-determination 
that allowed for nations such as Finland to become independent, but at the same time the 
reorganization of Europe along national lines created new territorial conflicts and convinced 
many nations, not satisfied with independence within well-recognized boundaries, to pursue 
irredentism59, the policy of seeking neighboring territories with ethnically related populations 
that historically had belonged to other countries.  
On October 14th 1920 both sides compromised in signing a peace treaty, basically 
reconfirming the pre-independence border; this treaty brought formal peace to Finnish-Soviet 
relations, but did not succeed in erasing Soviet’s dreams of further territorial gain. Shortly 
after, Moscow offered, by its own initiative, non-aggression pacts to the neighboring states. 
Finland refused the proposal twice in 1926 and 1927 but eventually concluded in 1932 a 
mutual non-aggression pact, renewed in 1934 for additional ten years60; this fulfilled the 
constitutionalists’ ideal of making Finnish-Soviet relations as legalistic as possible, although 
in all fairness the Finnish side never regarded the treaty as a credible confidence-building 
measure toward better relations with its mighty neighbor. Economic relations between instead 
remained absolutely insignificant, due to the extreme isolation chosen by the Soviet Union, 
despite the fact that natural prerequisites for fructuous trade were abundant and that Finland 
made several attempts to extend commerce with its eastern counterpart. 
Now it is easy to realize that many of those actions and pronouncements made by the Soviets 
were a clear preparation for a war of aggression: the closing of the Finnish Consulate in 
Leningrad, the ending of Finnish traffic rights on the river Neva were all signs that were 
underestimated by Finland’s political and military leadership. The defeat of Trotzky and the 
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rise to power of Stalin had a greater significance than that perceived by most at the time61: 
when the Soviets gave up striving for a world revolution and concentrated on the development 
of socialism in their own country, they soon embraced the old imperialistic attitude of the 
Russian Empire. This very fact radically changed the position of small neighboring countries, 
now seen as potential satellites in order to improve Soviet security and economy. When 
Foreign Minister R. Holsti went to Moscow in 1937, he bitterly became conscious of the 
fundamental mistrust that still existed in Soviet government circles toward Finland, accused of 
being plotting with Germany in order to jointly attack the Soviet Union. 
Since the beginning of the 1920s, Finland concluded a series of non-political treaties with its 
Scandinavian neighbors concerning economic arrangements, amicable settlement of disputes 
and other forms of cooperation62. Later on, in 1933, in order to shelter its economy from the 
fluctuation of the international markets63, recently industrialized Finland had joined the so-
called “Oslo group”, seen as a way to get good trade relations with Great Britain, the leading 
economic power in Europe a great consumer of several Finnish products such as timber, paper 
and pulp64; some years later also The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg joined the “Oslo 
group”, trying to develop closer economic relations among the small states of Europe and to 
follow a common line of neutrality.  
In 1934, when the international political scenario was already severely perturbed due to the 
ascent of Adolf Hitler in 1933 and to the reluctance of the great powers to resort to military 
measures against Germany and Italy, Mannerheim argued that Finnish security should be seen 
as part of a comprehensive vision of Nordic security, and called for all Scandinavian countries 
to strengthen their defenses. Mannerheim argued that, considering the disinterest of Great 
Britain and France in Finnish affairs and the weakness of the Baltic countries, the 
Scandinavian countries, and Sweden in particular, could be considered as the only actors with 
the interest and capability to come to Finland’s aid in case of a crisis. During that decade, 
Finland entered into cooperation with the Scandinavian neighbors on the basis of neutrality, 
but the emphasis was placed on the importance of its armed protection and so plans were 
developed for a mutual defense pact between these countries.   
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Replacing collective security by a more clearly Nordic orientation became official policy in 
1935, when Prime Minister T.M. Kivimäki clearly outlined Finland’s purposes regarding this 
foreign policy strategy in a famous speech delivered before the Parliament: “The Finns believe 
that of their neighbors, Scandinavia, Sweden in particular, is least likely to become involved 
in war or other dangerous international complications. Scandinavia has, therefore, the best 
possibilities for retaining its neutrality. Since Finland’s interests also demand, above all, the 
maintaining of neutrality, it is natural that Finland should align itself with Scandinavia, to 
which our country is more closely tied than elsewhere not only by bonds of history, but by 
economics and culture and by the consequent oneness of outlook as well. Finland sees as its 
responsibility the maintaining of an army for its own defense in order to protect neutrality and 
independence from danger no matter from what direction it may come, and in order thereby to 
aid the maintaining of the joint neutrality of all the Northern countries”65.  
It is no chance that the launch of this so-called “Scandinavian orientation” came at a time of 
growing tensions throughout Europe and that an immediate consequence of this policy was an 
increasing distance from the League of Nations, as Finland tried to avoid being involved in 
conflicts between the major powers by declining to assume any responsibility involved in 
sanctions66. By 1936 all the Scandinavian countries had distanced themselves from the League 
of Nations and tightened their cooperation with each other. On May 27th 1938, they made a 
joint statement explaining their neutrality and a plea to the great powers to refrain from the 
use of force in the settlement of their international controversies and to resort to peaceful 
means of dispute settling instead. However, this highly promising Scandinavian strategy 
encountered two main obstacles, that eventually led to its abandonment67: firstly, the four 
states involved could not agree on a common enemy (Norway and Denmark pointed at 
Germany, Finland was chiefly afraid of the Soviet Union, whereas Sweden held an ambiguous 
position); secondly, Scandinavian military potential was completely inappropriate to provide 
any defense in case of an attack, so that the policy of neutrality ended up losing most of its 
credibility as the probability of a new war kept increasing steadily in the second half of the 
1930s. Without the additional security provided by cooperation, Norway, Denmark and 
Finland were dragged into the war. 
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2.4 FINLAND AND WORLD WAR II (1939-1945) 
 
According to the majority of scholars, Finland’s road to World War II began on April 14th 
1938, when an official of the Soviet embassy in Helsinki named Boris Yartsev, who had 
received precise instructions from Stalin himself68, met with Finland’s Foreign Minister R. 
Holsti, in order to discuss his country’s concern about German expansion towards the east and 
the possibility of a German attack on the Soviet Union, carried out through Finnish territory. 
After having clarified that, in such circumstances, Moscow would not hesitate to occupy part 
of Finland, this obscure diplomat proposed formal ties between the two countries: in return for 
some strategically important concessions, the Soviet Union was prepared to guarantee 
Finland’s inviolability, provide military aid and grant a favorable trade agreement69. Talks 
were conducted for several months, but Finnish authorities treated the proposals with a mix of 
indifference and skepticism, especially because over the past twenty years they had been 
trying to achieve protection from, rather than cooperation with, the Soviets. This promise of 
aid was felt as a threat to the country’s neutrality and, possibly, even to its independence.  
When the Molotov-Rippentrop non-aggression pact was signed on August 23rd 1939 between 
Soviet Union and Germany70, not many were aware of the secrets provisions according to 
which Eastern Europe was divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence: in this frame 
Finland, the Baltic republics and the eastern regions of Poland were placed under Soviet 
control. At first, the pact caused no anxiety in Finland, because it was rather thought that such 
an alliance between the two nearest powers would have increased the possibilities for 
continued peace. 
With Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1st 1939, World War II began. Immediately 
following this event Finland, both individually and jointly with the other Scandinavian 
countries, issued a declaration of complete neutrality. In the same month, the Soviet Union 
demanded military bases from the Baltic republics which, lacking the resources to oppose the 
request, quickly acquiesced. Next, the Soviets turned on Finland: on October 5th Molotov 
called for “an exchange of ideas with the Finnish government regarding certain concrete 
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political questions”71, obtaining as a response the mobilization of regular army and reservists. 
Finland had declared the decision not to conclude any alliance with anybody and intended to 
stick to the policy of neutrality72. Some days later J.K. Paasikivi, the negotiator of the peace 
treaty of 1920, was sent to meet Stalin and Molotov in Moscow; his mission was to stress that 
Finnish-Soviet relations had been regularized in 1920 and Finland wished to remain outside 
all conflicts, but the demands brought forward by the Soviets were still rather high: enough 
territory to place Leningrad outside the range of Finnish artillery and a thirty-year lease of the 
port of Hanko. These requests once again revealed the strategic importance of Finland’s 
position in Soviet military thinking, urged to secure Leningrad against a Nazi attack.   
Several negotiations were attempted during the fall of 1939, but they led nowhere because the 
Finnish government remained unwilling to compromise73, especially after having observed the 
disastrous results of the appeasement policy both for great powers and for small states such as 
the Baltic republics, militarily occupied and formally annexed into the Soviet Union in June 
1940. The politicians, as well as the public opinion, understood that the very foundations of 
Finnish national existence were at stake. Furthermore Finland, just like other small European 
states on the eve of World War II, tended to place excessive trust in foreign help, specifically 
Swedish help, in the context of internationally approved sanctions, in the event of an attack; 
this belief, based on the country’s self-defined position as the outpost of Western civilization 
against Bolshevism, was maintained despite clear messages that Sweden would not come to 
Finland’s defense in the event of war74. France and Great Britain were only prepared to give 
their cautious moral support to Finland. President F.D. Roosevelt of the United States was 
instead more actively involved in the situation and offered diplomatic aid along with moral 
support of Scandinavian neutrality75.  
The invasion of Finland began on November 30th 1939, when the first Soviet troops crossed 
the border while the airplanes started dropping bombs on Helsinki. On the following day, the 
Soviet government announced the creation of a Democratic Republic of Finland, a puppet 
state led by the Finnish communist leader O.V. Kuusinen in the city of Terijoki76. As a purely 
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formal pretext to start the war, the Soviets accused Finns of having fired artillery shells on a 
Red Army unit stationed in a border village. Finland was not prepared to wage war, but in 
spite of a severe lack of resources and manpower, its armed forces managed to hold their main 
defensive positions for two whole months and compensated their disadvantages with strategic 
ingenuity, developing tactics that exploited Soviet weaknesses; these factors led to the greatest 
Finnish military victory of the war at the village of Suomussalmi in December 1939.  
Finland’s heroic resistance captured international imagination and deeply affected the main 
actors involved in the war: public opinion in Great Britain and in France clamored loudly for 
aid to be sent77. It is worth recalling a part of a radio address by Winston Churchill on January 
20th 1940, in which he stated: “Finland alone – in danger of death, superb, sublime Finland – 
shows what free men can do. The service Finland has rendered to humanity is magnificent”78. 
Also, the League of Nations gave its support to Finland by approving a resolution which 
stated that, since Soviet activities were contrary to general as well as specific treaties, League 
members should provide all possible aid to Finland, while the Soviet Union would be expelled 
for having acted in violation of the Covenant. Furthermore, some politicians in Sweden, the 
Foreign Minister R. Sandler above all79, endorsed an intervention in order to try preserving 
their own country’s security from the grave Soviet threat and, although in the end the country 
did not join the war, two reinforced battalions of volunteers were sent to the front and Sweden 
also became Finland’s largest supplier of arms and non-military equipment80. Germany, on the 
other hand, assumed a definitely inimical attitude toward Finland’s struggle, preventing arms 
and volunteers from passing through. When France and Great Britain finally resolved to 
provide consistent military aid, in early 1940, Finland balked at accepting their intervention, 
too little and too late, fearing that it would have only caused a prolongation of military 
operations conducted by the major powers on its territory. 
Soviet hopes of occupying Finland in just three or four weeks were soon dashed. The military 
stalemate and the possibility of a foreign intervention convinced the military leaders to reach a 
negotiated settlement with the government of Helsinki81: the Treaty of Moscow, signed on 
March 12th 1940, forced Finland to cede almost all of Finnish Karelia (nearly 10% of its 
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whole territory), all of the Karelian Isthmus, some islands in the Gulf of Finland and the Salla 
region, in addition to leasing the naval base of Hanko to the Soviet Union for thirty years, but 
it allowed Finland to preserve its national independence. At a time when many small countries 
in Europe were disappearing from the map, Finland succeeded in remaining a visible member 
of the international community. Notwithstanding this success, the peace treaty did not remove 
the original mistrust between the two countries, especially as the Soviet Union kept 
considering its neighbor as a potential corridor for invasion by a larger power. 
After the peace settlement, Finland continued to seek for security by reviving its pre-war 
orientation towards the other Scandinavian countries: in accepting the Moscow peace, Finland 
had simultaneously asked Sweden and Norway if they would be prepared to consider the 
possibility of a joint defense pact and received a positive answer from both. The Soviet Union 
opposed the idea of a Scandinavian League from the very beginning, fearing that it would be 
direct against its interests. Soon afterwards, in April 1940, the German occupation of 
Denmark and Norway made every possibility of crafting such an alliance unrealistic. 
Furthermore, the Soviet’s annexation of the Baltic republics left Finland and Sweden isolated 
between two great aggressive powers and unable to establish any political or military alliance, 
due to Soviet and German opposition to any such plan82.  
In these circumstances, after the hopes of support in Scandinavia had failed, Nazi Germany 
became the most logical counterweight to the Soviet Union. The first concrete evidence of 
more favorable Finnish-German relations was shown in September 1940, when Finland 
allowed German troops to transit through its territory on their way to Norway, in return for 
supplies of war material83. Both the domestic and international public opinion accepted the 
beginning of this cooperation, as it was understood that Finland did not have any other 
reasonable choice. The rapprochement culminated in June 1941 when, despite one last attempt 
to maintain a line of neutrality, carried out between June 22nd and 25th84, the Finnish 
government officially decided to join Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union, although 
only as a cobelligerent and not as a formal ally. Finland stubbornly tried to fight a separate 
war, independently from Germany, with its own limited objectives: above all, national defense 
and security.  
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This military campaign, which goes under the name of Continuation War, allowed Finland to 
re-capture all of the territories ceded at the end of the Winter War by September 1941 and to 
occupy a large portion of Soviet Karelia by the end of that same year. The moral authority of 
the war was however severely compromised, due to the very fact of fighting besides Nazi 
Germany, even if Finland distanced itself as much as possible from such an embarrassing 
partner, for example by refusing to participate in the siege of Leningrad or by entirely 
rejecting any program of genocidal anti-Semitism85. Helsinki kept claiming that its army was 
fighting a defensive war to guarantee its own security and not taking active part in Germany’s 
offensive war86, but the world’s democracies did not fully accept a theoretical distinction that 
appeared rife of paradoxes and in 1941 most Allied powers – with the significant exception of 
the United States – declared war on Finland, under Stalin’s personal pressure87. 
These events, along with German’s defeat in Stalingrad, induced Finnish political leaders to 
look for a way out of the war since early 1943, but the attempted American mediation failed to 
find a shared agreement between Finland and Soviet Union, whose requests were too far apart: 
the Soviets were prepared to grant an armistice only after unconditional surrender, something 
that the Finnish government could not accept. 
When Italy capitulated in the summer of 1943 and the German siege of Leningrad was broken 
in January 1944, the military situation became desperate for Finland, whose defenses soon 
started to crumble under the weight of the Soviet advance. The armistice terms proposed by 
Moscow on February 19th 1944 were almost impossible to carry out, including for example 
the internment of all German soldiers on Finnish soil, but the Finnish government could not 
ignore any possibility for continuing discussions. Hence, after some more feverish months of 
negotiations, despite President R. Ryti’s promise to Von Ribbentrop that his country would 
not have made a separate peace with the enemy88, the rapid worsening of the military situation 
urged Finland to find a compromise.  
The agreement for an armistice was found on September 4th and a few days later, on 
September 19th, the preliminary peace document was accepted in Moscow by the new 
government led by Marshal C.G. Mannerheim, one of the most prominent and charismatic 
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figures in Finnish recent history89. Finland agreed to retreat to the 1940 borders, accepted to 
pay war reparations and had to lease to the Soviets the Porkkala peninsula, near Helsinki. The 
armistice ended the Continuation War, but Finland still had to remove German troops from its 
territory and this goal was achieved during the so-called Lapland War, fought from October 
1944 to April 1945 and defined by some a “fake war”90.  
The Treaty of Paris, signed in 1947 with the Allied Powers after World War II, besides 
inflicting on Finland a 300 million dollars war indemnity to be delivered to the Soviet Union, 
imposed several restrictions to the armed forces: the country was permitted to maintain an 
army of 34,400 individuals, an air force of 3,000 individuals, 60 combat aircrafts and a navy 
of 4,500 individuals, with ships totaling 10,000 tons. World War II was not as hard on Finland 
as it was on several other European countries: about 90,000 soldiers perished in the 
campaigns, but of all the nations which took arms against the Soviet Union, Finland alone 
never suffered occupation and was able to retain its independence; nevertheless, Finland failed 
to achieve its main goals in foreign policy since independence: the neutralization of the Soviet 
threat and the finding of allies. 
After the defeat of the Nazis, Finland’s republican political culture was rather stable, no 
longer under the menace of a totalitarian revolution. From the perspective security strategy, 
the post-war situation returned Finland’s dilemma to where it was in the late 1930s: finding a 
suitable foreign policy to maintain the country safe from the threat posed by the Soviet Union, 
even more urgently since this emerged as a global superpower. Finland’s own existence was at 
stake: the extent of Soviet power and the geopolitical reach of the “socialist empire” in Europe 
after World War II made reliance on the West very difficult, leaving Finland to defend 
democratic institutions alone, almost a thousand kilometers East of the “iron curtain” that was 
quickly descending across Central Europe. The solution of linking a Western power to Finland 
via Sweden was also not available due to Swedish neutrality, but would not have been 
credible in any case, because the Soviet desire to acquire political supremacy in the Baltic 
area, had already been tacitly accepted by Great Britain and the United States in Yalta. Of all 
the other possible options, Germany’s defeat excluded any possibility of further cooperation 
and a Scandinavian common defense system was inexistent. 
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3. FINNISH-SOVIET RELATIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the outcome of the war had in effect confirmed Finland’s existence as an 
independent country, the very foundations of its security seemed to have been destroyed. 
Foreign policy had been based on the assumption that the Soviet Union, combining traditional 
imperialism and communist doctrine of world conquer, was inevitably going to overwhelm 
Finland by force. Furthermore, the radical left was in such a bold position as to be able to set 
the domestic political agenda in Finland, due to vast mass support in the working classes and 
the mighty Soviet Union as a neighbor. In this context, it was necessary to opt for a complete 
revolution in foreign policy, as the only alternative would have been sooner or later another 
major clash with the expanding Soviet Union interests. 
From a Soviet standpoint, Finland strategic importance had not changed significantly since the 
outbreak of World War II, because the essential objective in the Baltic, as previously, was to 
keep Finland from becoming a launching site or advanced base for any hostile military thrust 
into the northwest Soviet Union. The provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1947 granted the 
control of key territories to the Soviet Union, but exerting political influence over Finland was 
still perceived as fundamental by the military experts in Moscow for preserving a secure 
environment in the Baltic area. Specifically, defensive purpose was rooted, just like two 
centuries earlier, in the protection of Stalingrad, the second city of the country and a great 
industrial complex, whose loss would have certainly been a critical wound to the Soviets.  
Finland clearly perceived that failure in complying with the Soviet geostrategic imperatives 
could have meant the loss of national independence, or at least a growing interference in its 
domestic affairs on behalf of the Soviet Union. However at the present moment, no reasonable 
alternative was available, except maybe organizing a last fierce military resistance to the 
advancing Red Army that sooner or later would have invaded the country.  
The badly-needed change of orientation took the form of the foreign policy enacted by 
President Paasikivi in the late 1940s, based on the realistic assumption that the Soviet interest 
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in Finland had always been pre-eminently a security interest91, which did not require 
satellization to be fulfilled; consequently, it was possible – and necessary – to accommodate 
reciprocal interests in Finnish-Soviet relations in a more flexible way than it had ever been 
done in the past, through cooperative measures and mutually satisfactory arrangements. The 
treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (FCMA) concluded in Moscow on 
April 6th 1948 was the first and most tangible sign of the so-called Paasikivi Line. This 
agreement illustrated without a doubt the two guiding principles of the new strategy – the 
recognition of Soviet security interests in Finland and the assertion of its neutrality, defined as 
non-participation in any military alliances or other international alliances which can be 
regarded as instruments of Great Powers politics. Some authors have highlighted how the 
underlying philosophy of the Paasikivi line was the idea of a possible and mutually convenient 
exchange between the two countries involved92: what Finland gives is a solid assurance of 
non-aggression and territorial security; what she receives is friendly relations with the giant 
neighbor and non-interference in its domestic affairs. Also trade assumed marked political 
connotations in this context, as an instrument to further improve the convenience of 
maintaining good relations93. 
In this perspective, the possibility given to Finland to avoid “satellization” can be interpreted 
as a far-sighted Soviet attempt to shelter the Scandinavian region from the first turbulence of 
the emerging Cold War: for example, since “Sweden is forced to regard Finland as an 
extension of her territory”94, Soviet troops on the Swedish-Finnish border could have been 
considered a sufficient threat to induce Sweden to abandon neutrality and join the NATO95, 
making it an extension of the direct East-West confrontation and thus obviously running 
counter the long Russian tradition of attempting to retain Scandinavia as a buffer zone 
between its northwest border and the dominant powers in western Europe. 
The same security-defense purposes and the creation of a buffer zone, as well as less decisive 
economic factors, may explain the Soviet desire to include Finland in its sphere of influence. 
Finland’s position in the Soviet orbit has been often referred to as “exceptional”96 when 
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contrasted with that of other countries that were drawn, at the end of World War II, into the 
Soviet sphere of influence, defined as “an area into which is projected the power and influence 
of a country primarily for political, military-strategic, or economic purposes, but sometimes 
cultural purposes may be added. States within this area are usually nominally independent, but 
the degree of influence may be so great as to leave little independence; or it may be as indirect 
and restrained as to permit considerable independence. A sphere may be more or less 
exclusive, depending upon the degree of independence states within it enjoy”97. 
The years 1955-1956 brought in many respects a decisive turning point in Russian-Finnish 
relations and in the foreign policy of Finland: the Paasikivi line developed into its most logical 
consequence, a policy of neutrality. When the naval base of Porkkala was returned to Finland 
by the Soviet Union, the conditions of Finnish neutrality improved significantly, due to the 
fact that its whole territory was now free of foreign troops. Almost at the same time, after 
several years of attempts, Finland became a member of the United Nations and also joined the 
Nordic Council. Since then, the Finnish field of activity in foreign policy constantly widened, 
its neutrality being formally recognized by the United States, Great Britain and France. 
The first years of the Kekkonen presidency were marked by difficulties and 
misunderstandings in Soviet-Finnish relations between 1958 and 1961, which resulted in two 
major political crises between the big power and the small neighbor, originated from the 
continuous need of the Soviet Union to be reassured about Finland’s neutrality policy, in a 
context of growing international tensions. Well conscious of the strategic meaning of Finland 
in the context of the Cold War, by no means the Soviet Union intended to risk that the 
emergence of political forces contrary to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line would endanger the 
balance in the Baltic Sea region and in order to do this did not hesitate to resort to a certain 
degree of well-applied pressure. Also, the increasingly Western orientation of Finnish trade 
policies, which had already been initiated in 1957, could not be ignored in Moscow. Only 
Kekkonen’s personal ability and the credit he enjoyed in the Soviet Union made it possible for 
Finland’s neutrality to survive the crisis and retain its credibility. 
Drawing a balance sheet of the Kekkonen era is not easy, but an agreement can be reached on 
the fact that his foreign policy scored three very important achievements: first, he managed to 
use his personal influence in Moscow to rebuff several Soviet attempts to draw Finland even 
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closer both militarily and politically (the rejection of the proposal for Finnish-Soviet joint 
military maneuvers in 1978 is probably the best-known example); second, he made Finland 
wealthier, improving both the commercial relations with the Soviet Union and those with the 
Western countries, for example by signing agreements with the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), both in 
1973; third, he made Finland a reliable partner in the easing of East-West tensions, taking the 
initiative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, which later 
developed into a permanent organ, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
It can be said that the fundamental idea behind Kekkonen’s foreign policy has been to create a 
secure position for Finland in the buffer zone between East and West. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39
3.2 THE “PAASIKIVI LINE” AND THE FCMA TREATY (1944-1948) 
 
The revolution in Finnish-Soviet relations was brought by President Paasikivi, the architect of 
Finland’s postwar foreign policy, whose nation-wide prestige and intimate knowledge both of 
his own people and of the Russians made him appear as Finland’s last reserve in a moment 
when all other means of defending the country’s independence appeared to have been 
exhausted98. He determined the precondition for an innovative understanding of Finnish-
Soviet relations99, no longer based on the hereditary enmity between the two countries, but 
rather on the correct assessment of the basic geopolitical facts: first and foremost, Russia’s 
position was preponderant over Finland due to several factors that could not be altered; 
secondly, it was indispensable to recognize that the Soviet strategic and defensive interest in 
Finland was a “legitimate interest” and thus persuade the Soviet leaders that the security of 
their country was not going to be threatened by Finland: the concept of “legitimate interest” 
subtly conveyed both the direction and the limit of his policy by implying that Finland would 
not have been prepared to tolerate anything more than what could be considered legitimate; 
moreover, formal political assurances or treaties would not have been enough to prevent 
suspicion, so he adamantly insisted that any resentments and criticism of the Soviet Union in 
the public opinion or in the press had to be put aside100, committing the country to a genuinely 
pro-Soviet policy.  In essence, he accepted that Finnish strategic practices could not rest on the 
logic of defense, which would have been too expensive (requiring almost two times higher 
budgets) and certainly insufficient to effectively repel an attack of the mighty Red Army, but 
rather on the logic of deterrence — dissuading the enemy from aggression by increasing its 
costs. The main tool of the Finnish military strategy in containing the Soviet Union was a 
flexible and adaptable conventional deterrence doctrine101. 
Paasikivi’s line was bitterly criticized by the great majority of the Western countries, where 
the prevailing view was that the Soviet Union was indeed an aggressive, expansionist power, 
which could not be appeased but only contained militarily and economically. They probably 
underestimated the meaning of one of the most important component of this grand strategy, 
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which Paasikivi called “puolustustaho”, a concept that can be translated as the will and desire 
to defend one’s right and independence102: crafting a friendlier attitude toward the old enemy 
by no means meant that Finland intended to submit or give up its way of life. 
When Paasikivi received a personal letter from Stalin, on February 23rd 1948 there seemed to 
be no doubt about the fact that the end of Finland’s independence had arrived, especially 
considering the following passages of the letter: “As should be known to you, of the three 
countries bordering on the U.S.S.R. which waged war on the U.S.S.R. on the side of 
Germany, two – Hungary and Romania – have signed with the U.S.S.R. treaties of mutual 
assistance against possible German aggression… I assume that Finland, not less than Romania 
and Hungary, is interested in a pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. against possible 
German aggression. In view of those considerations, and wishing to establish conditions for a 
radical improvement in the relations between our countries with the aim of strengthening 
peace and security, the Soviet Government proposes the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish pact 
of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance similar to the Hungarian-Soviet and 
Romanian-Soviet pacts”103.  Once again, it was thought, the smallest countries of Europe were 
being taken over one by one by a totalitarian power. The international public opinion took for 
granted that there was no alternative but to submit104. Another ominous sign was the sudden 
return of several Finnish communists who had fled the country after the civil war, among 
them former Ministers in Kuusinen’s infamous Terijoki government105.   
However, Stalin’s letter came as no surprise for the Finnish government, which did not 
consider such a solution unacceptable. The idea of a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet 
Union had in fact been on and off the agenda since 1945, when Mannerheim had actually 
drafted an outline agreement in which mutual respect of each other’s independence and non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs was clearly stated, furthermore binding the two 
contracting parties to assist each other with all the forces at their disposal in the event of 
aggression. But while agreeing in principle with Stalin’s proposal, Paasikivi rejected the 
unlimited obligation to political consultation in time of peace and automatic mutual assistance 
in the event of war which were offered, because such a formula would have made Finland a 
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satellite and an ally of the Soviet Union in any future circumstances and thus impaired its 
freedom of action. 
The Eduskunta was fully consulted before starting the negotiations and at each subsequent 
stage: of the three parties represented in the government coalition, only the leftist People’s 
Democratic League (Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto – SKDL) was prepared to accept 
the kind of treaty Stalin had in mind; the Social Democratic Party and the Agrarian Party 
(Maalaisliitto) both declared their opposition. The chief purpose of the delegation, led by key 
figures of the Finnish political scenario – Prime Minister M. Pekkala and Foreign Minister C. 
Enckell above all – that was sent to Moscow in March was to limit Finland’s commitments to 
the bare minimum required to remove the historic Russian fear of Finnish collusion in an 
attack against Stalingrad, confining Finland’s role to the defense, to be carried out by Finns 
themselves, of its own territory. As Paasikivi declared to the press, the Finns were prepared to 
promise to fight against an aggressor who attempted to get at the Soviet Union by way of 
Finland and to accept Soviet assistance if needed, but nothing more, especially not the 
employment of Finnish troops outside the national territory. 
Surprisingly, at the first meeting between the two delegations, on March 25th, Molotov 
accepted the Finnish draft as a basis for negotiation and he offered no objections to the 
limitation of the treaty’s applicability to the sole defense of Finnish territory, although he did 
amend the clause regarding Soviet assistance in a manner implying that such assistance would 
be given automatically in case of an attack against Finland106. However, when Paasikivi 
further insisted that military aid could be accepted only in case if extreme need and by 
agreement between the two parties, the Soviets accepted a final text virtually identical to the 
original Finnish draft and on April 6th 1948 the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA)107 was formally concluded in Moscow in the presence of Stalin himself. 
There was no trace in it of the military clauses which had made the independence of Hungary 
and Romania illusory.  
The key provision of the treaty, in Article 1, stated that “in the eventuality that Finland, or the 
Soviet Union through the territory of Finland, become the object of military aggression on the 
part of Germany or any other Power allied with the latter, Finland will, true to its duty as a 
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sovereign state, fight to repel aggression”; it further stated that Finnish forces would be acting 
only within the limits of Finland’s own boundaries and that the Soviet Union would extend to 
Finland assistance “if necessary” and “as mutually agreed between the parties”; the issue of 
consultation was dealt with in Article 2, which stated that the parties “will consult in case 
there is found to be a threat of the military aggression referred to in Article 1”. Concerning the 
obligation of consultation, Paasikivi stated immediately after the signing of the treaty that 
such an obligation had been limited as closely as possible108. 
Even if Article 1 and Article 2 specifically dealt with obligations laid upon Finland in the 
interest of Soviet defense, from a Finnish point of view the most valued provision was the one 
taken into account in the Preamble, wherein Moscow acknowledged Finland’s “desire to stay 
outside the conflicts of interest between the great powers”: although according to the general 
principles of international law the Preamble is regarded as a mere indication of the objectives 
and purposes of the parties and thus does not reach the degree of substantive obligation it 
would have if included in the main body of the treaty109, the inclusion of one of Finland’s 
cardinal aspirations at the time in a legal instrument, meant for many observers the official 
recognition of Finland’s neutrality110. 
The main interpretative issue that was posed regarding the FCMA treaty of 1948 regarded the 
presumed incompatibility between neutrality and the limited military obligations provided for 
by the agreement: it has been objected that being the treaty by form and content a potential 
military alliance, any Finnish aspirations for neutrality would inevitably have to be abandoned 
in case of conflict and replaced by military cooperation111; others have observed how the ideal 
of neutrality can instead be considered complementary with limited military obligations, as the 
latter constituted the necessary precondition for securing the confidence of the Soviet Union, 
without which neutrality would have been built on sand112. By officially committing to 
neutrality in the frame of a treaty of alliance, Finland assured the Soviet Union that it would 
provide neither encouragement nor aid to potential enemy forces. This interpretation inclined 
Moscow to be favorably disposed toward Finnish neutrality, which after all served Soviet 
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security interests, so in the course of time, as the policy of neutrality became increasingly 
credible, the military component of the pact waned.  
The treaty, ratified by the Eduskunta on April 28th by a wide majority of 157 votes against 11 
with 30 absent, significantly helped to stabilize Soviet-Finnish relations by giving the Soviet 
Union guarantees that it would not face a military threat from the direction of Finland. But 
why did the Soviet government so readily accept the Finnish proposals? Stalin’s letter was 
rather straightforward in suggesting a treaty similar to those concluded by the Soviet Union 
with Hungary and Romania, and yet, when the Finnish negotiators arrived in Moscow a month 
later, Soviet leaders made no attempt to obtain such a treaty. In the absence of concrete 
evidence, it is impossible to ascertain exactly which factors induced the Soviet government to 
radically modify its attitude toward Finland, but scholars have suggested at least three 
interesting hypothesis: according to the first, the Soviet about-face can be explained by the 
respect and trust Stalin felt for Paasikivi, under whom Finland could be considered a friendly 
country and whose domestic prestige and role the Soviets did not want to discredit113; the 
second hypothesis takes into account the steady step taken by the Western world, shocked by 
the events in Czechoslovakia of February 1948, into organizing itself against the Soviet Union 
(even Norway and Sweden were about to abandon their traditional neutrality)114; the third 
option highlights the geographical location of Finland which, unlike Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Romania, did not represent a dangerous wedge deep into the Soviet security zone115.  
Basically, the Soviet Union, after having considered all of the above mentioned factors, 
decided to exert a gentle influence upon Finland rather than a tough domination, because the 
former was sufficient in order to guarantee a credible defense without exposing the Soviet 
Union to the risks of a counter-balancing western move or to resistance on behalf of the 
Finnish people. This Soviet soft power in Finland and its influence in its domestic politics was 
a means to preserve a favorable direction in the small neighbor’s foreign policy, but at the 
same time it left enough autonomy for Finland to continue developing as a western democracy 
and industrialize its economy with multilateral trade arrangements with countries on both 
sides of the iron curtain116. Not being formally bound to any bloc, Finland managed to avoid 
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the presence of Soviet troops on its territory and to stay out of the Warsaw Pact of 1955117. 
The condition for this mechanism to work properly was that the people in key decision-
making positions had to be trusted by the Soviets and considered functional for the continuity 
of Finnish foreign policy. As long as this balance was kept, Finnish-Soviet relations could 
develop smoothly, as they did in the first decade after the FCMA treaty, but any malfunction 
in the mechanism of trust would have led to a sudden change in the attitude of the Soviet 
leadership toward Finland, as the crises of 1958 and 1961 were to demonstrate.  
When the new parliamentary elections were held in July 1948, the results were surprisingly 
negative for the communist SKDL, which suffered a sharp decline of 11 seats, whereas both 
the SPD and the Maalaisliitto improved their position in the Eduskunta. Albeit defeated, it was 
expected that the SKDL would be included in the government, especially considering the new 
attitude toward the Soviet Union, but their too high demands led to their exclusion from the 
cabinet formed by the Social Democrat K.-A. Fagerholm. The first sign of negative Soviet 
response to the new government came from the press, with open criticism and accusations 
charging Finland with dreams of restoring a fascist regime under foreign control118.  
Even when the attacks from the media gradually intensified, but the Soviet government did 
not undertake any official step, preferring a wait-and-see policy in order to check how 
trustworthy it could be. Finland’s democratic institutions had evidently resisted the influence 
exerted from the eastern neighbor. On the other side, Soviet leaders were quick to see the 
importance of friendly relations with their small European non-socialist neighbor as an 
excellent advertisement for their new foreign policy line which, aimed at a broad reappraisal 
with the West. 
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3.3 BETWEEN FAIRWEATHER AND STORMS (1948-1961) 
 
In the late summer of 1955, six months before Paasikivi’s second term was over, the Soviet 
government declared itself prepared for immediately returning to Finland the Porkkala 
peninsula, leased as a naval base to the Soviet Union for a period of fifty years accordingly to 
the preliminary peace of 1944, in exchange for a prompt extension of the validity of the 
FCMA treaty for another twenty years. Paasikivi did not hesitate to accept and immediately 
left for Moscow, where the agreement was signed on September 19th. It must be observed that, 
considering the strategic irrelevance of this out-of-date naval base in the nuclear era, the 
Soviets did not give up anything in terms of the global balance of power, whereas they gained 
a lot in terms of security by renewing the treaty of 1948, since no one could be sure who 
might be elected after the retirement of the aging President of Finland. In addition, the Soviet 
magnanimous concession can be undoubtedly related to the contemporary context of 
international relations, which as a consequence of the Conference of Geneva was experiencing 
a moderate relief of tension119. The elimination of this military base so close to Helsinki had 
instead a much greater importance from a Finnish point of view, not only because it reflected 
a fundamental improvement of the reciprocal relations, but also because it opened the way to 
international recognition of Finnish neutrality120. A spokesman of the Ministry of Defense 
gave the following comment on this event: “As the point of departure for this new 
development we can regard the return of the Porkkala area in 1956. This event engendered the 
prerequisites necessary for the maintenance of our neutrality even in a crisis situation and the 
means of safeguarding the integrity of our borders in all directions”121. The Soviet 
preparedness to relinquish Porkkala also revitalized hopes that the part of Karelia lost in 1940 
could be returned to Finland, but the issue of revising the territorial provisions of the peace 
treaty were rejected right away by the Soviet leaders, according to whom the borders formed 
after World War II were to be considered irrevocable.  
Nevertheless, being finally able to claim control over its territory, Finland was now entitled to 
ask others to respect its neutrality in the event of war. Indeed, it is not chance that only a 
month after the base’s evacuation, in February 1956, Finland was for the very first time 
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referred to as a neutral country during the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party. In 
that same year, Finland also received the green light for joining the United Nations 
Organization, as a result of the Soviet-American agreement not to veto each other’s candidates 
for membership, and began participating in the activities of the Nordic Council, an organ of 
cooperation between the parliaments and governments of five Scandinavian countries created 
in 1951. Paasikivi’s mission was over. The task of securing wider acceptance and recognition 
of the policy of neutrality rested on the shoulders of his successor, President U.K. Kekkonen. 
He can be considered without any doubt the architect of Finland’s postwar destiny, an 
exceptionally energetic and talented politician who actively engaged in all major aspects of 
public life for over four decades. Especially Finland’s foreign policy is synonymous with 
Kekkonen’s foreign policy. Born in 1900 and brought up within the traditions of nationalism, 
since the early 1940s Kekkonen began advocating a more dynamic attitude toward the Soviet 
Union and after the war became one of the President Paasikivi’s most trusted ministers, even 
if suspected of collusions with the communist circles. Between 1950 and 1956 he served as 
Prime Minister in five cabinets, emerging as Paasikivi’s designated heir122. Kekkonen and 
Paasikivi shared the conviction that foreign policy had to take precedence over domestic 
policy and that Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union had to take precedence over all other 
foreign policy considerations, but they adopted opposite approaches in working toward this 
goal: whereas Paasikivi’s cautious conservatism strove for optimal adaptation to the prevailing 
conditions, Kekkonen’s bold dynamism emphasized the positive effect of change on Finland’s 
international standing123. 
When Paasikivi announced his retirement, just before the presidential elections in 1956, the 
contest for his succession involved Fagerholm and Kekkonen, with the latter eventually 
prevailing with the minimum possible majority, thanks to the decisive support of the SKDL. 
The choice was also appreciated in Moscow, where the post-Stalinian leadership was looking 
for someone who could perpetuate Paasikivi’s truthful policy.  
In 1957, however, the invitation to form a new government to the pro-American V. Tanner, 
tried by will of the Soviet-controlled control commission in 1946 and sentenced to five years 
and six months of prison due to his responsibilities in Finland’s wartime policy, sparked a 
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deep domestic and international crisis: not only the choice of such an unacceptable politician 
was bitterly welcomed in Moscow, but it also split the Finnish political parties, so that in the 
parliamentary elections in July 1958 the Communists were able to emerge as the leading force 
with 50 out of 200 seats. Shocked by this unexpected result, the moderate parties regained 
unity and formed a large coalition government under the direction of Fagerholm. Soviet 
apprehensions over the possible formation of a “reactionary government”124 seemed to have 
been borne out. The reactions were vehement: contrary to diplomatic practice, the Soviet 
ambassador in Helsinki left for Moscow without paying the customary farewell visit to the 
President; trade and economic negotiations underway in Moscow were postponed on the 
pretext of technical grounds; Finnish diplomats in the Soviet Union were isolated; the Soviet 
press published several anti-Finnish articles125. As the pressure heightened, little doubt was 
left of the fact that it was aimed at forcing the resignation of the government, although no 
official communication was dispatched on behalf of the Soviets. Under such a pressure, 
Fagerholm had no other alternative but to resign. Only a personal meeting in January 1959 
between President Kekkonen and Premier Khrushchev restored normal diplomatic relations 
and put an end to the so-called “night frost crisis”. 
The events were not devoid of consequences. Above all, it showed that the friendly relations 
established in 1948 and the Soviet moderation toward Finland, expressed in the form of a soft 
sphere of influence, could be maintained only on the fundamental condition that it would 
function satisfactorily, meaning that the Soviet expectations would not be threatened; 
otherwise, Moscow would not hesitate to resort to harder means of pressure126. Finland 
realized that and all things considered chose to accept a certain degree of foreign interference 
in order to regain Soviet confidence in its neutrality, considering that a deterioration of Soviet-
Finnish relations could bring to the point of weakening the country’s own security. 
Another crisis troubled the precarious balance between Finland and the Soviet Union, on the 
background of high Cold War tensions127. This time the cause was a note, delivered to the 
Finnish ambassador in Moscow on October 30th 1961, proposing “consultations on measures 
for insuring defense of the frontiers of both countries from the threat of a military attack by 
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Western Germany and allied states as it is envisaged by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance”128. According to this document, German rearmament in the frame of 
NATO constituted a threat to the Scandinavian area, because countries such as Denmark and 
Norway were being drawn into the sphere of influence of Western Germany. Soviet leaders 
were greatly concerned about the increasing participation of the northern NATO members into 
the organization’s command structure129 and as a consequence, consultations with Finland 
were seen as part of a broader range of security measures implemented by the Soviet Union as 
a response to the mounting tension in Europe. 
The sole idea of military consultation with the Soviet government stirred apprehension in 
Helsinki, where it was feared that they could burden Finland with undesired commitments that 
would undermine the recently recognized neutrality as well as the Nordic Balance idea, 
drawing the country into the Soviet strategic bloc and forcing it to be involved in the East-
West opposition. Once again most international observers took for granted that Finland had no 
choice but to enter into the talks and accept whatever the Soviets had in mind, despite the 
statements made by the Finnish government and aimed at assuring that there was no ongoing 
crisis with the Soviet Union and that Finland’s intention was to preserve its neutrality while 
maintaining good relations with all nations.  
The Finnish Foreign Minister, A. Karjalainen, met his Soviet counterpart A. Gromyko in the 
middle of November, but no military experts went with him. During the meeting, the Russians 
explained how their government felt the urge to start military consultations with Finland, not 
only due to the above mentioned international developments, but also to the uncertain political 
situations in Finland itself, where the re-election of Kekkonen in the presidential elections in 
January 1962 seemed to be questioned by the well-organized “Honka Front”, a coalition le by 
the Social Democrats and the Conservatives. Any threat to Kekkonen’s position was felt as a 
threat to Finnish neutrality and thus to Soviet interests in the area130 because it was obvious 
that, if neutrality had to be abandoned, Finland would have certainly joined the West rather 
than the East as its natural ally. The threat to neutrality, posed by eventual consultations, was 
used by Moscow as a mean of pressure in order to obtain the desired electoral outcome. 
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Even when Kekkonen dissolved the Eduskunta and anticipated the parliamentary elections, 
this way shortening the period of domestic political uncertainty, the Soviet leadership kept 
insisting for military consultations to be initiated, judging the undertaken measures not 
appropriate to ensure the presidential outcome. Once again, only a meeting between 
Kekkonen and Khruschev, held in November in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, solved the 
crisis. The Finnish President managed to turn to his advantage Khruschev’s will to reduce 
tension in Europe and convinced the Soviets that carrying out the consultations would have 
the effect of alarming the other Scandinavian countries, whose confidence on Finnish 
neutrality could not be underestimated, consequently causing an intensification of military 
activities on their territories131. The joint statement dispatched at the end of the meeting, 
although somewhat ambiguous, in effect confirmed the interpretation that both parties of the 
FCMA treaty had to recognize the actual existence of a threat of aggression before 
consultations could take place, implying that Finland would have the last word on the issue. 
On that same day, Kekkonen’s chief adversary withdrew his candidacy, allowing the former to 
be re-elected with a two thirds majority. 
Such a successful management of the crisis on behalf of Finland did not prevent the most 
acute observers132 from emphasizing the extreme frailty of neutrality in the frame of a sphere 
of foreign influence, especially in the face of international tensions and conflict. In the autumn 
of 1961 there were no material grounds to claim the existence of a serious threat of armed 
attack133 and so Finland was able to retain its peacetime neutrality, but if a war really had to be 
expected the greater power would have applied more pressure for the alliance to serve its 
wartime military interests. 
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3.4 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATE COLD WAR YEARS (1961-1989) 
 
The most significant strategic development in Scandinavia in the years following the two 
Finnish-Soviet crises was the increasing concentration of the great power alliance systems on 
the Arctic Sea, on the background of the balance of terror134. The most recent nuclear-
weapons development revolutionized the overall notion of strategic doctrine and defense 
policy: offensive actions involving the movement of armies, navies and aircraft could be 
initiated with ballistic missiles fired from far away, whereas defense had to be concentrated in 
the vicinity of the possible target areas. Most evidently in Soviet-Finnish relations, now that 
such weapons could cause the devastation of Stalingrad or any other Soviet region from 
behind the Atlantic Ocean, Finland’s geostrategic importance rapidly declined in the eyes of 
the great power. In this totally innovative context, Finland’s main security concern became a 
possible abuse of its air space, whose protection required the creation of an effective air 
defense through the acquirement of some up-to-date equipment that was prohibited by the 
Peace Treaty of 1947. Any proposal for a revision of the latter was of course out of question, 
since it would have opened an East-West controversy on this point and on several related 
issues as well, whereas simply reinterpreting the treaty without actually revising it 
encountered doubt and suspicion135. On the other hand, the present situation would have 
exposed Finland to the risk of not being able to prevent foreign powers from using its air 
space, dangerously affecting its capability of organizing an autonomous defense outside the 
provisions for military assistance of the FCMA treaty and thus of remaining neutral. 
The issue was first risen in 1961, when the crisis of Berlin highlighted that the Cold War 
tensions were reaching a climax, but only after some months of negotiations involving the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain, on October 1962 the British government accepted a 
reinterpretation of the treaty, on the condition that Finland continued to adhere to its policy of 
international neutrality, or in other words, that the country would keep a balance between arm 
purchases from the East and from the West, as the tendency for procurements to be made one-
sidedly from one of the two blocs would have risen the suspect of a political dependence 
“which in certain situations could limit decisively Finland’s opportunities to maintain its 
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policy of neutrality”136. The problem of controlling Finnish air space involved not only the 
threat perceived by the Soviet Union in the possible use of Norwegian airfields against the 
Kola peninsula and the Murmansk naval base, but also the possibility, never officially 
acknowledged in Finland, that during a crisis the Soviets may wish to make use of the existing 
airfields in Norway to extend air cover for their fleet in the Atlantic Ocean. 
The removal of legal obstacles to the creation of an effective air defense also had a more 
important meaning for Finland: it was the confirmation of the acceptance of its neutrality, both 
on behalf of the Soviet and the British governments. These developments induced President 
Kekkonen to declare, on the occasion of Finland’s 50th anniversary of independence in 1967, 
that the security of the country had never been greater137. Since the “note crisis”, Soviet 
interference in Finnish domestic concerns has been mostly limited to occasional comments in 
the press and from official spokesmen, but in general the tension level decreased significantly; 
two examples may indicate the restraint exercised by the Soviets in their dealings with Finnish 
affairs138: in 1971 the Soviet ambassador was recalled from Helsinki after he had become 
involved in the internal feuds of the Communist Party of Finland; in 1978 a suggestion by a 
Finnish leftist newspaper that Finnish military forces should hold joint maneuvers with Soviet 
forces was quickly dismissed by military officials as incompatible with their country's 
neutrality, with no Soviet rejoinder. 
Conversely, the lessening of political strains opened the way for improved economic relations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union. The thesis of peaceful coexistence, which underpinned 
the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, did not affect the economic 
preconditions of these trade relations, instead strengthening their political content. Since the 
early post-war years Finnish-Soviet trade had become a primary instrument in Finland’s 
eastern policy139. The war reparations in fact, consisting of goods and machinery requested by 
Moscow, had the double effect of rapidly expanding and diversifying the Finnish industry to 
an extent that would hardly have been possible under normal conditions140 and at the same 
time of strengthening solid economic ties for the future, since several reparation products were 
highly valued by the Soviet Union due to the fine standards of Finnish workmanship. After the 
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reparations had been fully paid, for example, Finland continued to deliver ships, machines and 
other heavy industry products to the Soviet Union as normal exports. Soviet political 
considerations also had an essential role in enhancing trade between the two countries: as long 
as Finnish industry remained greatly dependant on Soviet energy sources, oil and electricity 
above all, Finland would be prevented from participating in the political-economic expansion 
and integration of Western Europe141.  
This trade with the eastern neighbor gained in significance even more, as the import-side grew 
to comprise goods of vital importance for the national economy: most of the Finnish demand 
for cereals, petroleum products, coal, coke and synthetic fertilizers, all products which 
fluctuated widely in availability and price on Western markets142, has been satisfied through 
intensive trade with the Soviet Union. The size of Finnish-Soviet trade is demonstrated by the 
fact that Finland, in spite of a relatively small population, maintained for several years the 
greatest volume of trade with the East among West European countries143. Since trade acted 
for Soviet leaders as an indicator of the overall state of relations between the two countries, 
the Finnish government always paid close attention to the volume of trade with the Soviet 
Union. This was especially true during the years of President Kekkonen, who believed not 
only in the political benefits but also strongly in the economic benefits of trade with the Soviet 
Union, acknowledging that the promotion of welfare goals through mutual exchange was a 
common interest of both countries144. In this respect, Finland’s commercial orientation since 
World War II exhibits radically different features from those of its policy in the inter-war 
period, when trade across the Eastern border was extremely insignificant.  
The methods of agreement by which this trade developed mainly consisted of contracts 
extending over several years and comprising fixed quotas of both import and export goods. 
Detailed yearly agreements were then stipulated within the framework of the long-range 
contract and concerned the different deliveries of goods. The prices were in principle set 
according to prevailing market prices and the payments were arranged by means of central 
clearing. The fact that trade was quantitatively fixed over rather long periods of time had a 
stabilizing effect on economic activity in Finland, which continued to flourish even when the 
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international markets were subject to the dramatic crises of 1967 and 1973. Even when the 
Soviet Union decided to rise the oil prices to the Rotterdam notation level, in the autumn of 
1973, at a time when Finland was importing 74% of its overall oil requirement from the 
eastern partner, the pursue of mutually profitable trade relations were not damaged145.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Finnish-Soviet economic relations pioneered methods of 
trade and forms of cooperation between East and West. In 1955 the two countries had 
concluded a special treaty on scientific-technical cooperation, which was reinforced by a 
treaty in 1966; the following year Finland was the first Western state to establish with the 
Soviet Union a permanent commission for economic cooperation, an organism charged with 
the task of assessing the possibilities for cooperation in various areas, which carried out 
preparatory work to arrange the treaty of economic, technical and scientific cooperation 
signed in 1971146. By the mid-1970s, a great number of joint Finnish-Soviet programs had 
been completed and new ones were under construction or preparation: Finland built some 
power plants along its eastern border on Soviet territory; the Soviet Union supervised the 
construction of the Finnish nuclear power station in Loviisa; several projects for the 
construction of industrial plants in third countries were created jointly by Soviet organizations 
and Finnish firms. Associations like the Finnish-Soviet Society, founded in 1944 chiefly for 
the promotion of cultural relations, must also be remembered for the role they played in 
launching initiatives for the building up of economic relations147. 
Economic ties with the Soviet Union however did not prevent Finland from cultivating its 
relations with the Western economies, especially since the second half of the 1960s. From a 
purely economic point of view, in fact, Finland drew greatly valuable benefits from being able 
to take advantage of the many opportunities offered by commercial relations in the two 
directions. This way Finland managed to strengthen further its role between East and West, 
because it remained clear that each step taken in one direction had to be counter-balanced by a 
step in the other148: this is clearly exemplified by the way Finland in 1973 signed both 
cooperation agreements with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) formed 
by the Socialist countries and with the European Economic Community (EEC). With regard to 
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the former, Finland first indicated its interest in the new possibilities under the integration 
program in July 1971, presented its draft on the trade and cooperation agreement in December 
1972 and ratified the pact the following year. Although Finland did not become an actual 
member of the Council as a result of the agreement, it was allowed to “take part, fully or 
partially, in the implementation of Comecon’s Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and 
Integration”149, this way developing multilateral cooperation on questions of mutual interest in 
various fields of the economy, science and technology. Consequently, several bilateral 
meetings concerning the removal of trade restrictions were also held between Finland and 
countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany. East 
European sources tended to emphasize the model character of the agreement, as the first of its 
kind with a non-socialist state, stressing the “openness” of Comecon and the various benefits 
which the cooperating countries could enjoy without fear of losing independence, sovereignty, 
or neutrality150.   
Aside from lively economic cooperation, this third phase of Soviet-Finnish relations, 
especially the years between 1968 and 1982, was characterized by a certain attitude of the 
Finnish administration toward the Soviet Union, at a time when Finnish-Russian relations 
were undergoing a period of strain, which has often been criticized by foreign observers, who 
regarded Finland’s foreign policy as being almost entirely subordinated to the interests of the 
more powerful neighbor. The term Finlandization (Suomettuminen)151 and the theory behind it 
report, despite the conservation of traditional institutional forms, a severe loss of autonomy in 
Finland’s domestic policy-making and also, but the claim is controversial152, in its foreign 
policy, realized through the adaptation of both government personnel and political strategies 
to the desiderata of the Soviet Union. When analyzing the relations between two countries 
whose status and power resources are notably asymmetric it is, of course, hardly surprising to 
detect in many fields a clear correspondence of policies due to the prevalence of the bigger 
state’s dictates153; such elements of natural conditioning can be pointed out also in the case of 
Finnish-Soviet relations, but according to the advocates of Finlandization their extent is 
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disproportionate and resulted from excessive submissiveness of the ruling élite to the explicit 
or implicit pressure exerted by the Soviet government154. 
In effect, when by means of special legislation Kekkonen was nominated President for the 
fourth time in 1974 without having to face an opposition candidate, and then once again in 
1978, the facts seemed to fully confirm Finland’s compliance. The total loyalty to the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line pursued by every political party in the country as a patriotic duty155 
and the high degree of self-censorship and restraint exercised by or imposed on the media156 
may also be elements to be taken into account when evaluating this phase of Finland’s history, 
as well as the ban of any publication charged with jeopardizing the relations with the Soviet 
Union (the refusal of publishing A. Solzhenitsyn’s “Gulag Archipelago” in 1974 is probably 
the best-known example of this conduct).     
The debate between “prudence” and “servility” is legitimate and worth of in-depth analysis 
with regard to the specific situations and to the overall context, but when presented in a 
simplistic way as a-critical prostration the Finlandization theory highlights the lack of 
adequate understanding of the complexity of both the international political scenario and 
Finland’s internal politics. At least two crucial features of the Finnish-Soviet system can be 
mentioned in order account for the degree of independence Finland enjoyed even within the 
foreign sphere of influence: the steady development and prompt Soviet recognition of 
neutrality is the first and perhaps most important, but also the pursuit and maintenance of 
strong Western ties, both economically and politically, must be interpreted as a proof that the 
accuse of passive Finlandization is totally inadequate to summarize this period of Finnish 
politics. 
Kekkonen’s withdrawal from public life due to ill health signified of course a major turn for 
the whole country. Originally the former Foreign Minister A. Karjalainen had been designated 
in Moscow as Kekkonen’s natural heir, but the elections of 1983 were won by the Social 
Democrat M. Koivisto. However the rearranging of the political scenario was made easier by 
the lessening of pressure from Moscow, were the wind of change was also starting to blow. In 
his dealing with the Soviet Union, however, Koivisto maintained continuity, even in the use of 
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the channels of communication that his predecessor had built up: in 1983 the FCMA treaty 
was extended for further twenty years and the rhetoric of firm and friendly relations remained 
in place. Koivisto established a good working relationship both with M. Gorbachev and with 
G. Bush, playing a useful role as a mediator in the final stages of the Cold War157.  
Although the overall international situation of the Soviet Union was obviously deteriorating at 
a fast pace, in difficult moments, such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, Finland 
refrained from any negative comment. On the contrary, Finnish official policy in the face of 
the impending breakup of the Soviet Union remained cautious, though considerable assistance 
and support was unofficially provided to leading figures in the independence movement in 
Estonia158. However, under Koivisto, an entirely new approach was gradually adopted to the 
problematic issue of the relation between the FCMA Treaty and neutrality, aimed at 
highlighting that no inconsistency subsisted between the two, as they belonged to distinct 
fields159. The matter was finally settled in October 1989, when M. Gorbachev officially 
recognized Finland’s neutrality as well as the continued importance of the FCMA Treaty. 
Shortly afterwards, the twilight of the Soviet Union oriented the relationship between the two 
countries according to entirely different guidelines. 
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4. FINNISH-WESTERN RELATIONS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The experiences of the war years clearly showed Finland that the vital strategic interests of the 
Western Powers did not extend to this part of the Baltic, or that at least they were unable to 
enforce any interest in that area. In effect, they had already recognized such a situation before 
the outbreak of World War II, when during the negotiations that took place in 1939, involving 
the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, it appeared without a doubt that the border-states, 
including Finland, were to be left under Soviet rather than Western protection against a 
possible military attack from Germany. The same concept was reaffirmed at the Yalta 
Conference held in February 1945, where the Soviet legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
countries on its borders would not be unfriendly, was more explicitly recognized by the “big 
three” – Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin.  
Establishing a closer cooperation with the Soviet Union of course meant missing on the 
opportunity to participate in the earliest American postwar initiatives aimed at getting Europe 
back on its feet – the economic aid of the Marshall Plan above all – but on the other side it 
also meant realistically taking into account the strategic imperatives and the geographical 
position of Finland, caught between an aggressive superpower and neutral Scandinavian 
neighbors, with very few opportunities to interact with the West. Considering these 
inconveniences, maintaining friendly relations with the Kremlin, sometimes bordering on 
subservience, became an absolute priority for all the governing parties: acts or 
pronouncements that might be construed as hostile in Moscow were carefully avoided, 
discreet self-censorship was a widespread practice, continuity of the Paasikivi line was the 
main concern of the administration. How far could Finland in these difficult circumstances 
maintain some kind of relations with the West, particularly from the point of view of 
preserving the credibility of its neutrality?  
This seemingly unfavorable situation did not prevent Finland from pursuing the objective of 
participation in the latest developments of international cooperation among states, a concept 
that has grown considerably since World War II, as far as becoming one of the dominant 
processes in world politics. Finland’s postwar foreign policy, as analyzed above, first 
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concentrated on relations with the Soviet Union, so both the participation in international 
organizations and the enthusiasm toward Scandinavian cooperation in this early phase had to 
be relegated to a place of secondary importance, but not for long. Skillful policy and the 
personal diplomacy of charismatic leaders such as U. Kekkonen and M. Koivisto secured for 
Finland a position of national sovereignty and considerable autonomy in foreign affairs. The 
essence of Finland’s dilemma in these years was to somehow maintain good relations with 
both blocs, without raising the suspicion of either. It has been argued that the promotion of 
détente within international organizations and the building up of a network of contact points 
served the general purpose of avoiding the actual materialization of this dilemma160. 
Within the limits set by the Soviet Union, Scandinavian regionalism was certainly a cardinal 
principle of Finland’s foreign policy. The interdependence among these formally separated 
nations is rather obvious and roots deeply in their common cultural and political heritage, but 
the nature of such a relationship is more complex: without any doubt it is possible to assert 
that any change in one country in the area has a profound effect on all the others, but the 
assumption of the existence of a system of check and balances that tends to counteract any 
alteration needs to be examined with some caution. The Nordic Balance can be defined as a 
means not only to preserve the existing situation, but also to keep available certain options for 
modifying it161. The actual achievements of Finland’s Scandinavian orientations were rather 
scarce: from the point of view of security policy, neither a military alliance nor a formalized 
nuclear-free zone were indeed put into practice due to the different perceptions and 
commitments of each country; from a political and economic point of view, as well, some 
limited successes were registered, such an the institution of the Nordic Council and the 
implementation of a common labor market, but the most relevant accomplishments were 
obtained by the joint Scandinavian initiatives in the framework of broader structures.  Of 
particular importance to this end is the integration in EFTA, an economic association which 
involved Finland alongside its Nordic neighbors, replacing the idea of a Scandinavian 
common market and eventually leading these countries to apply for European Union 
membership.    
                                                            
160 MAUDE [1976], pp. 42-44; 
161 JAKOBSON [1968], pp. 91-92; 
 
 
59
Indeed, closer economic and political cooperation with Western Europe and involvement in 
the process of European integration had been among the most significant desires of Finnish 
foreign policy since the end of World War II, because of cultural affinity as well as economic 
convenience, but for a long time the developments of the international situations made it 
impossible to pursue them freely. The first step toward the West was taken between 1948 and 
1950, when Finland joined the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, fully participating in their economic programs, but still 
avoiding any political implications of membership that could be seen by the Soviets to link the 
country to the West162. For the same reason, aid from the Marshall Plan had been turned down 
only a few years earlier and the first initiatives to unite Europe were reluctantly ignored. 
European integration, whose initial progresses regarded the economic level with the 
association to EFTA and the EEC, must be seen within the general frame of Finland’s policy 
of neutrality, not influenced by such integration. This did not certainly lead to isolation; on the 
contrary, a successful neutrality opened the doors to multiple and active foreign economic 
relations163. By advancing in partial stages, the Finns have been able to avoid accusations of 
leaning toward European integration, while at the same time they have been able to keep their 
markets open to the benefits deriving from such a process.  
If economic integration was to be successful, political development would have followed. In 
fact, starting in 1961 from an external association with EFTA carefully balanced by equivalent 
measures toward the Soviet Union, Finland was able to gradually improve its situation and 
shift closer in the direction of Europe in 1973, when a commercial accord with the EEC was 
reached, although still countervailed by a deal with the eastern economic organization. As the 
hypothesis of a Soviet armed attack became less and less likely, Finland acquired a certain 
degree of confidence in its possibilities to approach the European institutions directly, an 
option that finally materialized after the end of the Cold War and the definitive breakdown of 
the Soviet Union, opening the way for Finland’s membership in the European Union in 1995. 
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4.2 PARTICIPATING IN WESTERN INTEGRATION 
 
Although Finland’s foreign trade had traditionally been oriented toward Western Europe, 
which provided the best markets for its exports of wood-processing products, Helsinki’s 
position in international politics did not allow direct participation in any form of European 
postwar cooperation. Geographically too distant from the area where the first steps of 
integration were being undertaken and subject to the influence of Moscow, the country had to 
surrender any hope to be involved in the early initiatives for uniting Europe. Some hard 
renunciations had to be made, in order to win Soviet approval: one of the earliest examples 
was in the summer of 1947, regarding the possible participation to the conference of European 
countries in Paris, in order to discuss their needs under the projected aid plan, conceived by 
the United States as a means of providing them with the necessary resources to rebuild their 
devastated societies and impoverished economies.  
The participation of the Soviet Union in the preliminary talks with France and Great Britain 
seemed to imply that Finland could take parts in the discussions as well, especially 
considering that its economy was not in the position to overlook any aid, no matter where it 
would be coming from164. Not participating would have meant missing the opportunity to 
receive credits for the reconstruction programs and in effect most European countries, the 
neutrals included, did not hesitate to take part in the Marshall Plan. However, the Soviet 
Union regarded the initiative as an attempt to construct an anti-communist front in Europe, so 
that on July 8th 1947, four days after Finland had received the official invitation to participate 
to the conference, Moscow dispatched an official note to Helsinki, bearing the admonition that 
accepting the offer would have been inevitably considered an act hostile to the Soviet 
Union165: behind the deceptive smokescreen of generosity, the Soviets saw the United States’ 
attempt to bind as many European economies as possible to their own sphere of influence and 
were not willing to let Finland slide westwards.  
After a first heated reaction, Paasikivi realized that his country had no other choice but to 
comply with the Soviet desire, not being ready to face a conflict with Moscow in an 
international dispute. Although a negative response may have signified a tremendous blow to 
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Finland’s international prestige and economic relations, on July 10th the government 
unanimously approved a proposal in which the invitation to the Paris conference was 
courteously turned down. Making a virtue of necessity, Finland proclaimed a policy of not 
seeking aid from any quarter, deliberately excluding itself from the first integration processes 
and institutions of the Western world, where plans for liberalization and multilateralization of 
trade were being discussed and carried out166: the country was left out of the OEEC, one of the 
main steps toward European integration, and of the Council of Europe; other pertinent 
examples of this policy, some years later, regard the EFTA negotiations in 1958-1959 and the 
Nordek plan in 1970. Non-participation to these initiatives was the high price Finland had to 
pay to preserve its own national security. 
However, true to its positive attitude toward free trade, Finland took part in other programs 
that established valuable contacts with the West: it joined the World Bank, which granted 
indispensable loans for reactivating production and rebuilding infrastructure after the war167, 
and the International Monetary Fund, both in 1948. Also, Finland was an eager supporter of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty signed by forty countries with the aim of 
progressively reducing barriers to international trade by forcing down tariffs, quantitative 
restrictions and subsidies through mutual agreements. The GATT treaty was ratified by the 
Eduskunta in 1949. Another step toward closer economic contacts with the West was the 
drawing up of the protocol of the “Helsinki Club”, signed between Finland and the OEEC 
countries in 1957, which provided an equivalent for the European Payments Union, 
considerably easing the payments position in reciprocal trade. 
Meanwhile, in Western Europe, the efforts to free and boost international trade were 
multiplying: the idea of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), launched in 1950 by 
the French Foreign Minister R. Schuman, opened the way to a series of initiatives which, 
driven forward by the great economic benefits they implied, culminated with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, for the institution of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
the first hallmark of the process of European integration. Once again, strategic as well as 
economic considerations prevented Finland from taking part in the creation of these 
commercial coalitions, despite the awareness that isolation from the integrating markets of 
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Western Europe would have implied a reduction of Finnish exports toward this area, with 
disastrous effects for the national economy168. 
Whatever the consequence, the political aims that the newly built organizations were designed 
to promote, as well as their link with the NATO military alliance169, could hardly be 
compatible with Finland’s desire for neutrality or with its obligations to the Soviet Union. In 
effect in Helsinki, as in the other Scandinavian countries, the main factor encouraging 
involvement in the process of European integration and cooperation was commercial: relying 
on trade for a relatively high proportion of their gross domestic product (between 20% and 
25%)170, these countries could not afford overlooking the increasing economic integration of 
Western Europe, the major market for Scandinavian export goods. 
When the European Economic Community was established, Finland was not inclined to 
become a member, as the economic benefits of joining were seen as rather limited, especially 
considering that Great Britain remained outside as well. More consideration was given instead 
to the British-Swedish proposal for a free trade area among the industrialized states outside 
the EEC: however, when the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was founded, 
following smooth negotiations, under the Stockholm agreement of 1960, it did not include 
Finland, because Moscow still regarded Western trade groupings with suspicion, as a danger 
to its own economic interests: a united, wealthy Europe could start to represent an appealing 
alternative to a socialist economy for its satellites, impairing the inner stability of the whole 
Eastern bloc. Things, however, moved forward rapidly: as early as the following year Finland 
became an associate member of EFTA under the special FINEFTA agreement, perhaps the 
clearest example of carefully balanced Finnish policy. The Soviet government explicitly 
recognized Finland’s interest in maintaining a trading position in the Western markets, 
whereas the EFTA countries accepted Finland’s interest in the Soviet market171.  
From a political perspective, the course of the negotiations for a special agreement with EFTA 
demonstrated the means by which Finland could preserve relations of mutual trust with the 
Soviet Union, while edging toward the institutions of Western economic integration: EFTA 
membership was in fact fully compatible with the policy of neutrality, since the organization 
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was only aiming at free trade, without any political or military implications that could be 
interpreted as threatening. From a trade-policy point of view, Finland’s the FINEFTA 
agreement was almost equivalent to full membership: all imports of manufactured goods from 
the other EFTA countries became free of duty in 1968 and several restrictions on the free flow 
of trade were also eliminated, resulting in a steady increase of Finnish exports; ultimately, 
Finland did not join EFTA as a full member until 1986, due to foreign policy and foreign trade 
constraints set by trade relations with the Soviet Union, to which Finland granted the same 
preferential treatment that it provided to its EFTA partners, for the most part based on the 
most-favored-nation clause172.  
The benefits brought by the association were obvious173: entering a market area of over one 
hundred million people not only represented an incentive to enhance the overall 
competitiveness of Finnish economy, but also meant that Finland was able to maintain an 
equitable position in the international market for its key export goods compared with its main 
competitors – Austria, Norway and Sweden. The liberalization of trade and capital movements 
also stimulated Finnish investments abroad and foreign investments in the country174. Most 
significantly, all of this was achieved without damaging the special trade relationship with the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, reaching an agreement with EFTA was an important step forward 
toward the realization of those plans for a Scandinavian common market sketched out as early 
as the 1950s, as in fact this association significantly increased Finnish trade with the other 
Scandinavian countries175: exports to Sweden rose by close to 80% and exports to Denmark 
rose by more than 80% between 1961 and 1966. 
There is good reason to emphasize the importance of the FINEFTA agreement also to Finnish 
trade outside Scandinavia, as for example it broke down tariffs between Finland and its 
traditionally biggest trading partner, Great Britain. In brief, besides purely numeric results 
visible in import and export statistics176, participation to EFTA drastically augmented the 
efficiency and diversification of Finnish economy within the framework of an increasingly 
integrating Europe, contributing to a spectacular rise of the gross domestic product. No 
inconsistency was noted in Helsinki between active participation in the integration process 
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and neutrality, as clearly exposed in an official statement of 1967: “it is only natural that we 
have participated in European economic integration and will continue to do so, keeping to our 
own neutral line in foreign policy. There is no contradiction in this. On the contrary, through 
participation in integration we have been able to strengthen our neutral position”177. Stronger 
commercial ties to the West were seen as a proper counter-weight to the existing economic 
relationship with the East. 
When Denmark and Norway applied for EEC membership alongside Great Britain in 1961, 
Finland, still conditioned by the above-mentioned note crisis, adopted a more cautious policy 
in order to avoid further deterioration of its relations with the Kremlin. All British attempts to 
find bilateral accommodation with the EEC were abruptly halted by general De Gaulle’s 
controversial vetoes in 1963 and 1967, temporarily reviving enthusiasm for EFTA, which had 
in the meanwhile proven very useful in increasing the level of trade among its members178. 
The prospects for an enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC), however, 
improved dramatically after De Gaulle’s withdrawal in 1969: the shift of Great Britain, 
Denmark and Norway toward EEC membership affected the relevance of EFTA and even cast 
some doubts on the continued existence of the organization. In April 1970 parallel 
negotiations with Finland, Sweden and Iceland for the conclusion of appropriate cooperation 
agreements were initiated. The political problems arising from them strained to the utmost 
Finland’s ability to harmonize the perceived requirements of neutral policy with the demands 
imposed by the process of European integration, while retaining Soviet confidence in the 
continuity of trade relations. 
The attraction of the EEC for dominant industrial and economic circles was clear: the entrance 
of Great Britain in the common market once again urged Finland to adapt its trade strategies 
accordingly and follow the trend. The government sought instead an economically balanced 
arrangement that could suit the policy of neutrality179; more specifically, the objective in 
Helsinki was the establishment of a commercial arrangement with the EEC, leading to the 
gradual implementation of free trade in industrial and agricultural goods and to the removal of 
all barriers and restrictions. The deal, reached a few months after the conclusion of a parallel 
cooperation agreement with Comecon, was signed on October 5th 1973: it covered a broad 
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spectrum of issues, including the gradual dismantling of tariffs on industrial products, the 
quantitative restrictions on imports and the progressive reduction of custom barriers.  
Despite some attempts to broaden and intensify the cooperation between EFTA and EEC 
“with the aim of creating a dynamic European economic space”180, the so-called 
“Luxembourg Process” failed to obtain the desired results181 and, by the second half of the 
1980s, the EFTA countries became frustrated by the slow pace of a dialogue that, besides 
futile declarations of political will, was still based on an awkward case-by-case approach. At 
the end of the decade, it still seemed difficult to reconcile European Community membership 
with neutrality182, but, as Soviet pressure extinguished little by little, Finland slowly overcame 
its traditional skepticism toward the supranational features of the community and started 
seeking closer economic, as well as political, ties with Western Europe.  
The need of international markets capable of replacing the Soviet Union’s can be pointed to as 
a crucial explanation for the rapprochement to the process of European integration: trade with 
the eastern partner declined from more than 20% of Finnish total external trade in the 1980s to 
less than 3% in 1992, leading to the natural downsizing of workforce and investments183. The 
sudden collapse of deeply-rooted commerce with the Soviet Union coincided with a recession 
also in Finland’s western export markets, due to financial speculation and failure of a banking 
system not used to deal with liberalization.   
Challenged by a grave economic crisis, Finland could not afford to miss the European train 
again. When the European Community, on which all the EFTA countries were highly reliant 
for their well-being, started to pursue the project of a European Economic Area, the model 
offered by J. Delors perfectly fit Finland’s expectations: the EEA was an extensive association 
agreement which, in short, allowed the EFTA countries to access the Single Market without 
requiring any commitment to the political aspects of integrated Europe. Negotiations for the 
attainment of this goal were initiated in October 1990, but they only represented the prelude to 
Finland’s application for full European Union membership.  
Sweden’s decision to seek participation in the same period certainly contributed to positively 
orient Finnish understanding of the implications stemming from joining Europe, but the 
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failure of the communist coup in August 1991 was the decisive turning point, persuading 
President Koivisto to give serious consideration to the European issue. After some extensive 
studies were carried out, the Eduskunta voted in favor of availing the option of full 
membership and a formal request of application was submitted in March 1992.  
Talks started in February 1993 and were rather smoothly completed in March 1994. The 
agreement was actually regarded by Finnish representatives as an historic hallmark, the 
beginning of a new era of cooperation in a no-longer-divided Europe184. The end of 
confrontation between East and West in Europe removed the security concerns that had for 
decades prevented Finland to express its natural western orientation in full, creating a whole 
new situation in which the preconditions for its accession to the European Union were met185. 
Finally one of the most “reluctant Europeans”186, basing on the awareness that participating in 
that structure was ultimately the only way to secure a larger voice in an increasingly 
institutionalized continent, successfully concluded its shift toward Europe. 
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4.3 THE SCANDINAVIAN OPTION: SECURITY ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Historically, Finland has always considered its Scandinavian neighbors as kin countries, due 
to the common linguistic, cultural and political characteristics187, but actual Scandinavian 
cooperation is a relatively new phenomenon. Throughout the 19th century some scattered 
initiatives took place: as early as 1840 the proposal for common postal services was put 
forward188, whereas the first Nordic legal conference took place in 1872. However, early 
Scandinavianism did not achieve any tangible result toward political unity or economic 
integration.  
The experience of World War I certainly brought the Scandinavian countries closer together, 
enhancing the value of cooperation: several new contacts were created and organizations such 
as the Norden Association were established in order to broaden cultural ties among the 
peoples. Also, the activities of the “Oslo Group” helped creating the habit of confrontation 
and dialogue in various fields. The first attempt to establish a successful military cooperation 
in the region was made in the mid-1930s, but, as a consequence of insurmountable 
divergences concerning world affairs, the situation of the Scandinavian countries developed 
quite differently during the years of World War II and Sweden alone succeeded in maintaining 
that neutrality at which all the countries had aimed. 
In the postwar period, law was indeed the first field in which some forms of cooperation were 
promoted, due to the similarities among the relative legal systems of Scandinavian countries: 
in 1946, for example, the Ministers of Justice of Denmark, Norway and Sweden appointed an 
ad-hoc committee to draw up proposals on cooperation on legislation in the region. However, 
while some significant successes were achieved, they generally have been low-level: efforts 
during the fifty years following 1945 to coordinate political interests, build a common defense 
and security system and integrate the Scandinavian economies with each other often collided 
with divergent national interests189.  
Security emerged as the preeminent field in which to seek for mutual assistance and 
coordination: at a time when a conventional conflict in Europe was still discussed as a real 
possibility that had to be taken into account in the elaboration of security policies, in 
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Scandinavia it quickly became evident that moderation by all the actors involved was the only 
available key to regional stability, to the benefit of all. Following the peace, some plans for 
joint Scandinavian defense and security were actually laid: in autumn 1948, a “Scandinavian 
Defense Committee” was set up with the task of assessing the possibilities for the 
establishment of a Nordic Defense Alliance involving the Scandinavian countries; in January 
1949, delegations from the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish governments participated in the 
Scandinavian Defense Alliance conferences, but the postwar situation proved to be still 
unfavorable to cooperation in the field of security policy and the negotiations were not 
successful, due to Sweden’s eagerness to preserve neutrality within the framework of a limited 
security arrangement190. So all proposals of a defense union collapsed and, when the United 
States administration insisted upon NATO membership as a basic condition for the supply of 
weapons to the Nordic countries, Denmark and later Iceland were induced to follow Norway 
into the military organization, while Sweden and Finland remained outside any bloc.  
At the same time though, some prerequisites for continued discussions concerning security 
policy between Finland and the other Nordic countries remained intact, in the name of a 
common special orientation toward neutrality and in spite of the commitment to militarily 
binding treaties or alliances. Nordic security decisions formed the base for what later came to 
be defined the “Nordic Balance”191, posited on the interdependence between Soviet policy 
toward Finland, Swedish neutrality and Danish and Norwegian low-profile attitude within 
NATO.  
The Nordic Balance concept represented for Finland the adaptation of a whole region to the 
delicate international situation through careful Scandinavian solidarity, as pointed out by the 
Foreign Minister A. Karjalainen in a speech delivered in 1967: “my references to the 
principles of neutrality would be incomplete without emphasizing the importance of our 
relations with our Western neighbors, the Scandinavian countries. As I said before, the 
success of our foreign policy depends both on our own resources and efforts and on our 
geopolitical position. Our Scandinavian neighbors are an important part of this geopolitical 
setting. Finland is, in many ways, an integral part of Scandinavia. The Scandinavian countries 
cooperate extensively and closely in almost all fields of life. They have found different 
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solutions for their security – Denmark, Norway and Iceland are members of NATO, while 
Sweden and Finland are neutral – but there are many common interests, above all the 
maintenance of peace in Northern Europe. To put it briefly: Scandinavia is an area which in a 
fairly high degree is disengaged from the confrontation between the superpowers”192. 
The Nordic Balance consists of two distinct yet complementary levels, the political and the 
military. The first level includes the subjective, political ambience borne out of the bilateral 
diplomatic, trade and cultural relations each of the Scandinavian countries maintains with the 
Soviet Union and those relationships and arrangements that these nations keep up among 
them. The second level includes the more objective aspects of military force structure, 
doctrine and strategy of each of the Scandinavian countries, as expressed in the contexts of 
both their legal commitment to NATO or to neutrality, and of the strategic East-West 
confrontation. Thus, the Nordic Balance is best conceptualized and defined as a carefully 
coordinated zone within which the treacherous tensions of Cold War hostilities are to be 
attenuated.  
Finland’s first attempt to draw the northern countries together toward a common policy of 
neutrality took place in January 1952, when in the famous “pajama pocket speech”193 he 
proposed that Norway, Denmark and Iceland dispose of NATO membership and resort to 
neutrality like Finland and Sweden. The line of Scandinavian orientation seemed to emphasize 
Finland’s cultural and psychological bonds with the West194 and the aspiration to finally be 
welcomed in the club of respected democracies, whose aims and love of peace nobody could 
doubt. However, the military problems and security issues were not identical for all the 
Scandinavian countries and some were openly skeptical toward neutrality as a viable policy 
for small nations, so the proposal was welcomed rather coolly. 
International conditions at the beginning of the 1960s left their imprint on the outlook of 
Finnish leadership: the Cuban crisis of 1962 showed that a dangerous threat to peace could 
arise when nuclear weapons were introduced into an area of interest to the great powers where 
no such weapons had previously existed195; the note crisis, more specifically, was taken as an 
indication of the vulnerability of the Scandinavian region to external pressures. On 28th May 
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1963, President Kekkonen presented a proposal for a nuclear-free area to be realized together 
with the Scandinavian neighbors, in order to prevent the unrest caused by the diffusion of 
nuclear weapons in the region196. According to his suggestion, countries forming such zone 
should enter into mutual undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring 
nuclear weapons and to refuse the deployment of such weapons on their territory on behalf of 
any other country. The main idea was thus to keep the region a low-tension area in the Cold 
War scenario and to some extent detached from the global high tensions between the rival 
blocs and their military alliances, in spite of the fact that some of the Scandinavian actors 
themselves were actually involved in such alliance systems197.  
It has been noted that the plan for a Scandinavian nuclear-free zone might appear somewhat 
redundant, the region already being devoid of such armaments198, but it was actually the 
possibility that Denmark and Norway could participate in a multilateral nuclear force within 
NATO which urged Kekkonen to conceive the idea of a nuclear-free zone, in order to stabilize 
the whole region. The initiative was regarded with a certain suspicion by Western strategists 
as a Finnish scheme to please the Soviet Union, whose interests of course tended to oppose 
any NATO plan to militarize Northern Europe199. As a consequence, Finland failed to initiate 
a constructive dialogue among the Scandinavian countries on this subject, being their attention 
focused more on the uncontrolled diffusion of nuclear weapons, which eventually led to the 
signing of the Non-Proliferation treaty in 1968, zealously promoted by M. Jakobson. 
Kekkonen’s proposal should have been interpreted instead as a means to enhance Finland’s 
security by reducing Soviet opportunities to resort to the military provisions of the FCMA 
treaty and at the same time to promote détente in Central Europe200. 
In a speech delivered in Stockholm in May 1978, Kekkonen renewed and updated his earlier 
plans for a nuclear-free zone in Scandinavia, arguing that in the case of nuclear war in Europe, 
Northern Europe would be by no means immune from the effects of great powers’ strategies; 
to avert this danger, he urged the Scandinavian countries to initiate negotiations for an arms 
control arrangement, founded on the principle of complete insulation from the effects of 
nuclear strategies in general and new weapons in particular and on the assurance given by 
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superpowers that such weapons would not be used under any circumstances against the 
territories of the state parties. Sticking to its traditional policy, Finland tried to defuse the 
military threat posed by the newly developed weapons through political means. This time the 
Swedish government responded favorably to the initiative, as well as the Soviet Union201, but 
the essential difficulty for the creation of the nuclear-free zone was the Danish and Norwegian 
insistence that such a strategic scheme should be implemented in the broader European 
context of arms discussions rather than among Scandinavian countries alone. However, the 
implications for Finland of the imminent deployment of American cruise missiles in Europe, 
in light of the FCMA treaty, led to the decision in November 1983 to start building the 
surveillance and interception technology required to shoot down such devices.   
Although a common foreign policy was never implemented and the idea of a Nordic Balance 
was never accepted as an official doctrine, other steps to strengthen the established security 
situation in the Nordic region in a broader European context were considered. Of the utmost 
importance were the various confidence and security building measures developed within the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its follow-up process, but also 
the significant degree of coordination of crisis management activities reached by the four 
Scandinavian countries with the establishment of a joint brigade, through the Nordic 
Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS)202, deserves to be 
mentioned. These ties gave the Scandinavian countries a certain sense of security with regard 
to the international situation and had an important impact on their mutual relations, as there 
was a growing awareness of the importance of relying on each other to face the manifold 
challenges posed by the Cold War era. 
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4.4 THE SCANDINAVIAN OPTION: OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
On the political level too, Scandinavian cooperation was an important option for Finland. 
During the 1951 meeting of the Nordic Intraparlamentarian Union, a private group of 
Scandinavian members of parliament founded in 1889 and often considered as the predecessor 
of any other political initiative, an actual proposal for the creation of a permanent council was 
launched203. Such a highly developed interaction was meant to create the premises to attain a 
broad degree of political coordination and integration. 
The Nordic Council, established in 1953, is a purely consultative organization consisting of 
members of the parliaments and of the governments of the Scandinavian countries – namely, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland – with no authority to take binding decisions. 
In principle, there is no limitation on the kinds of questions that may be dealt with, even if its 
activity mainly focuses on juridical, cultural, economic and socio-political issues, whereas 
detailed discussions about foreign or defense policy have not taken place because of the 
differences among the various countries204.  
At the time of the preparatory works, the Finnish delegation put forth a reservation that 
reflected anticipation of negative Soviet reactions to Finland’s membership in the Council205. 
This led Finland to participate in drafting the statute of the Nordic Council, but to stand aside 
and temporarily turn down the membership when the organism came to life. It was no secret 
that Soviet leaders harbored suspicion of Scandinavian cooperation: the proposal of a Nordic 
defensive alliance had not yet been forgotten. So, there was no surprise when they heaped 
accusations on the Nordic Council upon its foundation and for some years thereafter, charging 
it with being a mere anti-Soviet instrument to subvert Scandinavia to NATO and American 
influence and with being aimed at modifying Sweden’s status from that of a neutral to that of 
a member of the Atlantic Alliance. Efforts to include Finland in the organization were blamed 
by the press on “reactionary and imperialist circles”206 willing to damage the newly 
established friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. 
                                                            
203 ANDERSON [1967], p. 23; 
204 SOLEM [1977], pp. 36-38; 
205 TÖRNUDD [1961], pp. 110-117; 
206 Izvestia, 19th September 1954; 
 
 
73
Stalin’s death in March 1953 caused a radical reappraisal of the international situation on 
behalf of his successors, which culminated, in statements made at the 20th Congress of the 
Soviet Communist party, in the rejection of the notion that a country not totally submissive to 
the Soviet Union was to be considered an enemy. On the basis of such considerations, and 
also in the hope that a stronger Scandinavian unity inclining toward neutrality would have 
created a detrimental centrifugal force within the NATO camp by reinforcing the latent 
neutralism of Denmark and Norway207, objections to Finnish participation in the Nordic 
Council were withdrawn. Furthermore, given the loose character of the organization, there 
was little danger that Finland could be drawn into matters conflicting with its position in the 
Soviet sphere of influence. 
Finland joined the Nordic Council in late 1955 and in 1956 attended the first meeting as a full 
member, this way fulfilling the cherished national aspiration for Scandinavian cooperation, 
which dated back to the prewar years and was included by both Paasikivi and Kekkonen 
among the fundamental pillars of the country’s foreign policy: harmonizing obligations to  
Moscow, while at the same time pursuing an involvement in the development of an effective 
regional integration within the Scandinavian subsystem. The cooperation among northern 
countries did not receive as much publicity as other forms of regional integration, because it 
was never based on plans for a federation; rather, it can be effectively described as a common 
pragmatic approach in dealing with mutual problems.  
The main achievements of the Nordic Council have been in the social, juridical, cultural and 
economic fields208: a common labor market, created in 1954, contributed to the harmonization 
of business legislation; the Nordic Passport Union, implemented in 1958, allowed 
Scandinavian citizens to freely circulate in the territories of the member states and brought 
extensive coordination in custom matters; legal cooperation and coordination was keenly 
promoted by the Nordic Council through non-binding proposal and recommendations aimed at 
creating similar interpretations of the joint Scandinavian laws. 
The most fervent level of Scandinavian cooperation during the Cold War years was, however, 
the economic one, more specifically the creation of a Scandinavian common market. The idea 
of crafting the framework for a more intense economic cooperation was first discussed in the 
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August 1954 session of the Nordic Council, where the economic committee concluded that 
such a project would have been feasible and desirable for improving the competitive abilities 
of the countries involved and enable them to take up new kinds of production, paving the way 
for a higher standard of living in Scandinavia as a whole209. An apposite ministerial committee 
was appointed some months later to discuss the issue in detail and, notwithstanding a limited 
but vigorous opposition, the committee presented its main report in July 1957, putting forward 
a series of proposals for economic cooperation, so that the whole project seemed close to 
realization in the late 1950s. Finland was especially interested in the hypothesis of a 
Scandinavian common market and in stronger economic ties with its kin countries in general, 
since the country was dependent upon exports to Western Europe, although the administration 
had soon realized the impossibility for Finland to reconcile such an approach to Europe with 
the preferential relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Aside from Finland’s ambiguous position, other events proved to be decisive for the internal 
developments of Scandinavia. In July 1959 Denmark, Norway and Sweden agreed to take part 
in the creation of a free trade area to facilitate the entry into the European Economic 
Community; the name of this new organization was the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). 
Although a Scandinavian common market would have been theoretically compatible with the 
EFTA, such project started to be no longer perceived as important by some of its members, 
since most of the economic cooperation among the Scandinavian countries was now taking 
place within the framework of EFTA, GATT and the OEEC. So when in July 1959 the 
Finnish government officially confirmed its readiness to enter the Scandinavian common 
market, the whole project had already been abandoned210. 
The Nordic Economic Plan (Nordek) was the second major attempt to establish an economic 
union of the Scandinavian countries, prompted to a large extent by the abortive efforts to find 
a proper accommodation with the EEC. Following De Gaulle’s veto of British membership in 
1967, the impression developed among the Scandinavians that they should try to come up with 
a different solution. The Nordek proposal was put forward by the government of Denmark at 
the 1968 session of the Nordic Council, where it was received rather enthusiastically, so that 
by July of the following year the draft treaty was completed. A key part of the Nordek 
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proposal was a Scandinavian common tariff, to achieve a high level of industrial 
competitiveness and differentiation, capable of asserting itself in an integrated European 
market. In addition, the committee of experts proposed intensified exchanges of economic 
information, consultation on fiscal policies, harmonization of different instruments of 
financial policy and extended cooperation in the field of monetary policy211. A central 
investment bank was also to be created212. Evidently, the Nordek plan represented an attempt 
to formalize and solidify the already existing integration in Scandinavia. It should be noted 
that the project, being based on the principle of unanimity, did not involve any element of 
supranationality. 
In the early phases of the negotiations, Finland’s commitment to the plan was relevant, as the 
Nordek plan was seen as a means of strengthening commercial ties with the rest of 
Scandinavia and reducing their uneasy dependence on the Soviet Union213, but Finnish leaders 
were fully aware of the Soviet opposition to closed economic communities which may have 
been detrimental to their economic interests. After a visit to Stalingrad in May 1969, President 
Kekkonen claimed that Nordek membership would have endangered Finland’s policy of 
neutrality, which required building confidence eastwards by preserving trade relations with 
the Soviet Union and avoiding any collusion with the West liable to rise suspects in Moscow. 
Eventually, the decision of the Finnish government in March 1970 not to sign the treaty 
condemned to failure the whole project.  
The reason of Finland’s hesitancy and withdrawal is still controversial: the official 
justification provided at the time for such a quick about-face was that the other Nordic 
countries were preparing themselves to enter into negotiations with the EEC, which would put 
the whole Nordek plan in a state of ambivalence214; other observers point out the fear of 
Soviet reactions and the loss of credibility of the whole policy of neutrality215; a third 
explanation might be the preference given by the industrial and economic circles to an 
agreement with the EEC, seen as a greater opportunity to enhance Finnish wood products 
exports than the Scandinavian alternative216. 
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5. BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
For Finland, the most natural consequence of remaining neutral and maintaining positive 
political and economic relations with both sides of the Cold War was to play the increasingly 
important role of a bridge-builder on the global scenario, dynamically mediating between 
conflicting interests in the international organizations or through the promotion of mutually 
credible confidence-building measures. The role of a bridge between the East and the West 
was interpreted in Helsinki as a way to maximize national security, firstly by not antagonizing 
any of the superpowers or their allies and secondly by promoting worldwide détente: the 
chosen means to achieve the objective of self-security was strengthening world peace by 
supporting peaceful settlement of international disputes and striving for the improvement in 
the well-being of all nations. Most often actions in this direction were carried out within 
Western structures and political framework, simply because this seemed to provide far more 
opportunities to implement such a strategy than the communist environment crafted by the 
Soviet Union. 
Finland’s attitude toward the German question, besides providing powerful support to the 
claim of neutrality, can be considered the touchstone of this multilateral security policy217: the 
refusal to recognize until 1972 both political entities, the Western-supported Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Eastern-supported German Democratic Republic, marked Finland’s 
decision to remain uninvolved from the thorniest political struggles, instead following the road 
of détente and mediation between opposing ideologies and, more specifically, starting to 
actually play that bridge-builder role between East and West that was later recognized as the 
hallmark of President Kekkonen’s foreign strategy. 
If initially, at the end of World War II, the pursuit of this strategy was impossible due to 
Finland’s isolation in the international scenario, as years went by an increasing number of 
opportunities became available: the most relevant in the autumn of 1955, when Finland 
obtained from the new and more conciliatory Soviet leadership the permission to join the 
United Nations, which soon became a privileged forum in which the national political leaders 
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could express their broader foreign policy outlook, strengthening the basis of Finland’s 
neutrality through the promotion of peace-keeping operations, human rights and disarmament. 
Inclusion in the family of nations also meant a clear break with the previous security doctrine, 
as a multilateral approach to security issues replaced the bilateral channels of the early 
postwar years. 
The well-balanced attitude in the United Nations on one hand certainly impaired the 
effectiveness and the extent of any Finnish initiative, never inclined to take a firm position in 
the disputes between the superpowers, but on the other hand it allowed Finland to assume an 
important position within the organization’s structures and subsidiary organs and to focus its 
energies on other fields of activity: in particular, if the fundamental aim of Finland’s policy of 
neutrality is to promote international justice and peace, the issues of disarmament and human 
rights can be seen as closely connected, because of course when peace is strengthened through 
enhanced security and cooperation, the conditions for promoting human rights are also 
improved; once again, the other Scandinavian countries were often valuable partners for the 
pursuit of détente within the frame of the United Nations, as several forms of collaboration 
among these nations were implemented in the course of years. 
Besides participating in the existing international organizations, Finland also took initiatives 
of its own for the achievement of its most significant aims of security policy, that is, the 
prevention of an East-West conflict, especially since the second half of the 1960s, when both 
blocs appeared more willing to resort to détente and disarmament measures and a greater 
number of opportunities for dialogue were accessible. In this new context of more stable 
international relations, the Finnish government started to explore opportunities to encourage 
multilateral contacts for the enhancement of security and cooperation in Europe. The scope of 
Finland’s active involvement in the organization and hosting of the Strategic Arms 
Limitations Talks (SALT ) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was to 
establish multilateral networks for cooperation through international organizations, capable of 
replacing bilateral arrangements in the case of a crisis. It is not a chance, in fact, that such 
initiatives coincided with the country’s presence on the Security Council during 1969-1970 
and renewed interest in the ongoing process of European integration. 
Détente and disarmament are closely intertwined, so that significant progress in the latter issue 
is possible only in conditions of mutual trust and positive political atmosphere. Finland was 
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particularly clever in crafting such a favorable environment in which to conduct negotiations. 
Two causes have been pointed out by the commentators to explain Finland’s East-West 
success in alleviating the Cold War tensions and they both refer to the country’s strategic 
position as a communication channel between the ideological, political and military blocs218: 
firstly, the Soviet Union’s enhanced receptiveness to the mediation offer in light of the 
changing worldwide perceptions, a factor that could hardly be influenced by any initiative 
taken in Helsinki; secondly but equally important, the West’s willingness to accept such a 
mediation, which required the skillful building of contacts and trust, credentials that in fact 
played a major role in all the Finnish contributions to East-West détente. 
Even when the final outcome of the Cold War was no longer in doubt, Finland promptly 
recognized that the local tensions, which soon replaced the worldwide balance of terror, gave 
new dimensions and importance to some apparently obsolete security issues, calling for an 
even “wider participation of the international community in their solution”219. Non-
proliferation and weapons disposal without a doubt belonged to this category and that is why 
the attitude toward international relations in Helsinki did not change: the pursuit of 
disarmament and peaceful dialogue continued through the 1990s and in these first years of the 
new millennium, by the means of a general effort in taking the lead of various plans for the 
implementation of armament reductions and the creation of a truly inclusive system of global 
governance. 
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5.2 FINLAND IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
It is probably in Finland’s attitude within the United Nations Organization that the essential 
feature of its Cold War foreign policy, the attempt to reconcile Eastern and Western strategies 
in the framework of neutrality, can be best seen. The seemingly lack of compatibility between 
neutrality and membership in an international organization was soon overcome by the very 
nature of the U.N., an organization which due to its global character was, by definition, bound 
to impartiality in Cold War disputes.  
First of all, the role of the United Nations in maintaining peace and security must be 
mentioned; this of course was originally the primary task of the organization, the purpose for 
which it was founded. This was also the reason why Finland applied for U.N. membership at 
the first possible occasion, shortly after the ratification of the Peace Treaty in 1947, faithful in 
the new world order and willing to actively take part in its work for international cooperation. 
An evident sign of the Finnish desire to participate in the U.N. system is contained in the 
declaration of intent in Article 3 of the FCMA treaty, according to which Finland committed 
itself to “participate in all measures towards the maintenance of international peace and 
security in conformity of the aim and principles of the United Nations Organization”.  
As the international situation developed toward the Cold War, this early enthusiasm was 
replaced by growing skepticism220, so that when its admission was halted by the Soviet veto, 
as a reaction to the refusal of the West to admit certain Soviet-sponsored Eastern European 
countries in the organization, of all the nations kept waiting due to the arguments between the 
great powers, Finland was probably the least interested in obtaining a seat in the U.N., seen 
more and more as a dangerous battlefield of the East-West conflict221. These initial doubts 
probably reflected the lack of self-confidence that at the time affected Finland’s foreign 
policy, uncertain of the role that neutral countries could play in the organization. 
The deadlock was broken in the autumn of 1955 through a “package deal”, resulting from a 
temporary toning down of Cold War struggles, which allowed sixteen new members to be 
admitted to the organization. The first General Assembly session in which Finland took part, 
in the autumn of 1956, had to deal with the Hungarian crisis, confronting the country’s 
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delegation with a grave strategic as well as emotional dilemma: after having expressed the 
hope that the Soviet Union was soon to withdraw the troops from Hungary and supported the 
resolutions recommending the sending of observers, Finland abstained from voting on those 
condemning the action and demanding the immediate withdrawal of Soviet army. The 
contradiction inherent in Finland’s two major foreign policy objectives – maintaining friendly 
relations with the East while preserving the credibility of neutrality in the West – were often 
accentuated in the frame of the United Nations.  
Another dramatic event, the Suez crisis, monopolized the attention of the General Assembly in 
that same year and gave Finland the opportunity to play a more active role: not only by voting 
in favor of the resolution which approved the first deployment of U.N. troops, but also by 
providing troops for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) peace-keeping mission, as 
requested by the Secretary General. In the following years, Finland has been involved in a 
great number of U.N. peace-keeping operations: Finnish officers served under the U.N. flag in 
several missions, including those in Lebanon, the Kashmir region, Iran and Iraq, whereas 
Finnish troops were deployed in Cyprus, the Middle East, Yugoslavia and Somalia, just to 
mention some of the most important contributions.  
Due to its neutral position, Finland was a perfect candidate for sending troops for peace-
keeping missions under the banner of the world organization222. As highlighted by the 
literature, Finland devoted considerable energies to the cause of internationalism and belonged 
– alongside its Scandinavian neighbors – to the group of the most active participants in peace-
keeping in the world223: during the period 1956-1997, for example, Finland contributed with 
about 34,000 men to international peace-keeping under the umbrella of the United Nations. 
Such a generous commitment to UN crisis management operations, the latest of which was the 
UNIFIL II in Lebanon in 2006, is just an additional proof of the country’s eagerness to play its 
part in the context of international cooperation. 
In general, Finnish U.N. policy has always been characterized by a great consideration and 
respect of the Security Council, perceived as the organism embodying the ideal of equal 
participation of great powers and small states to the management of global issues224. In fact, as 
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it is widely recognized225, multilateral military measures, if undertaken under the auspices of 
the United Nations, do not conflict with the notion of neutrality. Finland, like other small 
nations, has a vital interest in supporting and building up the international organization to 
develop into an efficient instrument for the maintenance of international peace: in all 
circumstances its representatives emphasized the great significance of Article 2.4 of the 
Charter, which contains the principle prohibition of the use of force and of the threat to use it. 
Accordingly, the consistent support provided to U.N. peace-keeping efforts with men, votes 
and financial contributions reflects the broad compatibility existing between Finnish security 
strategies and general U.N. aims226.  
Standing on the intersection between East and West always rendered the pursuit of this policy 
quite problematic, since the country’s space of maneuver tended to vary greatly in accordance 
with periods of increased or decreased international tension227: except for participating in 
peace-keeping activities, not directed against any specific enemy, there was nothing 
particularly constructive that Finland could contribute to the political settlement of major 
disputes, without being accused of partisanship with any side in the conflict. Thus, adherence 
to the principle of not supporting any proposal that was found unacceptable by either of the 
main protagonists of the crisis228 resulted in a certain degree of passivity regarding far-
reaching controversial political issues. For instance, Finland sponsored a very limited number 
of resolutions in the General Assembly compared to its Scandinavian neighbors229.  
This choice reflected President Kekkoken’s conviction that Finland’s role in the United 
Nations was to act as a bridge-builder between East and West, by assuming an active role in 
lessening international tensions rather than stirring them up. The Finnish delegates repeatedly 
emphasized their understanding of the U.N. primarily as an instrument of negotiation at the 
disposal of its members, to be used for the purpose of reconciling differing or conflicting 
interests, rather than as a tribunal passing moral judgments on the behavior of nations. 
Neutrality was the guideline during the Cold War, although, as pointed out by the Foreign 
Minister A. Karjalainen in a speech in 1967, this notion had to be intended as “not an end in 
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itself: it is a tool of foreign policy”230, meaning that in political confrontations directly 
involving the interests of the great powers, Finland never took sides, manifesting its desire to 
stand aloof from any conflict engendered by political interests within the United Nations; in 
such cases, it was always natural for the Finnish delegation to assume the role of a detached, 
neutral observer. Through the attentive analysis of voting patterns in the General Assembly231, 
it has been noted that Finland, especially in the early years, was usually very careful in issues 
concerning stands on conflicts of power policy.  
The cornerstone of this cautious approach is the Charter of the United Nations, on whose 
stipulations the Finnish representatives base all of their decisions232: any attempt to depart 
from it or to circumvent it was interpreted as an attempt to transform the organization into an 
arena for the purpose of imposing an interest over another. Accordingly, if the U.N. is bound 
by Article 1.4 of the Charter to serve as “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations”233, 
universality and equal participation of all members must be a basic condition: that is why 
Finland always argued in favor of the admission of the People’s Republic of China. Finland 
has never been and is not prone to support expressions of condemnation and, in the words of 
President Kekkonen of 1961, continues to see its task “rather as a physician than as a 
judge”234, trying to provide a contribution for the conciliation of conflicting interests, without 
forgetting its neutrality policy. This explains why Finland has refrained over the years from 
condemning both American and Soviet actions, as for example the involvement of the United 
States in the Vietnam war, the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 on behalf of the 
Soviet Union or the occupation of Afghanistan ten years later.  
The neutralist policy followed by Finland in the United Nations makes it impossible to 
classify the country on the basis of its voting behavior, as its unique attitude was designed to 
suit a unique position235, but it is not unjustifiable to regard Finland as a member of the so-
called “Nordic Group”, in light of the close collaboration its delegation always sought with the 
other Scandinavian countries, of whose the joint participation to peace-keeping missions is 
only one of the possible examples. Actually, although Denmark, Norway and Iceland belong 
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to NATO while Finland and Sweden pursue a policy of neutrality, the differences between the 
security policies of these countries have little relevance and there are several issues on which 
the views of the Scandinavian countries are identical or almost, like international 
disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes and universality of the organization. Despite the 
fact that Finland tends to abstain from voting in the General Assembly236 or to vote differently 
from the Nordic Group237 more often than the others, it would be misleading to assess 
Finland’s role in the United Nations outside its Scandinavian context, as consultations among 
the five delegations of the group take place continuously during the sessions and usually their 
common identity takes precedence over the separate political characteristics of each.  
The Scandinavian countries realized that by acting together rather than individually they have 
a greater chance of influencing the activities of the organization and thus developed a network 
of contacts and consultations, entirely voluntary and not binding238, such as the two regular 
conferences that are held every year by the Foreign Ministers, in order to exchange 
information and opinions, mainly devoted to top-level policy coordination in the United 
Nations. The greater part of this cooperation, however, takes part at the U.N. itself, since 
representatives of the Scandinavian delegations keep in close contact and hold daily meetings; 
also, the fact that one delegate speaks on behalf of all his colleagues in the debates has 
become a frequent practice. Keeping into account the rate of recurrence of joint statements of 
these countries, the extent of mutual consultation and other practical forms of collaboration in 
the United Nations and several statements made by spokesmen of the Finnish government, it 
is quite clear that Finland strives consciously to identify itself politically with the 
“Scandinavian Group”. The extent of this close cooperation with the northern neighbors did 
not lose its importance even after 1995, when the European Union became the most important 
reference group in orienting Finland’s behavior and choices within the U.N. organisms. 
During the 1960s, two major phenomena characterized the development of the United 
Nations: a considerable increase in the number of member states and a consequent expansion 
of the structural framework of the organization239. In this context, leading to the creation of 
many new organs and to the expansion of formerly existing ones, increasing opportunities 
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became available for any member state to actively participate to the specialized subsidiary 
organs. Finland took its full share of responsibility in serving on many smaller bodies: the 
Sub-Committee on Angola (1961-1962), the Preparatory Committee and the Committee for 
the Year of International Cooperation (1963-1965), the Ad Hoc Committee for South-West 
Africa (1967), the politically important Committee of the Twenty-Four dealing with the 
implementation of independence in former colonies (1967-1968), the Commission on the 
Status of Women (1960-1968).  
Several Finns were also prominent in UN work involving the careful defining of rights and the 
limitation of power: for example, professor B. Broms chairmanned the committee that in 1975 
elaborated the definition of aggression. The experienced diplomat M. Jakobson, the champion 
of Finnish neutrality worldwide, was also proposed as a candidate for the post of U.N. 
Secretary-General in 1971 and he would probably have been elected, if not for the Soviet 
veto240. Finland’s activity at all levels in the structure of relations established by the United 
Nations and its specialist committees provided the country with a valuable arena in which to 
express its independent foreign policy outlook. 
There is a clear continuity in Finland’s policy within the United Nations, as it is reflected in its 
overall behavior over the period from its entry into the organization until recent times: a 
leitmotif can be traced in the ambition, accepted as a guideline by all political parties241, of 
establishing and developing friendly relations with all countries. The accession to the 
European Union in 1995, however, brought about some modifications in Finnish attitude242: 
since the continental institutions became the privileged forum for dialogue on security issues, 
fewer energies and resources were devoted to U.N. membership, as the country gradually 
conformed to the shared European foreign policy positions; among other things, this implied 
taking a more concrete orientation than before on political issues and to re-define its 
commitment to the more demanding form of EU-led peace-enforcing operations.  
Finland’s desire to effectively contribute to the purposes of the United Nations is also testified 
by its participation in the development of the system for the worldwide promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a constitutionally relevant243 issue of 
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Finnish domestic policy which naturally extended to foreign policy as well. The Charter 
places the promotion of human rights alongside the maintenance of peace and security as 
central goals: building on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drawn in 1948, the 
U.N. has established a set of major international human rights conventions, which Finland was 
among the first countries to ratify244, optional articles included. Finland’s systematical support 
of all efforts and initiatives within the U.N. to uphold a strong implementation of human rights 
everywhere in the world can be seen as another example of a long-term strategy, ultimately 
aimed at strengthening justice and settling disputes in international relations; in fact Finland 
tends to conceive human rights as universal, inviolable and inalienable.  
The areas of special emphasis in Finnish human rights policy can well illustrate the intense 
effort made by the country, usually alongside other Scandinavian nations, to promote 
initiatives within the U.N. specialized organs245. One of such areas is family planning, defined 
as the right of all individuals to the exercise of their full potential thanks to various measures 
required to set secure social and material conditions for the development of a family; closely 
connected with this is the question of the status of women in general and the elimination of 
any form of discrimination against women worldwide: Finland and Sweden have proven 
particularly active in this field and it is primarily upon their initiative that the issue was often 
dealt with by the Commission on the Status of Women and many resolutions were passed. 
Another key area of Finnish involvement is that dealing with the abolition of death penalty 
from national criminal law: Finland has always participated in the deliberations on this subject 
and sponsored the relevant resolutions both in the Economic and Social Council and in the 
General Assembly246 since the early years until present days, when in fact it voted in favor of 
the moratorium of the death penalty promoted by the government of Italy in late 2007. Other 
activities carried out by Finland in the U.N. relate to protection of children, minorities and 
indigenous peoples; work to combat racism and promotion of non-discrimination are also 
central themes. Finland’s election in 2006 to the permanent U.N. organism for the safeguard 
of human rights, the Human Rights Council, clearly demonstrated the relevance and 
international appreciation of its commitment in this field. 
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5.3 THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT AND THE CSCE CONFERENCE 
  
Another core element of Finland's active policy of neutrality was the country's participation in 
several arms control and disarmament initiatives, mainly but not only in the framework of the 
United Nations247. Actually, in the field of disarmament Finland’s own security interests as a 
small neutral country happened to coincide with those of the international community, 
especially at a time when the costs of direct military confrontation began to outweigh the 
benefits. This involvement in such a global issue of course became possible for Finland only 
since the 1960s, after the stabilization of neighborhood relations and the acquisition of 
international recognition of the policy of neutrality.  
Particular value was attributed to the prevention of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation in 
Europe, which posed the gravest danger to the very existence of mankind. Therefore, nuclear 
disarmament was felt as the most urgent task: in this regard, Finland signed in1963 the 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear testing underwater, above ground, and in outer 
space; moreover, in 1968 it was the first country to sign the major instrument for the 
attainment of non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear 
technology248, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed by Ireland; 
in 1971 Finland was the first country to conclude an agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency concerning the peaceful use of nuclear power (“ The activity of the IAEA has 
from the very beginning received full Finnish support. Nuclear energy has to be used not as a 
destructive force but as a beneficial factor in developing humanity. It should therefore only be 
applied for peaceful purposes.”249) and in the same year also signed the treaty banning the 
placement of nuclear weapons on the world's seabed; in 1974 an extensive study on nuclear-
free zones was carried out by the General Assembly on Finnish initiative and under its 
direction; in 1975 it joined in the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of biological 
weapons.  
Unable to openly raise the issue of security for fear of damaging the foundations of its 
neutrality, Finland tended to take part in technical projects rather than in political discourses, 
but, in general, it can be noted that in an extremely limited number of cases Finland voted 
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against or abstained from a U.N. resolution in the field of disarmament250. Since all these 
initiatives were primarily aimed at securing the European environment from the outbreak of a 
nuclear conflict, they were also tightly linked to Finland’s key aims in security policy. Some 
clear examples of this attitude can be provided by the statements delivered by the 
representative of Finland in the First Committee of the General Assembly, in which the 
possibility of crafting a secure environment is linked to the issue of arms control and 
reduction251.  
Moving from the realistic premise that the armament issue had to be interpreted in the overall 
struggle for power of the Cold War, Finland was well aware of the possibility of using its 
policy of neutrality in order to work within the broad framework of American-Soviet relations 
in the issue of disarmament. As early as 1969, probably urged by the events in 
Czechoslovakia, the government of Finland presented a memorandum to the governments of 
all European countries, the United States and Canada in order to sound out their position 
regarding the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to be held in 
Finland. Even Soviet leaders praised Finland’s initiative, judging that the consolidation of a 
stable security system in Europe could match Soviet geostrategic interests252. After long and 
extensive consultations, aimed at reaching as much preliminary agreement as possible among 
the participants253, the first stage of the conference was held in 1973 in Helsinki, which in the 
previous years had already been chosen as the site for some of the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT I). The CSCE was an unprecedented event in the history of Europe, with thirty-
five countries – including the two superpowers – participating to a far-reaching bridge-
building dialogue for the replacement of armed confrontation with mutual cooperation for the 
attainment of security and peace. 
The Finnish capital also hosted the final stage of the CSCE on 30th July – 1st August 1975. 
This summit, held in the Finlandia Hall, was a major breakthrough in East-West relations, 
culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, a document which contained a Declaration 
on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States ("the Decalogue") crafted on the 
basis of the U.N. Charter, as well as arrangements on confidence-building measures and 
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disarmament, on cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, humanitarian and 
environmental fields, on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area and on follow-up 
to the Conference. Aside from hosting the event, Finland played an important role during the 
talks, specifically by reason of its status of neutrality, since it was often capable of finding a 
compromise proposal to mediate the conflicting views of the East and West on certain 
issues254.  
The signing of the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki in 1975 was the high point of the 
country's commitment to a strategy of active bridge-building. The document not only 
recognized the legitimacy of neutrality as a foreign policy, a point further demonstrated by 
hosting the conference in Helsinki, but also remarkably enhanced Finland’s sense of security 
by providing the opportunity to refer to a set of shared normative principles in the case of a 
threatening conflict situation255. Among these: refraining from the threat or use of force, 
inviolability of the frontiers, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, territorial integrity 
of states, peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-interference in domestic 
affairs. The duration of the conference is by itself evidence that finding satisfactory 
formulation of common elements was not an easy task. 
The impact of the Final Act has been widely debated, but it is rather generally accepted that its 
significance lies in the fact that it provides a dynamic perspective for the development of 
relations among countries with different political and social systems, taking into account 
different aspects of national security and at the same time also the fundamental rights of 
individual citizens256. To a certain extent, it is possible to assert that the Final Act proved that 
the participation to rival military alliances may not represent an insurmountable obstacle to 
mutual interaction and cooperation characterized by a balance of interests. The conference, by 
providing explicit recognition to the mutually accepted ongoing transition from a state of open 
confrontation to one of non-military confrontation, explicitly confirmed the interest of all the 
participating states in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting 
disarmament as a complementary tool to political détente in Europe. 
The results of such a dynamic commitment toward disarmament, however, were not entirely 
satisfactory for Finland. Different perceptions and interpretations of the ambiguous provisions 
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of the Final Act made the most optimistic expectations quite soon turn into disappointments. 
The 1970s were coming to an end in conditions of almost relentless arms race, with about 6% 
of the world’s GDP devoted to military purposes257. Disarmament talks in Europe were at a 
standstill. Also the SALT II agreement signed in 1979 after a protracted period of negotiations 
between the superpowers, despite the evidence of some successes concerning the prohibition 
of the use and production of chemical weapons, the comprehensive test ban of nuclear 
weapons and the overall reduction of arms sales, failed to match Finnish expectations and was 
considered by most commentators a “partial and limited measure”258.  
The continuation of constructive dialogue was considered essential in Helsinki in order to 
achieve both quantitative and qualitative results in the field of arms limitation. In this light, the 
initiative taken in October 1979 for the preparation of a comprehensive European 
disarmament program can be interpreted as a Finnish attempt to revive the new long-cherished 
pattern of East-West relations, which started to appear as a remote objective after years of 
stagnation in the CSCE process, as shown by the meeting in Belgrade (1977-1978). The 
proposal was put forward at the Madrid meeting (1980-1983) and obtained widespread 
agreement, but opinions differed considerably as to the practical form such negotiations 
should take259. 
For Finland, a major opportunity to stimulate again international interest toward disarmament 
was the hosting of the 10th Anniversary of the CSCE at the ministerial level in Helsinki in 
1985. It was one of the occasions where the first signs of the end of the cold War could be felt, 
yet the Finnish representatives in official statements pointed out with ill-concealed 
dissatisfaction how “it is of fundamental importance for the credibility of our joint endeavor 
that the CSCE commitments are put into effect not only in word but in deed”260. Finland’s 
energetic approach revitalized the whole process: since the Stockholm Conference in 1986, 
the military negotiations started again to produce tangible results, leading to the signing of the 
CFE Treaty in 1990 for the balance of armaments between the NATO countries and the 
former Warsaw Pact members.  
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In the middle of significant change and tensions in the European landscape, the Paris Charter 
for a New Europe of 1990 institutionalized the CSCE process, which had lost its original 
purpose with the end of the Cold War261, giving life to a permanent structure, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), endowed with strengthened operational 
capabilities and broader fields of activity. The activity of the new institution has been rather 
dynamic and it involved actions that range from conflict resolution within the member states 
to the establishment of democratic institutions and the safeguard of human rights. 
Finland also hosted a follow-up meeting and a Summit of the CSCE in 1992. The 1992 
Helsinki "Challenges of Change" Document contained a Declaration and an ambitious set of 
decisions, transforming the Conference into an agent of early warning, conflict prevention, 
crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and strengthening the CSCE institutions, 
structures and methods of work accordingly262. The Charter for a New Europe, the Helsinki 
Document and the Budapest Summit Document of 1994 contain the essential provisions on 
which the OSCE of today is based. The concept of “human dimension” adopted by the OSCE 
unmistakably reflects Finland’s broad understanding of security, considered not only as the 
mere absence of war but rather as an extremely complex interaction among democracy, 
implementation of human rights and rule of law263: another confirmation of Finland’s key role 
in the process. 
In the course of recent years, when the threats posed by the Cold War were abruptly replaced 
by a set of different but not less dangerous phenomena such as the increase in the number of 
regional conflicts and the emergence of a renewed global terrorism, Finland has continued to 
work as a member of the neutral and nonaligned group at several OSCE meetings, where the 
utmost emphasis was placed on the formation of confidence-building and security-building 
measures; in addition, the country has hosted a number of OSCE meetings at the expert level, 
covering all dimensions of the OSCE.  
Finnish dedication to the issue of disarmament, however, is not devoid of certain reservations: 
moving from the theoretical assumption that the end of the Cold War did not remove that of 
an aggressive war against its territory264, Helsinki, although supporting in principle the 
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connection between disarmament and security, has repeatedly refused to contract obligations 
that would result in a reduction of its defensive capabilities265, such as the CFE Treaty 
restricting the use of conventional weapons, or the Ottawa Treaty banning antipersonnel land 
mines, which will be acceded in 2012. Finland fully supports the purpose of these treaties, but 
as long as its national defense system will not be capable of matching their requirements 
without weakening the country’s security, no such commitments will be undertaken.  
The Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2008 is providing an opportunity for Finland to continue to 
cultivate the field of comprehensive cooperative security between the fifty-six participating 
States in Europe, which again is facing new challenges in its development, such as regional 
conflicts and global terrorism: more specifically, Finland’s commitment is aimed at stressing 
the importance of cross-dimensional initiatives, that are capable of covering the various 
dimensions of security, on the basis on equal participation to the politico-military dialogue of 
all the actors involved in the process, including the organization’s Mediterranean and Asian 
partners266. 
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6. FINLAND IN THE WESTERN DEFENSIVE SYSTEM 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous three chapters identified three crucial aspects of Finland’s Cold War strategy, 
which became somewhat outdated with the release of global tension, but still play a 
determinant effect on the country’s own security doctrine. The systemic changes occurred in 
Europe and in the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 compelled Finland to adapt its 
national strategy and security policy to the new international scenario. Compliance with 
Soviet interests was no longer required, due to the sudden implosion of the communist system; 
the door of integration within the Western structure being finally open, Finland had to decide 
whether or not to follow the example of the other EFTA countries and take the decisive last 
step toward the European Union. The decision was not so much a question of security policy 
as a change of domestic and foreign orientation, in which all the factors contributing to the 
welfare of the nation had to be taken into account. It was necessary to ensure that the country 
was to find its proper place in the emerging international system in Europe. 
The first criteria in establishing a new foreign policy were defined under Koivisto’s 
presidency (1982-1994), but it was only during the term of office of M. Ahtisaari (1994-2000) 
that a clear security doctrine began to emerge: in this new approach, security and defense lost 
some of their relevance, making way for the two concepts of dynamic stability and 
comprehensive security, on the background of a fundamental qualitative transformation of 
international relations267. At a global level, the 1990s brought the end of traditional power 
politics, the decline of great ideologies and the withering away of the notion of national state 
in the frame of an increasingly globalized world268; at a continental level, politico-economic 
integration and the crafting of a secure European environment appeared as phenomena that 
could not be overlooked; at a regional level, cooperation with the Scandinavian neighbors, the 
Baltic states and Russia had to be the main focus of Finland’s activity. 
The membership issue was brought up for discussion only after the government had formally 
applied in March 1992, raising an active debate that involved all the political parties as well as 
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the public opinion. The issue of security, including the future of neutrality and the relations 
with Russia, immediately emerged as a controversial point: if at first seemingly inopportune, 
gradually the impact of accession to the European Union upon Finnish security started to be 
perceived as a means of protection from international instability and eventually turned out to 
be one of the most decisive factors in favor of membership269. On October 16th 1994, when the 
referendum was held, the turnout was relatively low (74%) compared to that in the other 
applicant countries, but a rather large majority (57%) of the voters opted for joining the 
European Union. Therefore, starting January 1st 1995, Finland acquired its official position in 
present-day Europe. 
Politically isolated by the geopolitics of the Cold War, forced to abide by the demands of the 
Soviet Union, this small country had nevertheless managed to keep its economy, domestic 
institutions and society embedded in the West. The actual integration in the EU was thus not 
only rapid and easy, but continued smoothly with full participation in the new economic and 
social policies: the whole “Acquis Communautaire” was accepted at one stroke270, including 
the highly demanding provision of the Maastricht Treaty, and the road toward the European 
Monetary Union was pursued without complaints, even if it meant a complete change of 
direction in terms of monetary policy271.  
The only areas where Finland’s commitment to Europe and the West remains unclear are 
foreign and security policy, issues in which the ties of the past still strain Finland’s 
membership. On the one hand Finland is willing to demonstrate to be an integral part of the 
European bloc: the burdensome line of neutrality was abandoned and replaced with the less 
restrictive concept of “military non-alignment” and the establishment and development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy was also favored, even if with some significant 
limitations. Yet, on the other hand, the willingness to participate in the structures and process 
of the European Union, the theoretical definitions of national foreign policy and a certain 
degree of commitment, while important in general terms, are in practice only a partial 
accomplishment, as long as Finland wishes to remain outside the establishment of a collective 
system of European defense and to maintain the field of security under national control. 
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So far the intrinsic incompatibility between Finnish position and European objectives has not 
led to any political clash, due to the great deal of adaptation and flexibility afforded by Finnish 
foreign policy and, in parallel, to the disagreements and uncertainties that, as of today, are 
preventing the member states to reach an agreement concerning the future overall 
development of the European Security and Defense Policy dimension – the double rejection of 
the Constitution Treaty in 2005 and 2008 clearly testifies the degree of “European 
disunion”272. Nevertheless, assuming that the process of continental integration will be 
someday resumed and the necessity of a supranational integrated defense system will be more 
widely accepted as a matter of fact, it is obvious that eventually Finland’s special position will 
confront the Finnish leadership itself with a grave alternative: abandoning a long-cherished 
foreign orientation in order not to lose the pace of an equally cherished integration in Western 
Europe, or supporting the option of a “double-speed” European Union in which, at the price of 
a downsized role upon the international scenario, each country can autonomously manage the 
issues concerning national and common defense and security. 
Another alternative is available, consenting Finland to wholly utilize its experience and 
expertise in alleviating tensions without resorting to hardcore security options: this is the 
promotion of “grass-root” trans-regional initiatives capable of building informal contacts at 
the sub-national level, by stressing the shared values and common interests of all participants. 
An excellent example of how this alternative can result in successful progress is the Northern 
Dimension, whose underlying thesis is that the interests of geographically interconnected 
actors, such as Scandinavia, the Baltic countries and Russia, can be best managed simply by 
enhancing the flexibility and the quality of their mutual cooperation in a wide range of issues, 
out of any rigid pattern of political or military alliances. 
The concept of comprehensive security again turns out to be a valuable perspective from 
which to consider the origins and developments of the Northern Dimension, in the attempt to 
evaluate its impact in relation to the geostrategic expectations of the actors involved and of 
Finland in particular. Indeed, although purely security issues were explicitly excluded from 
the model of the Northern Dimension, security considerations play a central role in it and 
affect to a great extent the way in which they deal with cross-border concerns273. By placing 
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further emphasis on the promotion of environmental protection, regional development and 
economic as well as cultural cooperation, the main objective that Finland tries to achieve is 
that of smoothing the rough edges of the cleavage resulting from an accentuate unbalance in 
the prosperity and living conditions between the neighboring regions, thus enhancing its 
overall security assets. Finnish ability to affect the quality of relations between the European 
Union and Russia will exert a decisive influence on the future of the project274: to this regard, 
the low-profile and rather informal character of the Northern Dimension could turn out to be a 
worthful element for preserving a communication channel even during serious political 
emergencies.           
As a consequence of its cooperative orientation, Finland also chose to remain outside 
Europe’s inner military core – NATO. Both ideologically and militarily, the organization 
today is the backbone of the continental security architecture, but the Finnish government still 
remains hesitant, due to the traditional commitment to the persisting desire of not being 
involved in military alliances, potentially capable of involving the country in an armed 
conflict. A lively debate about the pros and cons of NATO membership has been going on in 
Finland for years, but at least for the time being its leaders have chosen to remain outside the 
alliance, backed by the public opinion. Even though ripe with inconsistencies, the mainstream 
tendency in many political circles is to regard the EU and NATO as two distinct entities, so 
that no contradiction is seen in taking part in the political and economic integration of Europe 
while dissociating from the military structure275. Geography is a factor too often overlooked 
when evaluating this approach: unlike the majority of other members, Finland lies on the most 
unstable border of NATO and the theoretical as well as practical implications of this position 
weigh heavy on the choice of not joining the alliance, as in the event of the outbreak of a 
military confrontation, Finland would find itself exposed to any potential Russian 
conventional offensive.   
The redefinition of NATO’s purpose, nature and tasks, which has taken place mainly in the 
second half of the 1990s, however, has convinced Finland to attain a limited degree of 
participation in some political and military structures of the alliance, especially in those where 
Russia was present as well, such as the Partnership for Peace. In the attempt to outlive the 
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enemy it was created to address, NATO reinvented itself both as an international organ of 
military crisis management and as a promoter of “cooperative security” practices between the 
traditional members and the democracies emerging from the dust of the Berlin Wall. No 
longer needed as a formally anti-Soviet coalition, the alliance completed its process of 
adjustment to a new world order, which in practice translated into an eastward shift, with the 
inclusion of former socialist countries in 1999 and 2004 and several initiatives for the 
promotion of dialogue and cooperation between the “New NATO” and the “New Russia”. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the development of Russia–NATO relations has been 
characterized by two apparently opposite features: on the one hand, the building of mutual 
trust has been shadowed by several crises, related to Russia’s sometimes strong opposition to 
the enlargement of the alliance and also to NATO’s actions undertaken outside its own area; 
on the other hand, institutional cooperation between the two parties has strengthened 
continuously, especially as a consequence of the establishment of operative consultation 
round-tables. Moreover, the innovative scenario crafted by the events of September 11th 2001 
reinforced on both sides perceptions of the existence of mutual interests and contributed to the 
evolution of relations on an equal basis, as proven by the activities of the NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) established in 2002. 
The Russian military intervention in Georgia on August 8th 2008 has probably interrupted this 
rapprochement, shelving cooperation in military affairs. It is not given to foresee how the 
global situation will evolve in the near future, but there is broad consensus around the notion 
that the crisis will not have any direct consequences to Finland’s security environment276. 
However it is likely that the re-emergence of old tensions will not be overlooked by the 
centre-right coalition government led by M. Vanhanen at the moment of issuing the 2008 
Security Report, especially in relation to the re-assessment of the practicability of the former 
set-aside NATO option. 
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6.2 ORIENTATIONS TOWARD THE ESDP 
 
Although the idea of investing in a continental defense system has been on the table since the 
early 1950s, the failure of the European Defense Community project in 1952 showed that 
integrating foreign, let alone security and defense policies, was a far too high objective for the 
pioneers of European integration277. In the following years, some further attempts to reach a 
certain degree of political coordination in foreign issues were made, but their outcome was 
generally rather modest and limited, due to the unwillingness of some key actors not to 
proceed on the way to supranationality in such a sensitive domain of sovereignty. The 
relevance of foreign political integration has more often been recognized in theory as an ideal 
goal than it has been pursued in practice. Therefore, when Finland approached the European 
Community in the early 1990s, the issue of security was just starting to acquire a relevant 
position in the common agenda: European political cooperation was made part of the 
community’s structure through the Single European Act in 1986 and, some years later, the 
Treaty of Maastricht broadened the scope of such cooperation through the introduction of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose most significant element is the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as one of the three pillars of the Union. 
The substantial modifications occurred in the international system between 1989 and 1991, 
such as the end of the military aspect of the Cold War, the liberation of Eastern Europe from 
communist rule and the collapse of the Soviet Union, decisively contributed to redesign 
Finland’s attitude toward the process of European political integration, but they did not lead 
immediately to a fundamental revision of its national security perspective. Still in the early 
1990s, whereas the advantages of economic integration within the common market were 
commonly accepted as non-detrimental to the policy of neutrality, the argument that 
membership in the European Union would be essentially incompatible with such policy 
represented the main obstacle to a more extensive Finnish approach to Western Europe278. 
A reassessment of the country’s foreign policy attitude had been first experimented in mid-
1990, with the appointment of a more energetic Minister of Defense279 and, some months 
later, with the unilateral reinterpretation of the FCMA Treaty and the Paris Peace Treaty, 
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which had been the cornerstones of Finnish Cold War policy for over four decades. The 
choice of saying nothing that could be construed hostile or detrimental to the Kremlin was 
pursued until the final moment, but when the dismantling of the Soviet Union appeared 
inevitable, Finland rescinded the outdated obligations of the Paris Peace Treaty: after the so-
called 2+4 agreement and a few days before the reunification of Germany, Helsinki declared 
unilaterally that the military restrictions and the references to Germany contained in it were no 
longer in force. Also, when the communist August Coup fell short in 1991, marking the 
ultimate failure of the old leadership to regain power in Moscow, the Finnish were quiet but 
swift to act and, as early as September 2nd, the government publicly announced that an ad-hoc 
committee had been set up to assess the pros and cons of membership in the integrating 
Europe280. Furthermore, the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union became redundant and was 
replaced, in January 1992, by a series of simple political and economic agreements of good 
neighborliness between Finland and the newly born Russian Federation. 
The governmental report submitted to the Eduskunta in early 1992 marked a decisive step in 
Helsinki toward European integration because, due to the redefinition of the overall concept of 
neutrality281 brought about by the far-reaching geopolitical transformations, the combination 
between the former and the latter was no longer perceived as contradictory: Finland could be a 
full member of Europe, without needing to become an advanced military outpost282. Finnish 
contribution to continental defense and security, it was argued, could take various forms other 
than the military one. Accordingly, As soon as Finland applied for membership in March 
1992, its President declared that the country was ready to accept the Maastricht Treaty in full, 
including those provisions concerning a common foreign and defense policy. The approval of 
the Maastricht Treaty without reservations might seem surprising, given the uncertain rapport 
between Finland’s foreign policy guidelines and the ESDP contained in the “second pillar” of 
the agreement, but in fact it was not, mostly because of the vagueness of the language 
employed in the provisions, which revealed the unpreparedness of the other member states to 
deal in details with the issue of security283.  
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It would perhaps be excessive to assert, as some observers do284, that Finland joined the EU 
for security reasons or that EU membership replaced neutrality as a security policy instrument, 
yet the notion of Western Europe as a security community, built on reciprocal solidarity 
among the member states, was somewhat present within government circles, if an important 
document in 1995 went as far as stating that “Union membership will help Finland to repel 
any military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure”285. The European Union 
was thus seen as a shield, capable of enhancing national security. 
One of the most challenging tasks for the government at this point was to formulate a line of 
defense and security policy capable of suiting the European context. Quite disparate opinions 
were expressed on this point, insomuch as at least five distinct positions have been pointed out 
by the commentators286. The two mainstreams oriented the debate around the alternative 
between the pursuit of an Atlantic or a European integrated defense system: the Atlanticist 
school of thought, still concerned with Russia, emphasized the traditional links between 
Europe and the United States and, accordingly, supports the option of joining the existing 
western security community – NATO – for attaining protection from the traditional eastern 
threat; the Continental school instead, representing a younger generation, is aware of the fact 
that the European Union is gradually assuming a security political profile and thus stresses the 
importance of Finnish participation in the making of this inner security structure. A third trend 
has emerged recently, opposing any active participation in a military alliance, stressing liberal 
issues such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of worldwide development. 
The policy of neutrality was starting to be increasingly seen as an obstacle that stood in the 
way of membership, as it could rise suspects in the other member states about Finland’s will 
to act by common consent with the general interests of the European Union. Therefore, the 
traditional definition of Finland’s international status was officially renounced shortly after the 
admission and replaced in official statements with the concepts of being “militarily non-
allied” and having an “independent defense”. In short, these expressions outlined a more 
pragmatic interpretation of the desire, capable of being compatible with European 
membership, not to receive any external security guarantees in the form of an armed coalition; 
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in some key documents287, the formula “under the present/prevailing conditions” was  added 
as well, in order to enhance the flexibility of the concept, by implying that in changed 
conditions, which however are not specified, the policy of non-alliance might undergo some 
degree of reconsideration288. It has been noted that the fact of not being a member of a 
military alliance does not translate into any concrete expression of policy289, so that the core 
of the whole question concerning its compatibility with EU membership is for the time being 
an essentially political one, given that also the contents of the ESDP hold a substantial degree 
of ambiguity. 
As a further confirmation of this new attitude, in his opening statement at the membership 
negotiations in Brussels, the Finnish Foreign Minister highlighted that his government did not 
expect to encounter any problems related to foreign and security policies, because Finland was 
willing to share with the other member states the fundamental values and general goals 
underlying common foreign and defense policies290. Finland, as well as the other two formerly 
neutral countries that joined the European club in 1995 – Sweden and Austria – rather than 
focusing on the purely military side of cooperation, tends to stress the broader concept of 
comprehensive security: this, besides defense in strict terms, also includes multilevel and 
multilateral cooperation in the economic, humanitarian, legal and ecological fields. In this 
perspective, the CFSP appeared in Helsinki not only as a complement to national foreign 
policy, especially as long as the mechanism of decision-making was to remain 
intergovernmental, but also as an additional forum in which to promote the achievement of 
peace, justice and solidarity in the international system291.  
Despite the optimistic tone of official occasions, the question of compatibility between 
military non-alliance and European membership has not found a definitive answer yet. As 
long as the actual ESDP dimension will not be defined more precisely, enough room for 
compatibility may subsist, but, should the European Union finally decide to expand and 
strengthen a truly common security and defense policy, a whole new set of doubts would 
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arise: if the EU became an actual military alliance, the position of a non-allied country within 
it would be untenable.  
In the first delineations of its approach toward the institutional side of the CFSP, the Finnish 
government stressed the fact that the European Union must be seen first and foremost as an 
association of independent states, this way closing the gate to any form of supranationalism. 
Accordingly, foreign and security policy cooperation was seen in Helsinki as an 
intergovernmental domain, based on the principle of unanimous decision292. The page 
dedicated to presenting the national defense policy to the international audience on the website 
of the Ministry of Defense of Finland provides a rather vague definition, which does not 
address the underlying problems stemming from the country’s original position: “The line of 
action for Finland’s security and defence policy is aimed at safeguarding the country’s 
independence and society’s fundamental democratic values and at promoting the security and 
welfare of all citizens. Finland’s line of action is based on credible national defence, the 
functioning of society and a consistent foreign policy as well as a strong international position 
and an active participation as a member of the European Union”293. 
From a rigorously legal point of view, neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the Amsterdam 
Treaty contained any explicit clause of military assistance in contrast with this Finnish view, 
although allusions to security and defense appeared in different forms. In the Dutch capital, 
more solid ties between the European Union and the Western European Union were called for 
in order to render the EU a more resourceful performer outwardly, but no actual plans were 
laid for incorporating the latter’s assistance clause (Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty) within the 
Union’s system. Joint actions and common positions can only be agreed on by the 
achievement of unanimous consent, leaving each country free to opt-out of any military 
operation, thanks to the possibility of resorting to so-called “constructive abstention”294. For 
Finland this was an essential condition, given the desire that the interests of all member states 
would be taken equitably into account in developing the CFSP.  
Under these conditions, being militarily non-allied did not imply any major restriction to the 
practical participation of Finland in the common foreign policies of the EU, especially as this 
special position was coupled with the establishment of an appropriate western-compatible 
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national defense force295. In effect, coordination of positions in various fields has proven to be 
rather successful, especially within the frame of multilateral conferences or international 
organizations, such as the United Nations or the OSCE. Furthermore, remaining outside 
military structures turned out to be a valuable token to be capitalized in humanitarian help, 
political mediation, economic intervention and other non-military bridge-building and peace-
promoting activities for the settlement of conflicts in areas of European interest296, without 
having to deal with the obvious restrictions imposed by NATO membership. 
On the contrary, the Western European Union (WEU), which, notwithstanding its dormant 
character, is a formal military alliance connected to NATO, clearly could not fit into this 
picture. Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, EU and WEU were actually linked 
together, so that upon becoming a member of the former, Finland had no other viable option 
but to assume the status of observer in the latter in February 1995. The compatibility between 
this partial approach to a military alliance and the particular orientation of Finland is even 
more controversial than that with the ESDP, yet participation in the WEU network was judged 
not only possible by the government, given the practical swerve existing between the WEU 
and a full-scale military alliance297, but also positive as it provided one more opportunity to 
dynamically participate in European cooperation by being present when the key decisions 
were taken298. Such interpretation stemmed from the specific Finnish understanding of the 
WEU, seen mostly as an organization charged with the task of implementing crisis 
management or peace-keeping measures within the framework and under the supervision of 
the European Union’s political organs.  
The acceptance of this view on behalf of the other member states in Amsterdam meant a 
double success for Finnish policy-makers299, who in 1996 had presented a joint proposal with 
Sweden for an alternative to the EU-WEU merger: firstly, the right to fully take part in crisis 
management despite being militarily non-allied was upheld; secondly, the ties forged between 
the EU and the WEU were limited to the field of crisis management and peace-making, 
without extending to the more sensitive area of defense and security policy in strict terms. 
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However, when confronted with some of the most recent informal developments in the 
security dimension of the European Union, an evident sign of the concrete pressure toward 
harmonization and convergence in such policy areas, the Finnish ideal of remaining militarily 
non-allied is more and more often challenged with practical matters. The evident inadequacy 
in managing international crises, in comparison with NATO’s effective operational capability, 
make the implementation of a common defense system as well as a less restrictive decision-
making mechanism fundamental, in order to translate Europe’s economic and cultural 
potential into political weight; however, proceeding in this direction would indeed mark the 
impossibility for Finland to keep pursuing a road that would lead nowhere, being 
fundamentally incompatible with the principle of an integrated defense300. 
According to the official declaration issued at the end of the Cologne European Council in 
June 1999, the objective of the member states was to “develop an effective EU-led crisis 
management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-aligned members, of the 
EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations”301. The necessity of 
constructing a European force to promote international peace and stability – the Petersberg 
tasks – was recognized, but at the same time this formulation, even more than the ambiguous 
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, safeguarded the right to full Finnish participation in the 
broad field of European defense, by letting each country free to decide whether or not to 
employ its armed forces in the context of ESDP operations.  
The EU commitment to crisis management is shared by most in Helsinki, so that consistent 
support in terms of men has been given to plenty of operations, such as the Police Mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Proxima police operation in FYROM and the Concordia 
military operation in the same country. A clear line, however, was traced by Finnish domestic 
legislation in order to define the domain of such participation: while the possibility to resort to 
the reactive use of defensive force in peace-keeping was widened to match the evolving nature 
of such operations, the first use of offensive force employed in peace-enforcement missions 
was firmly rejected. 
Some months later, during the Helsinki European Council, all the fifteen member states of the 
European Union agreed to set up a Rapid Reaction Force, capable of deploying 60,000 men 
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for emergency interventions in international conflicts. Finland contributed to the RRF with 
2,000 troops, military equipment and expertise302. The Helsinki conference also approved a 
report on civil crisis management project, including humanitarian aid and the monitoring of 
human rights: this was welcomed as an important progress in Finland, where it is believed that 
the EU should concentrate on the whole cycle of conflict, including prevention initiatives, 
operation of military peace-keeping and civilian reconstruction.  
These moderate involvements were acceptable for Finland, which had somehow managed to 
craft a situation in which full EU membership and the status of being militarily non-allied 
overcame their fundamental incompatibility303, allowing the country to remain somewhat 
below the threshold of common defense. As President T. Halonen phrased it in 2000, Finland 
“as a fully-fledged member of the EU, is participating in developing its crisis management 
without being part of a military alliance”304. This way, Finland made a mark on the ESDP and 
managed to prove to the more skeptical member countries that not relying on any military 
alliance does not impair the country’s capacity to play a central role in the development of 
European conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Once again, limited commitments were made without implying any form of involvement in an 
integrated European defense system. When a more demanding commitment to the cause 
appeared in Article 40 of the 2003 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe305, 
however, reactions in Helsinki were rather surprised and preoccupied306.  Finland was ready to 
accept in principle that all member states should be committed to defend each other, as long as 
no binding security guarantees were to be included in the draft. Alongside the other non-
aligned countries – Austria, Ireland and Sweden – Finland tried to push for a less binding 
provision and eventually was able to reach another compromise solution, sponsored by Italy, 
partially safeguarding its desire to preserve a special status (Article 40.2). Moreover, Finland 
only reluctantly resolved to accept the institution of the EU Foreign Minister with such 
extensive authority in determining common foreign and security policies307.  
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The actual Constitutional Treaty however brought forward the ESDP as an area in which a far-
reaching review was demanded in light of the latest international developments – notably, the 
divisions materialized in the European Union regarding the war against terrorism: the joint 
French-German proposal to set up a permanent structured cooperation, including WEU’s 
security guarantees in the final document, was only mildly opposed in Finnish political circles, 
not quite ready to go that far from the general provisions of the draft, but still willing to keep 
the pace with Europe. In 2003, the election of a strongly pro-European government eventually 
led, in the name of foreign policy pragmatism, to the unreserved acceptance of the ESDP 
evolution, expressed in the 2004 White Paper on security and defense308. The condition of 
being militarily non-allied is no longer perceived as an impediment to full ESDP support, but 
certainly the alternative between non-alliance and military commitment is becoming more 
urgent. The rejection of the Constitution project on behalf of The Netherlands and France in 
May-June 2005 and the setback of the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008, however, besides casting 
grave doubts on the future of the Union itself, demonstrated once more that Europe is not yet 
ready to rely merely on its own defense capabilities. 
Having realized this, EU-NATO concurrence has generally been regarded with favor in 
Finland, where the presence of the United States in Europe and the improvement of 
transatlantic relations in security issues are deemed necessary for the increase of overall 
stability and security on the continent: the Finnish Security and Defense Policy report issued 
in 2001 already explicitly looked at closer cooperation between the European Union and the 
Atlantic Alliance, for the enhancement of cooperative crisis management capacity309. This 
statement must not be taken as a definitive abandonment of Finland’s Europeanism, but rather 
as a proof of the country’s preference for multilateral presence in Europe and its flexibility in 
accepting various solutions in the interest of European security.  
Of course, in the light of the latest events, it is not possible to exactly predict what the future 
developments of the European Union in the field of defense and security policy will be, but 
considering that continental integration is often perceived as an ongoing process surrounded 
by “an aura of inevitability”310, steps aimed at reaching further internal cohesion may 
reasonably be expected to overcome political divisions and divergences about the range of 
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common policies. Among these, without any doubts, the strengthening of the highly political 
dimension of defense and security may represent the ultimate landmark of such integration.  
Two alternatives appear: one, a tight defensive structure, would provide the European Union 
with an effective means of action through increasing majority vote and binding decisions; the 
other, a looser type of cooperation based on the possibility of opting-out, would be little more 
than a symbolic gesture, unable to enhance the role of Europe worldwide. In both cases, 
Finland’s capacity to exert some degree of influence on the common security strategies may 
be consistently reduced311. 
So far, Finland has been rather accommodative and flexible in relation to the ESDP, so that its 
distinct approach to the question of European security has not caused any major conflict with 
the other partners and in no circumstances the military development of the EU has been 
slowed down by Finland’s attitude312. On the contrary, the general tendency has been to avoid 
statements of direct incompatibility, highlighting instead the value of the intergovernmental 
approach to European security and the absence of any pressure for change.  
National interest and sovereignty still being powerful guidelines for determining the behavior 
of most European countries, an integrated defense system is far from being actually 
established. The process however has been set in motion and someday will find the fuel to 
proceed forward, most likely when the need of a credible defense architecture will arise in 
time of crisis. The question of how to endorse such a development is thus not yet high on the 
political agenda in Helsinki, but it is likely that sooner or later the issue is going to emerge, in 
the form of a major problem of reciprocal compatibility.  
Will it be possible to refrain from participating to some aspects of the future European defense 
structure, while other countries move forward? How far will it be possible to stretch the notion 
of military non-alliance? An answer is not yet available. For Finland, as well as for the other 
non-allied countries in the EU, the crucial present-day issue is the extent of their capacity to 
influence the direction in which the ESDP is developing. 
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6.3 THE INITIATIVE FOR A NORTHERN DIMENSION 
 
Even within the framework of the European Union, Finland has not abandoned its role of a 
bridge-builder between the West and the East, which however had to be fundamentally 
readjusted to match the unconventional challenges posed by the post-Cold War era. All of a 
sudden, opportunities inconceivable until a few years earlier became available; the end of 
global confrontation no longer required striving to obtain a limited space of maneuver for the 
promotion of détente and friendlier relations between the two giants; after a long forced 
absence; a plurality of countries re-emerged on the stage of Europe; the conception of a new 
integrated system of governance became priority to facilitate the course of everyday contacts. 
The implementation of comprehensive security can be best noted in Northern Europe, a trans-
regional area in which military confrontation was soon replaced by a broader set of political, 
economic, environmental and legal issues that could only be properly addressed through a 
responsible, multilateral and multidimensional approach. Finland, due to its geographical 
position and historical heritage, was the most natural candidate to encourage the advancement 
of cross-border dialogue between the main actors involved in the area: the European Union, 
the Russian Federation, the Baltic nations and the other Scandinavian countries.  
The concept of a Northern Dimension within the European Union was launched by Finland in 
September 1997, during a conference whose purpose was to identify the multitude of actors 
involved in northern affairs. During his speech, Prime Minister P. Lipponen argued in favor of 
translating the vital interests shared by Northern countries into an official policy of the EU313. 
The idea of a Northern Dimension itself was not original, as the term had previously been on 
and off the political debate, giving rise to different interpretations and expectations according 
to different perspectives. The expression, for example, had also been often utilized by Finnish 
policy-makers before achieving EU membership, to stress the future role of the Scandinavian 
bloc of countries within the integrated Europe and the added value of their contribution in 
terms of welfare and social policies, even though in practice a Northern Dimension of this 
kind was never pursued314. 
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The extent of Finnish initiative of 1997 was instead rather innovative, resembling that of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched two years earlier. Geographically, the area of 
reference was extremely diversified, stretching from Iceland to Russia, including Great 
Britain, the four Scandinavian countries, the three Baltic republics, Poland and even the 
United States and Canada. The main focus was however devoted to the border area between 
the European Union – and Finland in particular – and Russia, whose North-Western regions 
were still perceived in Helsinki as a grave threat, not so much in strict military terms, but 
rather in relation to broader issues, such as environmental standards, nuclear safety and 
migration dynamics. As the project evolved, in fact, the Russian dimension was given 
increasing emphasis: as early as October 1998, in another speech in Rovaniemi, Ahtisaari, 
stressed that relations with Russia constituted the most important part of the Northern 
Dimension315. Such contacts between the partners are not limited to the governmental level, 
but also include a variety of non-institutional actors316: regional and local authorities, as well 
as non-governmental organizations, academic institutions and business communities, all 
capable of and necessary for establishing a vital environment of cross-border cooperation. 
The proposal of implementing new forms of dialogue in this area between the European 
Union and its neighbors, which immediately gathered cross-party consensus, fully revealed 
Finland’s main intention: to deal with the most complex regional questions under the umbrella 
of European governance network, rather than alone. It is not a chance, however, that from the 
very beginning the traditional military security dimension was omitted from the Northern 
Dimension, judged an ill-suited sector in which to pursue cooperation. 
From a Finnish perspective, at least two major geopolitical factors contributed to molding the 
idea of a Northern Dimension317. Firstly, Northern Europe was deeply affected by the collapse 
of the Cold War security configuration known as the Nordic Balance, occurred along with that 
of the Soviet Union itself: confronted with an entirely innovative and potentially unstable 
situation, Finland sought to maximize its defensive capacity by crafting a whole new balance, 
capable of granting peace and stability to the region. Secondly, standing on the world’s 
deepest socio-economic rift318, that between the victorious wealthy Europe and the defeated 
                                                            
315 AHTISAARI [Oct. 5th 1998]; 
316 STÅLVANT [2001], pp. 23-24; 
317 ARTER [Dec. 2000], pp. 680-682; 
318 NYBERG [Aug. 19th 1999], p. 2; 
 
 
109
poor former Soviet countries, Finland was willing to enhance its comprehensive security level 
by relieving the tensions connected to the perception of this chasm. Consistently with its post-
Cold War strategic doctrine, crucial importance was attached by Finland to the 
multidimensional and cooperative approach, rather than to security in strict military terms, in 
developing the Northern Dimension: its premise was that European security could no longer 
be guaranteed through traditional means, but that it was vital to stabilize the social, economic 
and political situation on the continent through measures of transnational collaboration.    
Neither financial contributions nor the creation of new institutions were mentioned in 
Lipponen’s speech, although the actual viability of this offer for stability and security free of 
charge – an offer that nobody could possibly decline – was discredited by the economists319. 
Yet the initial reaction to the Finnish initiative was rather critical, as most EU members did 
not feel any urge to develop a Northern Dimension policy or to intensify contacts with 
Russia320: within the Union there was skepticism coming mainly from some of the southern 
countries, such as Spain and Italy; the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries reacted rather 
coldly to the initiative, seen in competition with the already existing agencies for cooperation 
(especially the Council of the Baltic Sea States)321; France voiced its unease concerning the 
inclusion of the United States. Some support was instead shown by the European Parliament 
and Germany, which welcomed the project as a way to integrate the Baltic States into the EU 
without alienating Russia; also Norway, Great Britain, Luxembourg and Portugal regarded the 
Finnish initiative with some interest. In Russia the main focus was rather on the building of 
the security architecture in Europe, so that officially the idea of a Northern Dimension was 
dismissed as secondary, although clear informal signs of appreciation were shown. 
The role of the Commission was indeed decisive for the success of the plan and its eventual 
inclusion in the domain of European policies, despite some degree of adjustment322: even 
though initially dubious about the inclusion of non-EU states, J. Santer was aware of the high 
degree of expertise that Finland could provide on Russian, Baltic and northern affairs as well 
as on environmental policy, to the advantage of the whole European Union and at no 
additional cost. The inclusion of the Baltic nations in the EU, the advancement of Russian 
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integration into the process of European cooperation, the eastward extension of the zone of 
stability and welfare as well as the further development of the whole Northern European area 
were indeed fundamental aims that the Commission could not afford to overleap. The Finnish 
proposal was thus seen as a major contribution to the overall development of the European 
Union: a great number of observers have in fact pointed to Finland’s ability to “denationalize” 
the Northern Dimension, that is, to present its own national interest as a common benefit, as 
the most relevant argument to explain its eventual success323.  
The Vienna European Council of 1998 approved the interim report presented by the 
Commission, in which the original guidelines of the project were accepted and the 
geographical focus of the Northern Dimension was reduced from the global to the regional 
level with the exclusion of the United States and Canada324. Some have noted325 that Vienna 
marked only an illusory success for Finland, because the means by which the goals had to be 
addressed were loosely defined, so that the whole concept of Northern Dimension was 
somewhat debased by the lack of concrete proposals. Finnish European presidency in 1999 
was no occasion for further progress either: international events such as the struggles in 
Kosovo and Chechnya diverted Europe’s attention elsewhere and strained EU-Russia 
relations, contributing to the unsuccessful outcome of the highly-expected Helsinki Foreign 
Ministers’ conference on the Northern Dimension scheduled for November326.         
After some setbacks, an important objective was reached at the Feira European Council on 
June 2000, where an Action Plan for the establishing of the Northern Dimension was finally 
approved. Though it did not fully clarify the practical way in which the proposal was to be 
translated from theory into practice, the document asserted both the centrality of Northern 
Europe for the EU and the notion of positive interdependence between the EU members and 
their partner countries, in order to preserve “security, stability, democratic reforms and 
sustainable development”327 in the whole northern area. These were also the main goals of the 
original Finnish proposal of 1997, whose political relevance had dramatically grown in light 
of the most recent challenges posed by international developments. The connection between 
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multilevel cross-border coordination and comprehensive security thus replaced hardcore 
confrontation, emerging as the background of future EU-Baltic-Russian relations. 
The imminent accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to the European Union in 
2004 was ripe of implications for the region: it of course increased the impact of the Northern 
Dimension itself both on the EU institutional framework, which was now to count eight 
members directly involved in the project, and on its relations with Russia, about to become an 
even closer neighbor of Europe. A second Action Plan was issued in 2003, aimed at 
reinforcing complementarity, subsidiarity and synergy among all the members, in view of the 
European Union’s enlargement328. 
Finland set the strengthening of this cooperative policy as one key objective of its EU 
Presidency in 2006, which was fully achieved with the renewal of the Northern Dimension at 
the Helsinki summit on November 24th, when leaders of the EU, Iceland, Norway and the 
Russian Federation replaced the vague and outdated Action Plans with the Policy Framework 
Document and the Political Declaration, two basic documents charged with guiding the 
activities of the Northern Dimension from now on. The purpose of such renewal was to 
revitalize the policy itself and emphasize the dedication of all the partners involved. The most 
significant change to the original proposal, contained in the jointly negotiated documents, was 
the evolution of the notion of the Northern Dimension into a genuinely common policy 
involving the EU and its most proximate North-Eastern neighbors. 
Since 2007, a permanent, high-profile and structured Northern Dimension Policy was actually 
implemented by the European Union, aimed, in the words of the statement issued by the 
Parliamentary Conference on the Northern Dimension held on March 1st 2007, “at providing a 
common framework for the promotion of dialogue and concrete cooperation, strengthening 
stability, well-being and intensified economic cooperation, promotion of economic integration 
and competitiveness and sustainable development in Northern Europe”329. After having gained 
such widespread recognition, the common project is thus moving to an advanced level for the 
discussion on practical means of realizing its full potential: the First International Northern 
Dimension Forum, held in St. Petersburg on May 13th-14th 2008, is the proof that, after all, 
peaceful change is possible. 
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6.4 THE NATO DILEMMA 
 
The Washington Treaty which established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed 
on April 4th 1949. Its purpose was to deter a Soviet military attack in Western Europe and to 
defend the continent from a Soviet attack, should deterrence fail. Originally, when the alliance 
came into existence, the necessity to maintain friendly and trust-based relations with the 
Soviet Union, as well as the wish to commit to a credible policy of neutrality, were the two 
main factors preventing Finland from joining either of the two opposing military structures – 
NATO itself and the Warsaw Pact. As the international scenario slowly developed, Finnish 
orientation toward the process of Western European integration became clearer and smoother, 
eventually leading to European Union membership in 1995. This also implied a sudden 
approach to the idea of an integrated defense system in Europe, whose current expression was 
NATO. 
Since the end of the Cold War, EU-NATO relations evolved in accordance with Europe’s 
changed strategic landscape: new, ever-broadening security challenges have replaced outdated 
East-West tensions, drawing the attention on regional conflicts on Europe’s borders and 
beyond. As such, security came to be defined in a more comprehensive way: the main 
question was no longer how to avoid being drawn into a nuclear war between the 
superpowers, but by which means to face present-day cross-border threats, such as 
environmental hazards, international drugs traffic and crime, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, social and economic turmoil and, above all, regional instability. The Balkan War, 
fought between 1993 and 1997, in fact, proved that neither pursuing a policy of strict 
neutrality nor relying on a legal clause of military assistance could be any useful in providing 
help in the face of a crisis330. Constant global interaction created the need for governance 
systems operating on the global scale: unavoidably, the whole security architecture of post-
Cold War Europe had to be redesigned.  
Although the threat NATO was created to meet has disappeared, the alliance had developed 
assets and institutional practices which proved to be cost-effective in dealing with the new 
tasks posed by the emerging unstable security environment331. At the American-Russian 
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Helsinki meeting in March 1997, an important step was taken in this direction. The role of 
NATO was re-defined by the two presidents as the cornerstone to “build an undivided, 
democratic and peaceful Europe for the first time in history”, of which Russia was to become 
a respected partner “in making the future for all of Europe peaceful and secure”332: the 
alliance’s new aspiration became that of preserving order and stability in Europe through 
focused multilateral interventions. In this perspective, expanding NATO eastward and treating 
Russia as a partner could be reconciled in the name of a common interest, as proven by the 
decision, taken some months later in Madrid, to begin membership negotiations with Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, which eventually obtained membership in 1999. 
The reassessment of NATO’s international role proceeded in parallel with the rethinking of 
Finland’s defense and security policy. The more flexible interpretation given since the early 
1990s to the old notion of neutrality, now limited to non-participation in military alliances, 
allowed Finnish political leadership to assume an enthusiastic attitude in regard to the 
economic, political and even non-binding joint military development of the common policies, 
but NATO kept to be perceived by most as a distinct entity, whose task stretched far beyond 
Finland’s willingness to undertake certain kinds of obligations. A deeper NATO commitment 
to UN and OSCE crisis management operations, however, encouraged even the most skeptical 
countries to become more participative within the framework of the “New NATO”, especially 
since this kind of cooperation implied neither any form of automatic military assistance, nor 
any advancement toward an integrated defense system based on the principle of 
supranationality. 
The so-called “NATO option” first emerged for political discussion in 1995, articulated into a 
variety of positions, but none of the parties represented in the Eduskunta approved any quest 
for membership in the alliance at that time. This aversion was probably influenced to a great 
extent by the mainstream orientation of the public opinion, which was in favor of remaining 
outside military alliances (in late 1999, more than 60% of respondents in a poll were contrary 
to NATO membership)333. Therefore, an official examination of the pros and cons of joining 
NATO was regarded as unnecessary, although some sporadic research projects regarding the 
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subject have been informally carried out334. It is not possible of course to evaluate the 
alternative in terms of black and white, because either choice, joining or remaining outside, 
would imply advantages as well as disadvantages for Finland, which need to be carefully 
weighed before reaching any sort of conclusive answer. 
The main arguments that have contributed to negatively orient the debate stressed the 
perception, supported by the majority of the political spectrum, that NATO membership could 
not represent a viable option, either because it would be interpreted in Russia as an 
unacceptable provocation, or because it was seen as the road toward American-style 
militarization and conflict involvement, rather than an instrument for lessening international 
tensions335; others stressed that NATO membership would be far too expensive and would 
result in an impoverishment of the resources devoted to national defense, forcing Finland to 
depend on the highly unreliable promise of Western assistance336. All these theses could be 
rebutted, for example by observing that historically Finland’s orientation never had any major 
influence on Russia, or that NATO mechanisms are based on the principle of unanimity 
among all the participants, or even that contacts with Russia would not be more problematic 
from within NATO than they already are from within the European Union, nevertheless the 
significance of these arguments and their impact on Finnish public can not be ignored.    
Membership advocates instead tended to highlight the positive impact that taking part in the 
NATO would have on national defensive capabilities and the importance of being present at 
the tables where all the crucial decisions are taken, for obtaining a central political role in the 
shaping of a fully functional Western security system; according to this argument, NATO 
membership would allow Finland to take part in the inner security core of Western Europe, 
enhancing its capacity of managing regional crises337 and also gaining a significant degree of 
protection from possible Russian influence. The debate between NATO enthusiasts and 
skeptics over the issue of membership has been going on and off base for over fifteen years in 
the country and the basic arguments are still there, but no definitive conclusion has ever been 
reached. In practice however, the international developments caused Finland to gradually shift 
toward the alliance, without actually seeking its membership. 
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Initially, Finland kept relying only on its own credible armed force, based on conscription and 
mobilization of a massive trained reserve (up to 430,000 men could be called to arms for 
territorial defense in the event of a conflict), on the acquisition and maintenance of modern 
equipment and on the maximization of flexibility and territorial resources before 
outnumbering enemies338. Although not seeking to become a formal member of the 
organization and regardless of a certain degree of criticism and indecision, however, this self-
reliant doctrine was partially revised in recent years: Finland implemented limited forms of 
cooperation with NATO, which in practice drew the non-allied country very close to the 
alliance, through participation in its cooperative security organs339. All these activities and 
commitments were not only perceived as wholly compatible with Finnish security policy of 
non-alliance, but also seen as unrelated to future NATO membership. The objective that was 
considered most important in Helsinki’s view was not whether to actually join the 
organization or to remain outside it, but rather the attainment of a natural partnership 
stemming from shared values and common interests. 
From a wide-ranging political point of view, as early as June 1992, the country became an 
observer in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), whose main task was to 
establish tighter relations between NATO members and the Central and Eastern European 
non-member countries; the institution was later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC); in 1994 Finland also joined the Partnership for Peace program, launched on 
that same year with the purpose of building trust between NATO members, European non-
members and former Soviet Union countries: in its Presentation Document, Finland motivated 
its posture within the organization as aimed “to expand and intensify political and military 
cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build stronger 
relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic 
principles”340; in 1997, the first Finnish ambassador was accredited to NATO and a certain 
interest was expressed in sending forces to work in the Combined Joined Task Forces (CJTF) 
headquarters. A clear continuity between the objectives of Finnish Cold War and post-Cold 
War security policy can thus be identified in the wish to craft a secure environment through 
multilevel interventions in various fields of human activity. 
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From a decidedly military point of view, joining the Partnership for Peace included 
participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and was aimed at enhancing, 
through intensive exchange of information, the interoperability capacities among the member 
states’ armed forces – defined as shared systems of command, control and communication – in 
view of future NATO membership; moreover, Finland took part in several U.N.-mandated 
NATO-led crisis management operations, such as the Implementation Force (IFOR), the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the Balkans341. Concerning the 
alliance’s operations outside Europe, the Finnish government believes that NATO’s global 
role may be strengthened if it assumes responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction tasks 
not only in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq342. The increasing support of international crisis 
management operations within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, coupled with the 
gradual restructuring of Finnish armed force which has recently been undertaken343 (the 
replacement of outdated Cold War gear began in 1994 with the purchase of F-18 fighter 
aircrafts and translated into a substantial increase of military expenditure), marked the 
enhanced flexibility of military non-alliance and at the same time proved to be a factor of 
stability in Northern Europe and in the Baltic Sea region344. 
According to President Ahtisaari, “by being fully integrated into the European Union but 
remaining militarily non-allied, we contribute to a controlled process of change with 
maximum stability in the northern part of our continent”345. The reference to the position of 
the newly independent Baltic countries is evident: by not seeking NATO membership, Finland 
sought to prevent Russia from impeding their accession to the West. With the end of the Cold 
War, in fact, the artificially constructed political and ideological boundaries in the Baltic Sea 
region collapsed, allowing economic relations to flourish again and providing the ideal 
conditions for a cooperative security policy discourse346.  
Common intergovernmental institutions were established to jointly discuss and manage an 
ample spectrum of security-related issues: the Council of the Baltic Sea States was one of the 
first and most successful initiatives in response to the radical geopolitical changes that were 
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taking place in the region. Established in March 1992, the organism provides a flexible forum 
for regional cooperation in political, economic and cultural matters. The simultaneous 
admission to NATO (March 2004) and to the European Union (May 2004) of the three Baltic 
republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania marked the beginning of a new era of cooperation 
among all the countries in the Baltic Sea region and was warmly welcomed in Finland347. 
During the past decade, extensive military cooperation has also developed in the region, under 
Finnish and Swedish guidance, due to the former Soviet republics’ desire to secure themselves 
within a Western European framework from any possible revival of Russian expansionist 
ambitions348: Finland, mainly focusing on Estonia, provided military experts for the training 
of local troops and donated a large amount of military equipment.     
By virtue of this behavior, even if legally not a member, Finland became de facto a 
representative of NATO’s political and military strategy in the Nordic-Baltic region: as one of 
the most fervent supporters of joining the alliance has observed349, this meant, in practice, 
giving up the possible benefits of non-alliance in the face of a crisis, without in return being a 
part of the security guarantees of Article 5. In the event of tense or even hostile relations 
between Russia and the West, Finland could not distance itself from the confrontation and at 
the same time could not count on the deterrent effect of being part of a mutually defensive 
alliance. According to this view, official membership at this point is not much more than a 
formality, whose carrying out would at least counterweigh the risks of commitment.  
So far, such voices went unheard and the country continues to remain outside the boundaries 
of NATO. This imperfect approach resulted from the realistic consideration that no security 
deficit was pointed out as a consequence of non-attaining membership in the integrated 
structure, as long as no imminent menace was impending upon the region; in the words of the 
1997 Security Report, “Finland is not the focus of any military threats for which security 
guarantees provided by a military alliance could be considered necessary for their prevention 
or repulsion”350. On the contrary, joining the alliance would imply the risk of jeopardizing the 
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completion of Russian transition toward democracy, a factor which kept the United States 
from applying pressure on Finland at the Madrid summit on NATO enlargement351.  
While there is still, at least for the time being, no urge to seek NATO membership, the 
possibility of a future approach has never been discarded by the policy-makers in Helsinki, 
who keep regarding it as a viable option in case of adverse changes in the country’s 
environment: the same 1997 document goes as far as stating that “if the security constellation 
in Europe changes essentially, Finland will assess its security situation and arrangements in 
the light of these developments”352. The main concern for the near future is without any doubt 
represented by Russia, a great power which is undergoing an internal process of 
transformation whose final outcome is still unpredictable (will it be an implosion or 
revival?353), but has already had detrimental effects on its relations with Western Europe and 
might eventually result in a spill-over political and economic instability. Still in 2004, 
however, the Finnish security report, despite the recognition of the increasingly challenging 
character of the international scenario, did not contain any fundamental reassessment of this 
strategic doctrine354. 
Supervising Russia’s smooth transition to democracy is the key task of the “New NATO”. The 
notion of “balance of powers” between Russia and the West was profoundly redefined at the 
end of the Cold War, but it did not disappear: NATO’s eastern enlargement in 2004 can also 
be seen, from this perspective, as an adjustment to the existing balance. Overall European 
security, however, can not be achieved simply through adaptation: there is a marked need for a 
mutually satisfying arrangement, capable of including Russia as a full participant355 in the 
process of crafting a new world order based on interactive governance. Some limited progress 
toward this goal was reached on May 27th 1997 with the signing of the Founding Act, a 
document concerning NATO-Russian relations, which also established the Permanent Joint 
Council, charged with the task of broadening mutual dialogue. The importance of Finland’s 
position in this area emerges particularly in relation to the task of facilitating a more dynamic 
Russian understanding of the alliance, no longer constructed for direct confrontation, but 
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rather evolved into an instrument to achieve a deeper degree of cooperation in the face of the 
common security problems that are emerging worldwide.  
This strategy reached two high points. In 1997, Finland’s effort was decisive in arranging the 
meeting between B. Clinton and B. Yeltsin in Helsinki, an occasion in which the tensions 
connected to Russian vigorous opposition to NATO were in part alleviated. In 1999 an even 
more significant accomplishment was the successful mediation carried out by President 
Ahtisaari himself, in the capacity of U.N. Special Envoy, during the conflict in Kosovo: his 
diplomatic efforts to bring the Kosovo confrontation to an end once again healed a serious 
break between Russia and the West, originated after the Kremlin had announced its intention 
to resort to its veto right in the Security Council, to prevent the use of force against Serbia, 
and the West, regardless of the lack of U.N. mandate, had nevertheless launched Operation 
Allied Force; by managing to bring Russia into the mediation process for the solution to the 
crisis and avoiding its exclusion from the political security process in Europe, Ahtisaari 
helped restoring the vital relationship between EU-NATO on one side and Russia on the other, 
an element of major strategic importance for Europe. 
Another episode which helped improving NATO-Russian relations, this time independently 
from Finland’s position, was the terrorist attack perpetrated on September 11th 2001 against 
the United States. Those tragic events, in fact, strengthened the conviction that, in the post-
Cold War context, common security interests concern the West as vividly as the East. The 
“war on terror” became a key area of cooperation, marking an increasing Russian involvement 
in NATO’s strategies and structures: the NATO-Russia Council, which replaced the PJC in 
May 2002, operates on the principle of consensus and works on the basis of continuous 
political dialogue on anti-terrorist activities, with particular regard to the early identification of 
emerging problems, the determination of common approaches and the conduct of joint 
operations356.  
Russia’s orientation is indeed another key element that must be taken into consideration when 
assessing Finland’s NATO option: how could the recent rapprochement between Russia and 
NATO influence the views of the policy-makers in Helsinki? According to those who seek to 
orientate the country towards the Atlantic, in the current scenario Finnish membership in the 
organization could turn out to be a valuable instrument to enhance cooperation between 
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Russia and the West, whose neighborly relations are often endangered by different security 
perceptions. It would certainly be in Finland’s interest, it is argued, to promote the 
development of institutionalized cooperation and dialogue between its two major neighbors357, 
whose harmonious coexistence would both serve its own security interests by reducing the 
degree of unpredictability in the whole region358 and fulfill a vital precondition for overall 
stability in Europe. Due to its posture of non-alliance and to the historical heritage of bridge-
building, in effect, Helsinki maintained several preferential contact channels with both the 
East and the West available and thus appears as the perfect candidate for advancing Russian 
integration into Western institutions through NATO membership.  
On the contrary, at it is often pointed out by NATO critics, Finland’s capacity to exert such an 
influence might not derive, if not to a lesser extent, from the fact of being a NATO member 
country itself, but rather from the opposite condition, that of a dynamic and well-integrated 
actor within the European Union, not burdened by any sort of military obligation359: it is not a 
coincidence that Ahtisaari’s mediation was carried out under the insignia of the United 
Nations. Accordingly, in light of the unchanged aversion perceptible in Moscow toward the 
alliance360, joining NATO would only provoke harsh critical reactions from Russia, 
potentially endangering the very foundations of the special relationship between the two 
countries as well. The consistency of such assertions is rather questionable, especially when 
considering that, being contacts between Russia and NATO unavoidable in practice, Finland 
could be regarded as a skillful mediator, capable of exerting, in the long term, a decisive 
influence in order to bring the former adversaries closer to each other. As it was in the case of 
EU membership, therefore, further integration in the West could prove to have a positive 
effect on Finnish-Russian confidence-building process. 
A further step toward military integration was taken in March 2008, just before the Bucharest 
summit, when Finland announced its intention to join the NATO Response Force (NRF), a 
multinational force package whose task is to rapidly intervene for collective defense or crisis 
management. Through this move does not equate full membership, it can be regarded as a 
major shift away from non-alliance. The new Finnish administration has since the beginning 
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revived the debate over NATO, showing that the country is ready to consider the membership 
option as a realistic one, especially in the light of the European Union’s manifest incapacity to 
organize its own integrated defense system. 
The whole debate concerning the impact of the NATO option in relation to Russia was of 
course profoundly affected by the August 2008 military crisis involving the Georgian regions 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which again brought forward the risk of a conflict on the 
border of Europe and put EU-Russian relations at a crossroad. Finland had, for quite a long 
time, been aware of the possible re-emergence of Russia as a militaristic and expansionist 
power: the possibility was already foreseen by the 2004 Security Report, whose words sound 
almost prophetic today: “during the last few years, Russia has again become an active 
international actor, which asserts itself more strongly than before as a major power and an 
equal partner of other big countries. The primary aim of present-day Russia is to expand its 
influence in the CIS region”361.  
Even though the likelihood of a military confrontation in the near future is very low, 
containing Russian ambitions materializes again as a priority on the agenda of Europe and the 
importance of the task of mediating between competing interests is likely to grow in the near 
future. Two major elements deserve consideration in the present circumstances: the first is that 
Russia demonstrated to the whole world that it has not yet accepted to renounce the use of 
force as an instrument of foreign policy; the second is that the U.N. Security Council, 
paralyzed by internal disagreements, has once again proven its powerlessness in the face of 
emergency situations.  
According to some representatives of the Finnish government, above all the Foreign Minister 
A. Stubb362, these facts call for a reorganization of the Finnish foreign and security policy 
agenda: since the notion of military non-alliance had the sole effect of excluding Finland from 
playing a role in the crisis mediation effort in Georgia other than obtaining a fragile cease-fire 
under the insignia of OSCE, the development of a less restrictive approach seems much-
needed, as well as the overall periodical reassessment of the NATO membership issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of this study, it is opportune to conclude with some remarks aimed at summarizing 
the “state of the art” as of today. Several systemic changes occurred over the centuries, re-
shaping the very foundations of the security environment in Europe as well as in the 
Scandinavian-Baltic region: nevertheless, in a way that ironically resembles its most ancient 
past, Finland still finds itself on the border between two opposing civilization, whose clash 
might once again endanger the independence, or in the worst case the survival, of the country. 
The awareness of the existence of this incumbent threat, due to geographical as well as 
strategic conditions, is the one key element which oriented the security strategy of Finland 
since the origins and it is likely to continue doing so in the years to come. 
Time after time, temporarily satisfying solutions were found to deal with this fundamental 
security dilemma, each of which contributed to alleviate the most immediate concerns, but 
none of which outlived the collapse of the system of international relations they were designed 
for. In the current phase of post-Cold War transition and instability, the readjustment of 
Finnish security thinking has not yet come to a completion, albeit it is increasingly probable 
that in the foreseeable future it will find a viable solution to the Europeanist-Atlanticist 
alternative. The maintenance of a line of non-alliance appears in fact as the least convenient 
option in terms of security assets, especially considering the degree of bellicosity which 
affects today’s international system. The pace and timing of this change will widely depend on 
Europe’s capacity to restore its credibility and on the direction Russia will take in developing 
its society. 
This brings us back to the opening question of this research paper: why should anyone be 
interested in Finnish security thinking and defense policy? After all, these far-reaching 
considerations seem to demonstrate that Finland’s security orientation is more than anything 
decided by external events, outside its domain of control. Having investigated the various 
phases of its history and having presented its present-day position in security affairs, a more 
elaborate answer may be attempted, since such a precipitate conclusion would be in many 
ways misleading, completely overlooking the most peculiar feature of Finnish contribution to 
the establishment of a European security architecture: that is, tailoring its own space of 
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maneuver and preserving its capacity to counter-influence the surrounding environment, 
despite the limitations imposed and the pressure exerted by uncontrollable global dynamics. 
Indeed, Finland has much to teach, both to historians of the European integration process and 
to peace studies researchers. I wish I have been able to demonstrate that by influencing the 
Swedish monarch, by gaining a certain autonomy within the Russian Empire, by mitigating its 
alliance with Nazi Germany, by preserving its independence and trade connections from 
within the sphere of Soviet influence, by promoting détente through peace-making and 
initiatives for disarmament, by always supporting Scandinavian cooperation and by stressing 
the importance of comprehensive security within the United Nations and the European Union, 
Finland not only has managed to survive in a world of bigger powers, but can be also taken as 
a reference model when it comes to original adaptation to change and total commitment to the 
cause of peace.   
The main purpose of this research is to provide those readers not particularly acquainted with 
Finnish security background with some basic material for further reasoning. Besides the 
analysis of Finland security policies in different contexts, however, this journey through the 
country’s history was also undertaken in the attempt to illustrate the consistency and 
usefulness of two general paradigms underlying the theory and practice of security policy, by 
applying them to the specific case of Finland. The implicit assumption that is possible to read 
between the lines of this paper is that the same paradigms may be successfully availed in other 
case studies and lead to similar conclusions.  
The first demonstrates how the security perception of a country is profoundly influenced by its 
overall historical experience and the particular perspective deriving from it, which transcend 
contingent political situations and orientate its fundamental choices. More than any other 
factor, a country’s history shapes its people and the way the think about the surrounding 
environment; accordingly, a line of continuity can be detected in Finland’s international 
attitude, originating from the sufferance derived from having become the battlefield between 
Swedish and Russian interests, passing through the fruitless quest for alliances and the raising 
consciousness of the need for neutrality, up to today’s skepticism toward any military 
commitment capable of involving the country in a conflict between Europe and Russia.  
The second reveals how even a relatively small country can have a major impact on the 
security landscape of the European Union, not only by providing the community with an 
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added value of regional expertise and cross-border contacts, but especially by offering a third, 
more flexible and probably also more practicable way to the traditional alternative between a 
defense system still based on national sovereignty, characterized by intergovernmental 
cooperation, and a really integrated defense structure, based on the principle of 
supranationality; a country like Finland is the unequivocal demonstration that security can be 
achieved also through an original approach, reliant on the capacity to nurture and foster 
constructive dialogue through practical initiatives for the attainment of a stable governance 
system, without resorting to the use of force. 
The future of Europe is questioned by complex domestic and international challenges, which 
require everybody’s involvement to be addressed in a suitable manner, before risking to reach 
a point of no return. The future development in the field of defense and security is one of the 
most controversial issues the citizens and their leaders will have to face, but it is not the only 
one. Finland’s voice will be just one of the many forces that will craft the continent’s political 
identity of tomorrow; perhaps it will not even be among the most influential ones, but 
certainly drawing a lesson from its experience might prove beneficial for looking with 
renewed confidence at the ideal of perpetual peace in Europe.     
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